India-China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond
17 Mar, 2009 · 2832
Report of Book Discussion held at the IIC Annexe in collaboration with the Center for Policy Alternatives on 4 March 2009
Report of the Discussion of the book India-China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond by Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh
Chair: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
Speakers: Mr. Mohan Guruswamy, Director, Center for Policy Alternatives
Prof. Mira Sinha Bhhattacharjea, Emeritus Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies
Amb. Lalit Mansingh, Former Foreign Secretary of India
Lt. Gen. VR Raghavan, Advisor, Delhi Policy Group
Mohan Guruswamy
Lalit Mansingh
However, the book seems to neglect several important aspects of the topic under research. One major aspect which has not been approached by the present book concerns the future of India-China relations. Following the title ‘Border issues and beyond’ the present book focuses mainly on the ‘border’ aspect of this relationship, but if fails to provide an analysis of the ‘beyond’ aspects mentioned in the title. A pertinent prognosis of future developments on this issue is not to be found. A second aspect missing from the present book is an analysis of China’s growing military power in Asia and its aggressive diplomacy towards India. In particular, its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean area has been a matter of primary concern for the strategic community in India. A further aspect missing is the intensifying China-Pakistan military relations, especially China’s nuclear assistance and the transfer of nuclear missile technology to Pakistan. Therefore, China’s pursuit of security policies, which are adverse to India’s national interest, requires a more thorough examination.
Another point, which should not be overlooked, deals with the question of whether China is opposing India’s peaceful economic growth. The Chinese ‘veto’ against India’s membership of the East Asia Summit provides a clear example of such an approach. Finally, the Tibet issue and its impact on India-China relations lack a comprehensive approach. The question of whether Nehru compromised the future strategic interests of India in the region, by signing the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 should represent the starting point for such an analysis.
India and China have a long history of friendship. Therefore, the widespread belief among Indian public opinion that China is a predestined competitor for India, is rooted in several aspects, mainly concerning misperception and the difficult access of public opinion to information. The first aspect leading to an uninformed Indian public opinion vis-à-vis China is due to the lack of Indian archival material on China and Tibet, combined with the government’s secrecy in this regard toward India’s public at large. Moreover, the difficult assessment of Chinese written documents due to the language obstacle has also been an inductive factor for uninformed Indian public opinion.
A second argument which has generated the above-mentioned belief among the Indian public, deals with the Cold War-induced ideological hostility toward undemocratic countries like China. Finally, there seems to be a major problem in reading the history of India-China relations. From the perspective of relative political and economic power, the India of 1947 cannot be compared with the British India just before Independence. As a much weaker political and economical actor, the India of 1947 inherited no borders, but rather the problems on the border which followed the retreat of Britain from the region. Thus, the border conflict with China and its invasion of Tibet in 1950 contradicted the widespread foreign policy belief suggesting the necessity of creating buffer states between major powers. Moreover, it inaugurated a new era in India-China relations, which has nothing to do with the past relationship between the two countries.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s political position was that the McMahon Line was India’s non-negotiable border with China, nowadays. If there is one problem which could obstruct the strategic relations between India and China, then it is this legality question of the McMahon Line. Furthermore, future research dealing with this issue should locate the territorial controversy and India’s relations with China in a much larger frame than the bilateral one and to focus on its implications on the regional and the international system.
VR Raghavan
The book clearly details a well-known event in a nuanced way. It contains a new perspective and its value lies in the way it has made the past relevant to the present in language that all can understand. It asks us to consider the larger geopolitical implications of wars and the importance of border disputes in inter-state relations. From a military perspective the book raises questions about the utility of wars and whether it is really a viable option, and whether they actually provide leverage in power politics? If not then is war a demonstration or a barometer of national sentiment? Today’s strategists are battling with the question of what war can achieve.
The Chinese have more to lose than to gain from war with India due to the evolution of the Indian army and current political circumstances. War would ruin the carefully constructed Chinese edifice of ‘peaceful rise,’ would not initiate a positive change in the boundary dispute and would necessitate a US presence in the region for the coming decades. India’s best option is not to compete militarily with China but rather to continue building its defence capacity in order to increase the cost of war for the Chinese, both in political and geopolitical terms.
