Is China becoming Blue Water Navy?
27 Feb, 2009 · 2820
Hayoun Ryou examines recent developments in the PLA Navy
China’s long-standing land-based survival strategy is likely to become history soon. The Chinese Navy’s decision to send warships to the Somalia coast last month, soon after UN Resolution 1851 on 16 December 2008, coincided with its first public confirmation, on 24 December 2008, that it was “seriously considering” building an aircraft carrier. These announcements reflect the Asian giant’s growing interest in the maritime domain. Despite a coastline stretching approximately 14,500km in length, China has traditionally focused on inland security.
China has been preparing to build an aircraft carrier for a long time now. Therefore, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua’s comment in November 2008, stating that “the world should not be surprised if China builds an aircraft carrier,” followed quickly by its first public confirmation of its maritime intentions is not very surprising news for Western observers. The world is merely alarmed by the fact that ‘the time’ for China to become a maritime power and to exert its global influence in the high seas is ‘now.’
In a free world, every country has the right to develop and possess an aircraft carrier, unlike the contentious issue of possessing a nuclear weapon. Even as the world is keenly watching China and the steps it is taking towards acquiring an aircraft carrier, it will not be the sole Asian country to possess one. Both India and Thailand have aircraft carriers and thus, China would be the third country in Asia, and the last country among the UN Security Council’s permanent members to own an aircraft carrier. The reason why China’s procession of an aircraft carrier is of keen interest to the world stems from its potential to create a new maritime geostrategic balance of power leading to fresh anxieties in Asia. China is the only Asian country in UNSC and the third largest economy of the world, and exercises huge influence both within the continent and globally.
China’s recognition of its need to have a far-reaching maritime sphere stems from its decision to protect its interests as well as its desire to seek great power status. For Beijing, protecting the sea line of communication (SLOC) is essential as China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer and the third-largest importer. In 2008, eight Chinese owned or operated vessels came under attack by pirates off the coast of Somalia. Between December 2008 and January about 20 per cent of the 1,265 Chinese vessels that use this vital shipping route - at an average of three to four vessels a day - came under attack. Chinese domestic sentiments regarding the issue of its maritime security rose sharply and a majority voiced that China must protect its national interest. Moreover, while safeguarding its energy route, China can also achieve its other strategic goal, namely that of breaking through what it perceives as an encirclement of China.
The latest news related to China’s design of processing an aircraft carrier was published in a Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, on 31 December 2008 which states precisely that plans are to possess two aircraft carriers, each with a capacity of 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes. These will be tasked with patrolling the South China Sea, where China has territorial disputes with other Asian countries. The act of sending warships to the Somalian coast might imply future potential Chinese postures in other vital regions like the Straits of Malacca. The significance of the Malacca Straits can be understood from the fact that 40 percent of Chinese oil is imported and 80 percent of these imports come through this route. On 24 November 2008, People’s Daily, said that it was the mandate of China to protect its vital SLOCs, including areas in the South China Sea, and raised the question of whether or not China needed to have a presence in the Straits of Malacca. If China is to build an aircraft carrier, as is predicted for the near future, China can no longer elude the suspicious eyes of other Asian countries and will have to clarify its motivation through confidence-building measures in established frameworks like the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Some Asian countries have already started responding to China’s new maritime goals. In December 2008, littoral states in the Straits of Malacca pledged to increase security cooperation and expand joint patrols on their borders in the Straits and also signed an agreement to allow limited use of each other’s air space without prior diplomatic permission. It is the first time that an agreement of this kind has come into being. It now depends on China whether these counter-responses keep growing or are maintained at status quo.
China has been preparing to build an aircraft carrier for a long time now. Therefore, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua’s comment in November 2008, stating that “the world should not be surprised if China builds an aircraft carrier,” followed quickly by its first public confirmation of its maritime intentions is not very surprising news for Western observers. The world is merely alarmed by the fact that ‘the time’ for China to become a maritime power and to exert its global influence in the high seas is ‘now.’
In a free world, every country has the right to develop and possess an aircraft carrier, unlike the contentious issue of possessing a nuclear weapon. Even as the world is keenly watching China and the steps it is taking towards acquiring an aircraft carrier, it will not be the sole Asian country to possess one. Both India and Thailand have aircraft carriers and thus, China would be the third country in Asia, and the last country among the UN Security Council’s permanent members to own an aircraft carrier. The reason why China’s procession of an aircraft carrier is of keen interest to the world stems from its potential to create a new maritime geostrategic balance of power leading to fresh anxieties in Asia. China is the only Asian country in UNSC and the third largest economy of the world, and exercises huge influence both within the continent and globally.
China’s recognition of its need to have a far-reaching maritime sphere stems from its decision to protect its interests as well as its desire to seek great power status. For Beijing, protecting the sea line of communication (SLOC) is essential as China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer and the third-largest importer. In 2008, eight Chinese owned or operated vessels came under attack by pirates off the coast of Somalia. Between December 2008 and January about 20 per cent of the 1,265 Chinese vessels that use this vital shipping route - at an average of three to four vessels a day - came under attack. Chinese domestic sentiments regarding the issue of its maritime security rose sharply and a majority voiced that China must protect its national interest. Moreover, while safeguarding its energy route, China can also achieve its other strategic goal, namely that of breaking through what it perceives as an encirclement of China.
The latest news related to China’s design of processing an aircraft carrier was published in a Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, on 31 December 2008 which states precisely that plans are to possess two aircraft carriers, each with a capacity of 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes. These will be tasked with patrolling the South China Sea, where China has territorial disputes with other Asian countries. The act of sending warships to the Somalian coast might imply future potential Chinese postures in other vital regions like the Straits of Malacca. The significance of the Malacca Straits can be understood from the fact that 40 percent of Chinese oil is imported and 80 percent of these imports come through this route. On 24 November 2008, People’s Daily, said that it was the mandate of China to protect its vital SLOCs, including areas in the South China Sea, and raised the question of whether or not China needed to have a presence in the Straits of Malacca. If China is to build an aircraft carrier, as is predicted for the near future, China can no longer elude the suspicious eyes of other Asian countries and will have to clarify its motivation through confidence-building measures in established frameworks like the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Some Asian countries have already started responding to China’s new maritime goals. In December 2008, littoral states in the Straits of Malacca pledged to increase security cooperation and expand joint patrols on their borders in the Straits and also signed an agreement to allow limited use of each other’s air space without prior diplomatic permission. It is the first time that an agreement of this kind has come into being. It now depends on China whether these counter-responses keep growing or are maintained at status quo.
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