Post-Mumbai: The Great Game Continues
12 Feb, 2009 · 2807
Vinod Anand advises New Delhi not to have too much expectations of American policy in the region
The “Grand Bargain” propounded by Barnett Rubin and Rashid Ahmed in the in the Foreign Affairs issue of November/December 2008 is meant to resolve the situation in Afghanistan by involving the key South Asian stakeholders to cooperate and with the US functioning as the honest broker. It hopes, ambitiously, to bring stability into Afghanistan by linking it with Pakistan and Kashmir and then addressing this issue, but has a distorted vision of the problem.
As the Mumbai massacre and events leading to it have revealed this formulation is likely to flounder due to the differing perceptions of the stakeholders and the ossified thinking and ideology of PakistMan’s military establishment. The Mumbai terror attacks were engineered by Pakistan when the civilian government had become more assertive in seeking its legitimate role in the affairs of the state. Attempting to wrest control of the Pakistan’s infamous Inter-Service Intelligence agency from the military was one such act, but it ended in failure. The Pakistan military could not lose an institution which it has used for decades as its instrument for manipulating internal and external policies.
One of the intended or unintended consequences of the Mumbai attacks has been to highlight the domineering influence of Pakistan’s military within the country, which undermines the authority of the elected democratic government. Another intended or unintended consequence of the attacks was to dash the hopes of ant near-term reconciliation between India and Pakistan. After the February 2008 elections in Pakistan a positive momentum had been gained in the India-Pakistan peace process. A third possible objective was that the post-Mumbai war hysteria created by the Pakistan military would enable it to withdraw from the FATA and NWFP to deploy forces against India. This is being used as a bargaining tool against the United States by Pakistan.
Both the military and jihadis in Pakistan use each other to enhance their strength and pursue their separate agendas. However, with the jihadis becoming increasingly autonomous it is not clear who is driving whose agenda. Pakistan’s military establishment first created an enhanced threat to US forces in Afghanistan by aiding and abetting Taliban and then sought to mitigate that threat by bargaining for military aid which it uses against India. By its soft approach towards a recalcitrant Pakistani military, the US has unwittingly become complicit in an unending drama, which ends up serving the jihadi agenda. With the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US administration has resisted the temptation of linking things up with Kashmir, but that does not mean there has been any change in US perceptions.
The over-dependence of the US on Pakistan’s military to bail it out of the Afghan quagmire has shaped US policies, which have not yielded any positive results in the past seven years of turmoil in Afghanistan. A regional approach to the Afghan conflict has been suggested by Rubin and Ahmed but such efforts have yet to be made. The harsh reality is that a solution to Afghanistan has to be found in Pakistan, and in the Pakistani military establishment. And any other strategy will not work. Propping up the Pakistani state and its military and asking India to make concessions on Kashmir to Pakistan or attempting to preserve balance in South Asia through massive military supplies to Pakistan, and asking India to exercise restraint every time a state-sponsored terror attack takes place only whets the appetite of the Pakistani military junta for more concessions.
The Indian political leadership is disappointed with American polices post the Mumbai attacks. While India was expecting the US to apply pressure on Pakistan to deliver those involved in the Mumbai massacre, the Pakistani generals were remonstrating with the US to be given ‘equal treatment’ vis-à-vis India and for it to apply more pressure on India to concede more on Kashmir. What stands out in crystal clear terms is that the complex power dynamics of the region do not allow a quick solution through simple formulations. The evolving Indo-US relationship has its limitations. It cannot be used by the US to tread on the toes of India nor can it be used by India to resolve the problem on its own terms. Therefore, the stark lesson emerging out of Mumbai is that India has to moderate its expectations from the US and follow a more nuanced foreign policy which has, in recent years, come too close to the US worldview.
As the Mumbai massacre and events leading to it have revealed this formulation is likely to flounder due to the differing perceptions of the stakeholders and the ossified thinking and ideology of PakistMan’s military establishment. The Mumbai terror attacks were engineered by Pakistan when the civilian government had become more assertive in seeking its legitimate role in the affairs of the state. Attempting to wrest control of the Pakistan’s infamous Inter-Service Intelligence agency from the military was one such act, but it ended in failure. The Pakistan military could not lose an institution which it has used for decades as its instrument for manipulating internal and external policies.
One of the intended or unintended consequences of the Mumbai attacks has been to highlight the domineering influence of Pakistan’s military within the country, which undermines the authority of the elected democratic government. Another intended or unintended consequence of the attacks was to dash the hopes of ant near-term reconciliation between India and Pakistan. After the February 2008 elections in Pakistan a positive momentum had been gained in the India-Pakistan peace process. A third possible objective was that the post-Mumbai war hysteria created by the Pakistan military would enable it to withdraw from the FATA and NWFP to deploy forces against India. This is being used as a bargaining tool against the United States by Pakistan.
Both the military and jihadis in Pakistan use each other to enhance their strength and pursue their separate agendas. However, with the jihadis becoming increasingly autonomous it is not clear who is driving whose agenda. Pakistan’s military establishment first created an enhanced threat to US forces in Afghanistan by aiding and abetting Taliban and then sought to mitigate that threat by bargaining for military aid which it uses against India. By its soft approach towards a recalcitrant Pakistani military, the US has unwittingly become complicit in an unending drama, which ends up serving the jihadi agenda. With the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US administration has resisted the temptation of linking things up with Kashmir, but that does not mean there has been any change in US perceptions.
The over-dependence of the US on Pakistan’s military to bail it out of the Afghan quagmire has shaped US policies, which have not yielded any positive results in the past seven years of turmoil in Afghanistan. A regional approach to the Afghan conflict has been suggested by Rubin and Ahmed but such efforts have yet to be made. The harsh reality is that a solution to Afghanistan has to be found in Pakistan, and in the Pakistani military establishment. And any other strategy will not work. Propping up the Pakistani state and its military and asking India to make concessions on Kashmir to Pakistan or attempting to preserve balance in South Asia through massive military supplies to Pakistan, and asking India to exercise restraint every time a state-sponsored terror attack takes place only whets the appetite of the Pakistani military junta for more concessions.
The Indian political leadership is disappointed with American polices post the Mumbai attacks. While India was expecting the US to apply pressure on Pakistan to deliver those involved in the Mumbai massacre, the Pakistani generals were remonstrating with the US to be given ‘equal treatment’ vis-à-vis India and for it to apply more pressure on India to concede more on Kashmir. What stands out in crystal clear terms is that the complex power dynamics of the region do not allow a quick solution through simple formulations. The evolving Indo-US relationship has its limitations. It cannot be used by the US to tread on the toes of India nor can it be used by India to resolve the problem on its own terms. Therefore, the stark lesson emerging out of Mumbai is that India has to moderate its expectations from the US and follow a more nuanced foreign policy which has, in recent years, come too close to the US worldview.
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