There are domestic factors involved for both countries that also make war between them unlikely. There are serious debates in both countries between the governments and the militaries over the right course of action to take. In India, a national consensus is needed on how to best respond to China and there should be an agreement on what the ‘bottom line’ is. There must also be policy continuity regardless of which party is in control at the time. All parties must be willing to negotiate from a shared position over what the bottom line is and all the major parties should be stakeholders in the perceived outcome.
Concluding remarks by authors
Chair: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
Speakers: Mr. Mohan Guruswamy, Director, Center for Policy Alternatives
Prof. Mira Sinha Bhhattacharjea, Emeritus Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies
Amb. Lalit Mansingh, Former Foreign Secretary of India
Lt. Gen. VR Raghavan, Advisor, Delhi Policy Group
Mohan Guruswamy
The objective of the book is to provide an assessment of the Tibetan issue that has historically complicated India-China relations and de-link it from the historical baggage by applying contemporary conflict resolution perspectives. Based on a number of visits across various sectors in the India-China border, wide ranging discussions both in India and China at high levels, the book aims to put forth both the Indian and the Chinese perspectives on the issue and in doing so, seeks to contribute towards better understanding amongst the policymakers on both sides.
Lalit Mansingh
There are three main strengths of the present book that need to be noted. The first one resides in its brief and precise narrative style as well as the clear logical structure of the argumentation. The second is represented by its balanced approach of both perspectives of the conflicting parties. By means of an objective approach the present volume presents the realities as they are, and does not create a case for or against anything. Finally, it points to the future and ends on a note of optimism, which is very important for the future of India-China strategic relations.
However, the book seems to neglect several important aspects of the topic under research. One major aspect which has not been approached by the present book concerns the future of India-China relations. Following the title ‘Border issues and beyond’ the present book focuses mainly on the ‘border’ aspect of this relationship, but if fails to provide an analysis of the ‘beyond’ aspects mentioned in the title. A pertinent prognosis of future developments on this issue is not to be found. A second aspect missing from the present book is an analysis of China’s growing military power in Asia and its aggressive diplomacy towards India. In particular, its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean area has been a matter of primary concern for the strategic community in India. A further aspect missing is the intensifying China-Pakistan military relations, especially China’s nuclear assistance and the transfer of nuclear missile technology to Pakistan. Therefore, China’s pursuit of security policies, which are adverse to India’s national interest, requires a more thorough examination.
Another point, which should not be overlooked, deals with the question of whether China is opposing India’s peaceful economic growth. The Chinese ‘veto’ against India’s membership of the East Asia Summit provides a clear example of such an approach. Finally, the Tibet issue and its impact on India-China relations lack a comprehensive approach. The question of whether Nehru compromised the future strategic interests of India in the region, by signing the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 should represent the starting point for such an analysis.
Therefore, a second volume of this book should more comprehensively approach these controversial points.
Mira Sinha Bhhattacharjea
The present volume is a competent documentation of India-China strategic relations. By means of a broader analytical focus, beyond the small and rather manageable bilateral disputes, it pays special attention to the impact of this relationship on the global economic and political structure.
India and China have a long history of friendship. Therefore, the widespread belief among Indian public opinion that China is a predestined competitor for India, is rooted in several aspects, mainly concerning misperception and the difficult access of public opinion to information. The first aspect leading to an uninformed Indian public opinion vis-à-vis China is due to the lack of Indian archival material on China and Tibet, combined with the government’s secrecy in this regard toward India’s public at large. Moreover, the difficult assessment of Chinese written documents due to the language obstacle has also been an inductive factor for uninformed Indian public opinion.
A second argument which has generated the above-mentioned belief among the Indian public, deals with the Cold War-induced ideological hostility toward undemocratic countries like China. Finally, there seems to be a major problem in reading the history of India-China relations. From the perspective of relative political and economic power, the India of 1947 cannot be compared with the British India just before Independence. As a much weaker political and economical actor, the India of 1947 inherited no borders, but rather the problems on the border which followed the retreat of Britain from the region. Thus, the border conflict with China and its invasion of Tibet in 1950 contradicted the widespread foreign policy belief suggesting the necessity of creating buffer states between major powers. Moreover, it inaugurated a new era in India-China relations, which has nothing to do with the past relationship between the two countries.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s political position was that the McMahon Line was India’s non-negotiable border with China, nowadays. If there is one problem which could obstruct the strategic relations between India and China, then it is this legality question of the McMahon Line. Furthermore, future research dealing with this issue should locate the territorial controversy and India’s relations with China in a much larger frame than the bilateral one and to focus on its implications on the regional and the international system.
