Lessons from Lankan Military Successes
09 Feb, 2009 · 2802
Sripathi Narayanan analyzes the reasons for the Lankan military’s recent achievements against the LTTE
On 2 January, Sri Lankan armed forces stormed into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) de-facto capital of Killinochi. This was soon followed by the recapture of another district town, Mullaitivu, in the Tamil-majority Northern Province. According to latest reports the LTTE has under its control only around 250 sq. kms. of territory. Such has been the rapidity with which the armed forces have been advancing in what is being increasingly seen as a one-sided war. This could mark the beginning of the end in the final battle for a separate Tamil Eelam.
The fall of the rebels in the island is not an overnight phenomenon as may like to believe. It was the lessons of past defeats and an overall change in the approach in the functioning of the state apparitions that has resulted in the military victory. This approach began with the transformation of the Lankan military from a ceremony one of 15,000 men at the commencement of the ethnic war to a real fighting force of up to 200,000 battle-hardened soldiers. With a strong political leadership in the form of President Mahindra Rajapaksa gave the state the momentum to fight an all out-war with the militants. . The Government also ensured the continuity in the leadership of the troops by granting service extensions for the army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.
The second factor is a culmination of various incidents that changed political opinion the global community. This process started with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and the 9/11. Both these two events resulted in the Tigers losing support first in the region then in the world. The post 9/11 “war on terror” along with the efforts of the state resulted in the LTTE losing their support base, funding and supplies through the Tamil Diaspora. Apart from this the infighting and splits within the LTTE came as an added boost. .
The success of the government can be attributed to the dismantling of the tripod on which the rebels were standing. This tripod consists of the support of the Tamil-speaking people, organisational strength of the LTTE and outside support from the diasporas. The tripod collapsed due to a few key factors. This first was the loss of public support. This is a result of large scale migration of the masses due to the prolonged war, in search of greener pastures. The second factor the diplomatic pressure mounted by the Sri Lankan government to the LTTE banned in the many countries. This also resulted in these countries aiding the government to curtail the supplies of weapons to the rebels. The last factor was the result of attrition, splits within the LTTE and the superiority of the state forces with respect to numerical strength of men and materials.
As a result of these factors the rebels are on the run with very little room to hide and to fight. However, there are several lessons to be learned in this ethnic war. To fight militancy, the state has to make the war expensive for the militants. This does not refer to the financial position of the belligerents, but to the availability of men and material. It is important to cut of supply lines of weapons and safe houses outside the conflict zone. In such kinds of conflict the state has to ensure that the rebels do not enjoy any outside support and to get that organization banned in as many countries as possible. Thus, the state does not suffer any diplomatic pressures. Military operations also have to be specific with the objective of weakening the rebels before going after them. The last and the most crucial aspect is that the uniformed forces are to have the unquestioned support of the state apparatus.
The ethnic war of the last three decades was a result of poor leadership and bad political judgement on the part of the state added to the indifferent attitude of the military. Added to this was the overwhelming support that the LTTE received from the international community. The ability of the state to overcome these shortcomings is what resulted in the recent military victories.
Nevertheless, the current round of military success is not to be mistaken for the annihilation of the Tamil Tigers, for the LTTE still operates the world’s largest suicide force. To this end one also ought to remember that the Tigers are masters of guerrilla tactics. It was the jungle war that had given them their initial sweet taste of military achievement. Thus, it is now up to the government of Sri Lanka to move ahead and to resolve the ethnic issue. If this does not happen, any future military endeavour could be a different cut of tea, as the Tigers have not been eliminated to the last bullet and man.
The fall of the rebels in the island is not an overnight phenomenon as may like to believe. It was the lessons of past defeats and an overall change in the approach in the functioning of the state apparitions that has resulted in the military victory. This approach began with the transformation of the Lankan military from a ceremony one of 15,000 men at the commencement of the ethnic war to a real fighting force of up to 200,000 battle-hardened soldiers. With a strong political leadership in the form of President Mahindra Rajapaksa gave the state the momentum to fight an all out-war with the militants. . The Government also ensured the continuity in the leadership of the troops by granting service extensions for the army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.
The second factor is a culmination of various incidents that changed political opinion the global community. This process started with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and the 9/11. Both these two events resulted in the Tigers losing support first in the region then in the world. The post 9/11 “war on terror” along with the efforts of the state resulted in the LTTE losing their support base, funding and supplies through the Tamil Diaspora. Apart from this the infighting and splits within the LTTE came as an added boost. .
The success of the government can be attributed to the dismantling of the tripod on which the rebels were standing. This tripod consists of the support of the Tamil-speaking people, organisational strength of the LTTE and outside support from the diasporas. The tripod collapsed due to a few key factors. This first was the loss of public support. This is a result of large scale migration of the masses due to the prolonged war, in search of greener pastures. The second factor the diplomatic pressure mounted by the Sri Lankan government to the LTTE banned in the many countries. This also resulted in these countries aiding the government to curtail the supplies of weapons to the rebels. The last factor was the result of attrition, splits within the LTTE and the superiority of the state forces with respect to numerical strength of men and materials.
As a result of these factors the rebels are on the run with very little room to hide and to fight. However, there are several lessons to be learned in this ethnic war. To fight militancy, the state has to make the war expensive for the militants. This does not refer to the financial position of the belligerents, but to the availability of men and material. It is important to cut of supply lines of weapons and safe houses outside the conflict zone. In such kinds of conflict the state has to ensure that the rebels do not enjoy any outside support and to get that organization banned in as many countries as possible. Thus, the state does not suffer any diplomatic pressures. Military operations also have to be specific with the objective of weakening the rebels before going after them. The last and the most crucial aspect is that the uniformed forces are to have the unquestioned support of the state apparatus.
The ethnic war of the last three decades was a result of poor leadership and bad political judgement on the part of the state added to the indifferent attitude of the military. Added to this was the overwhelming support that the LTTE received from the international community. The ability of the state to overcome these shortcomings is what resulted in the recent military victories.
Nevertheless, the current round of military success is not to be mistaken for the annihilation of the Tamil Tigers, for the LTTE still operates the world’s largest suicide force. To this end one also ought to remember that the Tigers are masters of guerrilla tactics. It was the jungle war that had given them their initial sweet taste of military achievement. Thus, it is now up to the government of Sri Lanka to move ahead and to resolve the ethnic issue. If this does not happen, any future military endeavour could be a different cut of tea, as the Tigers have not been eliminated to the last bullet and man.
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