The Sri Lankan government has never before been in a more undeniably assertive position with regards to the ongoing conflict in the island nation. Following the collapse of the LTTE's administrative capital, Kilinocchi, the Sri Lankan Army has successfully managed to recapture the crucial Elephant Pass, thus securing the entire length of the A-9 highway. A blockade has been set up around Mullaitivu, the Tamil Tigers' last territorial stronghold, and troops have consolidated their grip over recently-captured terrain.

It was against this backdrop to the Sri Lankan war that Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, visited the island country on a long-overdue official trip, to restate India's position of a political solution to the conflict. Menon met with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Rohitha Bogollagama, and in a communique issued later, both agreed that the "present juncture offers a window of opportunity to implement the [Indo-Sri Lanka] Accord, given the decisive victories gained by the government in combating LTTE terror on all fronts." Bogollagama also thanked the Foreign Secretary for India's continued humanitarian assistance for war-affected Sri Lankans, and reemphasized the country's commitment to "evolving a broad based and an inclusive peace process in order to achieve a durable peace, acceptable to all communities living in the island." This would include exploring channels for implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.

India's stance on Sri Lanka's war however, continues to be weak and misguided. While India continues to demand that Tamil aspirations be met only within a unified Sri Lanka, they have been averse to taking a more proactive role. Menon's own visit came only after strong pressure from Tamil Nadu's state government on the centre. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, was meant to have visited in December. However, his trip was canceled at the eleventh hour, and he was duly replaced by Menon, an esteemed official but lower in rank in the Indian political strata.

India's disengaged stance arises out of lessons learned from a previously failed peacekeeping mission. There is a general consensus among diplomatic and intellectual circles here that international solidarity is more important than intervention for the time being. However, by keeping in line with the "War on Terrorism" rhetoric that the Sri Lankan government has been using to legitimize its own actions in the North and East of the island, India has essentially become complicit in renaming a political problem as a terrorist one.

India's perception that implementation of the 13th Amendment and the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord will address Tamil grievances is also flawed. This was made clear in a statement made by R Sampanthan, leader of a delegation from the minority political party, Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which met the Foreign Secretary in Sri Lanka, "We said that there was genocide going on the north. We clearly stated that there was no point in talking about the Indo-Lanka Accord …We also said that there was no point talking about the implementation of the 13th amendment."

The 13th Amendment and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord are not well-accepted among the Sri Lankan Tamils because they give the illusion of addressing objections by minorities but actually only skirt the key issues. Under the provisions of the Amendment and the Accord, although power will be devolved to the provincial level, the central government in Colombo will continue to wield authority over all decision-making processes at the local level. What is more, budgets, policing, and matters related to land disposition will be settled only from the centre. Hence, the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state will be preserved, and provincial ministries will wield absolutely no clout.

India has also made numerous requests for the Sri Lankan government to hand over LTTE leader, Vellupilai Prabhakaran, once he is captured. According to N Manoharan, a senior Indian Sri Lanka analyst, "this is like counting your chickens before the eggs are hatched." The likelihood of catching Prabhakaran alive is highly remote, if at all possible. Should Prabhakaran still be in the northern reaches of Sri Lanka, chances are he will live up to Tiger tradition and commit suicide rather than fall into the hands of the state.

The government's absolute disregard for human rights violations stands out amidst the reckless bloodshed. With the proscription of the LTTE last week, any outline of a ceasefire has simply vanished. President Rajapakse has resorted to the psyche of inflicting irreversible damages in the north, both in terms of loss of civilian lives, and destruction of property and means of livelihood. Such a tactic comes in handy at a time when troop morale might be low - by harping on a victory message, Rajapakse has tried to restore the standing of the army in its own eyes.

What is more, when the cannons fall silent Rajapakse will return to elections, riding high on the wave of mass support from the war victories. Sadly enough, India has stopped short of accusing Rajapakse of deliberately massacring his own people - in its purposeful official silence, the messages that go across to Tamils and other minorities is that India will not seek to ban war, and that civilians lives lost are only a tragedy, not a war crime.