In the year 2008, Sri Lanka was caught-up even more intensely with the ethnic conflict that was building-up since 2006. The year commenced with the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) unilaterally abrogating the ceasefire agreement (CFA) signed on 22 February 2002. By end-2008, the government forces were in a position to capture most of the LTTE-controlled areas except parts of Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu and Jaffna.

Although the end of CFA came in January 2008, the beginning of the end started within two years of signing of the Agreement. Both antagonists indulged in numerous violations resulting in gradual weakening of the spirit of the Agreement. Effectively using free access provided by the CFA, the LTTE hit-squads penetrated government-controlled areas for selective assassinations. On its part, the government, with the help of Tamil paramilitary groups and 'Deep Penetration Units', knocked out some key LTTE leaders. The government was successful in weakening the LTTE by weaning away Karuna, one of the longest serving commanders of the LTTE. At the structural level, the CFA ignored the issue of arms control thereby encouraging both conflicting parties to arm themselves. The Monitoring Mission was not empowered enough to prevent ceasefire violations. Its role was restricted to 'naming and shaming' of the parties rather than to make parties abide by the Agreement. Given the wide mandate of the CFA, powers of SLMM were very limited. In due course, both the GOSL and the LTTE developed serious disagreements on interpreting the CFA. The Agreement, thus, was relegated to exist only on paper.

Both parties, however, were reluctant to call it off fearing international condemnation. Each was waiting for the other to blink. But, the government under Mahinda Rajapakse took the initiative to pull out citing "the agreement has become a dead letter for the government" in the wake of "senseless violence by the LTTE". In reality, the government believed that CFA stood as an obstacle for its formal military thrust against the LTTE. President Rajapakse had also been under tremendous pressure from hard line parties like JVP and JHU ever since he signed MoUs with them during his bid for presidentship in 2005. One of the conditions laid by the two parties for supporting Rajapakse as President was abrogation of CFA. Rajapakse successfully evaded the promise for nearly two years, but could not resisit it any longer.

2008 was a violent year claiming over 10,000 lives and displacing about 200,000 internally. Using three-frontal attack, the government could capture large chunks of territory from the LTTE. 58 Division and Task Force I from west, 57 & 56 Divisions and Task Forces II & III from south, and 59 Division and Task Force IV from Southeast managed to squeeze the Tigers. During the year the Army captured several strategic positions like Adamban, Viduthalaithivu, Illuppaikaduvai, Thunukkai, Nachikuda, Akkarayankulam, Devil's Point, Pooneryn, Nedunkerni, Mankulam and Paranthan from the LTTE. Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) and Navy (SLN) were ably supporting the Army in the advance. Air strikes were used to support the ground troops and as well to destroy LTTE defences and installations. Precision aerial bombings to kill LTTE leaders based on specific intelligence were also SLAF's additional task. Navy was used to mainly cut supply lines of the LTTE and at the same time to weaken the 'Sea Tigers' as much as possible to trim down their capability to launch amphibious operations.

On its part, the LTTE faced severe military reverses. Due to numerical inferiority, the Tigers found difficult to hold back rapidly advancing government forces in the western (Mannar), southern (Vavuniya) and southeastern (Welioya) fronts, but did fairly well in the northern front (along Elephant Pass). This front was vital for the LTTE mainly because of its seriousness in retaining the hard-won Elephant Pass. The "strategic retreat" of the LTTE had been partly to conserve its energy in terms of men and material. The LTTE used 'hit and run' tactics in the east to make its presence felt in the region, but also to keep the security forces occupied. The idea was also to kill "informers" and "traitors". In the south the Tigers used suicide tactics to hit VIPs or innocent civilians to create terror among the people. The LTTE used its air wing to launch sporadic air attacks on vital targets and also to keep alive an element of surprise.

Given this scenario, conflict is expected to continue in 2009 with more intensity. The Army has already captured Kilinochchi, administrative headquarters of the Tigers, and has been proceeding swiftly towards Mullaitivu. The LTTE may shift to guerilla warfare mode to engage numerically superior government forces. At this juncture, the challenge before the GOSL is to consolidate the military gains by offering a credible political package to the Tamil minority. This is going to be more formidable than the military victory against the LTTE.