VR Raghavan
The book clearly details a well-known event in a nuanced way. It contains a new perspective and its value lies in the way it has made the past relevant to the present in language that all can understand. It asks us to consider the larger geopolitical implications of wars and the importance of border disputes in inter-state relations. From a military perspective the book raises questions about the utility of wars and whether it is really a viable option, and whether they actually provide leverage in power politics? If not then is war a demonstration or a barometer of national sentiment? Today’s strategists are battling with the question of what war can achieve.
The Chinese have more to lose than to gain from war with India due to the evolution of the Indian army and current political circumstances. War would ruin the carefully constructed Chinese edifice of ‘peaceful rise,’ would not initiate a positive change in the boundary dispute and would necessitate a US presence in the region for the coming decades. India’s best option is not to compete militarily with China but rather to continue building its defence capacity in order to increase the cost of war for the Chinese, both in political and geopolitical terms.
There are domestic factors involved for both countries that also make war between them unlikely. There are serious debates in both countries between the governments and the militaries over the right course of action to take. In India, a national consensus is needed on how to best respond to China and there should be an agreement on what the ‘bottom line’ is. There must also be policy continuity regardless of which party is in control at the time. All parties must be willing to negotiate from a shared position over what the bottom line is and all the major parties should be stakeholders in the perceived outcome.
It should be noted that in the joint statement issued on 14 January 2008 on the recent talks between Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart, the boundary dispute is addressed in only one paragraph. Either they are shying away from it or they want to put it on the backburner hoping that one day it will be resolved. Regardless, the fear that everything that is happening over the border will lead to war, is an overstated one. India should be realistic and should create conditions which make it more difficult for the Chinese to consider war as an option.
DISCUSSION
Questions/Comments
• Does the idea of looking ‘beyond’ include the chance of Chinese cooperation with the West or the subcontinent over the issue of Afghanistan?
• Given the historical prevalence of war, does there remain a possibility of conflict, despite all the ‘logical’ arguments against it?
• Why should China and India push continually to resolve the border issue?
• There is a lack of trust in India today that is detrimental to a resolution of the dispute with China and this needs to be overcome. China knows what type of settlement India wants. It has India on the back foot and compels it to continually seek Chinese goodwill. China is modernizing its military more rapidly than India, which has a reasonably static military budget. The gap between the two countries is increasing and if this continues China may attempt to force a resolution in the future, given its military superiority.
• There are two ways of looking at the border dispute, and about India’s relationship with China: episodically or as a continuum. By using the continuum method one is able to see patterns, and this is therefore, more effective. The types of policies formulated are directly related to which perspective one takes in considering the border dispute.
• The younger generations that have inherited this dispute do not want war and are more likely to seek a non-military resolution to the dispute.
Responses
• There is no possibility of conflict because it would not serve any purpose. Countries need to have an end-goal when they go to war. In the past China has fought, for example, in Vietnam to ‘teach a lesson’ yet there is no valid reason for it to go to war with India. It is unlikely that Indian policies will be inflammatory enough to provoke China. It is more likely that China wants India as a partner in Asia.
• The Chinese work at two levels. The first is strategic; it sees India and China as two rising powers and focuses on stability and cooperation. The second is operational and tactical in which China ‘keeps the fires burning’. The skill comes in navigating between these two policy levels.
• China has a long history of statehood and a respect for borders and state frontiers. It has used its borders to define itself and to construct its identity. There is an appreciation in China that firm borders are a necessary ingredient of modern statehood and security. In reality, there is a tacit acceptance of the reality on the border and it is only the specific details that need to be settled. The role of geopolitics and historical context in this dispute also needs to be considered. A greater understanding of the dispute comes with a greater understanding of its history as well as with an improved understanding of Chinese thinking, which young Indian scholars are increasingly analyzing. It is possible to continue positive interaction with China whilst not letting the territorial issue affect the wider relationship.
Concluding remarks by authors
More work might be done on the wider geopolitical variables, for example a more detailed analysis might be included of the Southern Eurasia region. This book was purely bilateral and as such did not delve more deeply into the wider regional implications of the border dispute. The goal of the book was limited to the education of policymakers and its language and structure reflects this goal.
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