The West and 26/11: A ‘Contain India’ Policy?
03 Feb, 2009 · 2796
Sanjay Kumar suggests that Western policies post the Mumbai attacks constrain India more than punish Pakistan
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s remarks on 26/11, tracing its roots to the Kashmir issue, indicates that western countries and Britain’s perceptions on terrorism has not changed much since 9/11. This partisan approach to a global problem is perhaps the biggest obstacle to winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT).
Miliband’s remarks on Kashmir, however, underscore Pakistan’s geopolitical significance for the combined long-term strategy of US and UK to contain India. Arguably, Pakistan is geopolitically more significant than India because of its status as a frontline ally in the GWoT, and in providing the logistics base and supply routes to support coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s dependence on these countries for its economic and military sustenance could have been easily exploited. With its ability, however, to influence non-state actors, Pakistan has retained a greater ability than any other country in the region to influence India’s security environment. Pakistan is just as important for the West to contain India as India is important for the West to contain China. A top intelligence-official designate of the Obama Administration recently admitted that managing the growing power and influence of China and India are among the key long-term challenges for American intelligence and policymakers.
The long-term British-American strategic interests (and to a large extent, Chinese interests as well) would be well served if India remains locked in a strategic rivalry with Pakistan. This would also undercut India’s claim for regional power status. Thus, it is difficult to believe that Washington did not know all these years that Pakistan was diverting counter-terrorism funds to buy big-ticket weapons for use against India. Despite its track-record of proliferation of WMDs and terrorism, Pakistan was raised to the status of a major non-NATO ally in 2004. The US also recently announced a plan to increase threefold, its economic assistance for Pakistan, raising the security stakes for India. Clearly, this is evidence that Pakistan is pivotal to the long-term US strategy for containing India.
With the new Obama administration deciding to deduct US$55 million under its reimbursement programme for expenses incurred by Pakistan on the war on terror and making future counter-terrorism aid to Islamabad conditional to its effectively fighting the Taliban, Washington has sent out a clear message to the world that US policy is making a paradigm shift on Pakistan. While this change was long overdue, India should be aware that a dichotomy obtains in the West’s perceptions on terrorism and Pakistan remains an important node for the intense geostrategic rivalry in Asia.
As regards Kashmir, the US would like to gain more concessions from Pakistan by dangling the Kashmir carrot before it. The new US administration’s directive to Richard Holbrooke, the newly appointed special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, is silent on Kashmir, but it does not endorse India’s position on Kashmir either. Making US aid to Pakistan conditional does not extend to stopping its proxy war against India. Understandably, India would have liked the US to do more to contain Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India. There is a gradual acceptance now in the Indian establishment that Pakistan may reject the Indian dossier on terrorism. Even if it did not, Islamabad will do little to punish the masterminds behind the perpetrators of the Mumbai mayhem in their own courts. This hypothesis raises serious doubts about Islamabad’s willingness to close its terror factory, leaving New Delhi with no option but to keep a quick military response ready to meet any such future attack. .
Indian diplomats have begun to reflect a certain despondency; there is a significant toning down of the rhetoric against Pakistan, suggesting that India’s diplomatic manoeuvres against Islamabad have run its full course. A statement, quickly retracted, by the External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, a few days back, reflects this turnaround in the Indian government’s initial stand. Mukherjee reportedly said that, if Pakistan could not hand over the perpetrators to India, the least it could do was to ensure a fair and transparent trial in Pakistan itself.
India’s failure to retaliate against Pakistan in the wake of 26/11 is being perceived as a sign of weakness globally - not commensurate with the image of a country seeking regional superpower status. Repeated terrorist attacks on India do not auger well for its Brand India image. Internally, the massive outpouring of public anger witnessed after 26/11 demonstrates that the Indian masses are in no mood to absorb another attack. The political bosses in New Delhi need to find a quick-fix for a tricky situation before they face the general elections in April this year.
Miliband’s remarks on Kashmir, however, underscore Pakistan’s geopolitical significance for the combined long-term strategy of US and UK to contain India. Arguably, Pakistan is geopolitically more significant than India because of its status as a frontline ally in the GWoT, and in providing the logistics base and supply routes to support coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s dependence on these countries for its economic and military sustenance could have been easily exploited. With its ability, however, to influence non-state actors, Pakistan has retained a greater ability than any other country in the region to influence India’s security environment. Pakistan is just as important for the West to contain India as India is important for the West to contain China. A top intelligence-official designate of the Obama Administration recently admitted that managing the growing power and influence of China and India are among the key long-term challenges for American intelligence and policymakers.
The long-term British-American strategic interests (and to a large extent, Chinese interests as well) would be well served if India remains locked in a strategic rivalry with Pakistan. This would also undercut India’s claim for regional power status. Thus, it is difficult to believe that Washington did not know all these years that Pakistan was diverting counter-terrorism funds to buy big-ticket weapons for use against India. Despite its track-record of proliferation of WMDs and terrorism, Pakistan was raised to the status of a major non-NATO ally in 2004. The US also recently announced a plan to increase threefold, its economic assistance for Pakistan, raising the security stakes for India. Clearly, this is evidence that Pakistan is pivotal to the long-term US strategy for containing India.
With the new Obama administration deciding to deduct US$55 million under its reimbursement programme for expenses incurred by Pakistan on the war on terror and making future counter-terrorism aid to Islamabad conditional to its effectively fighting the Taliban, Washington has sent out a clear message to the world that US policy is making a paradigm shift on Pakistan. While this change was long overdue, India should be aware that a dichotomy obtains in the West’s perceptions on terrorism and Pakistan remains an important node for the intense geostrategic rivalry in Asia.
As regards Kashmir, the US would like to gain more concessions from Pakistan by dangling the Kashmir carrot before it. The new US administration’s directive to Richard Holbrooke, the newly appointed special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, is silent on Kashmir, but it does not endorse India’s position on Kashmir either. Making US aid to Pakistan conditional does not extend to stopping its proxy war against India. Understandably, India would have liked the US to do more to contain Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India. There is a gradual acceptance now in the Indian establishment that Pakistan may reject the Indian dossier on terrorism. Even if it did not, Islamabad will do little to punish the masterminds behind the perpetrators of the Mumbai mayhem in their own courts. This hypothesis raises serious doubts about Islamabad’s willingness to close its terror factory, leaving New Delhi with no option but to keep a quick military response ready to meet any such future attack. .
Indian diplomats have begun to reflect a certain despondency; there is a significant toning down of the rhetoric against Pakistan, suggesting that India’s diplomatic manoeuvres against Islamabad have run its full course. A statement, quickly retracted, by the External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, a few days back, reflects this turnaround in the Indian government’s initial stand. Mukherjee reportedly said that, if Pakistan could not hand over the perpetrators to India, the least it could do was to ensure a fair and transparent trial in Pakistan itself.
India’s failure to retaliate against Pakistan in the wake of 26/11 is being perceived as a sign of weakness globally - not commensurate with the image of a country seeking regional superpower status. Repeated terrorist attacks on India do not auger well for its Brand India image. Internally, the massive outpouring of public anger witnessed after 26/11 demonstrates that the Indian masses are in no mood to absorb another attack. The political bosses in New Delhi need to find a quick-fix for a tricky situation before they face the general elections in April this year.
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
