The year 2009 started off with serial blasts in Assam's capital, Guwahati, following one of its worst terror strikes just two months earlier. The present strike was no less significant and held the attention of the country and the national media for a few days for many reasons. First, it came soon after the Mumbai attacks; second it was on the New Year's Day and third it came hours before the newly-appointed Union Home Minister, P Chidambaram was to arrive in Guwahati a day ahead of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is himself a member of parliamentary from Assam. The national media's attention came instantly; and again to no one's surprise in Northeast India, faded away quickly. The ceremonial blaming of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was done by the security forces and the Assam state government, and all was over. In the process, important questions that need to be probed have been neglected.

First of all, the new spate of terror strikes in Northeast India has to be seen apart from what is happening elsewhere in the country. The general tendency to homogenize the pattern would be misleading and would not help in examining its genesis or devise ways to effectively tackle the growing menace of terror in Northeast India. The recent strikes come in the backdrop of the ouster of Ranjan Daimary from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the formal split of the ULFA, which has over the past year been clearly divided along ideological lines. It also comes at a time when there is a political change in Bangladesh, where Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League has won a clear majority in the recently-concluded parliamentary elections and has pledged that her country would not be used for terrorism against India. There are reports that the camps of various insurgent outfits of Northeast India in Bangladesh are already under pressure to shift location to Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal. This development however, needs to be monitored and the assurance of the newly-elected leader of Bangladesh needs to be tested.

Insurgencies have been raging on in Northeast India for a long time now, and the recent spate of terror strikes are not to be equated with the insurgent ideology at all. The current state of insecurity in Northeast India is of the government's own making. Both the central and the respective state governments are unfortunately only trying to perpetuate this. The increased factionalism in almost all the insurgent groups in Northeast India have not come by their own, instead they are the product of a systematic and conscious policy of the Indian government to 'split and rule,' constantly avoiding a sincere attempt at solving any insurgency politically. Northeast India has been fast turning into a maze of insurgent factions, which is not a positive sign for the future, and nor is the government is fully aware of the implications. There are numerous factions in many states of the Northeast, and the central government and the respective state governments take particular pride in entering into 'ceasefire discussions' with each of them, without solving any with purpose. There are reportedly more insurgent factions than state government departments in Manipur, and the state government is talking to most of them.

These factions provide fertile ground for radical jihadi outfits sponsored by Bangladesh and Pakistan to launch their war on India, as they become easy to infiltrate, given their divisions and want of resources. The insurgent factions have in turn become highly corrupt, an excellent example being the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA faction, which has collaborated with jihadi groups to unleash terror in Assam. The delay by the Indian government in solving the insurgencies politically has led to conditions where these factions have been ideologically and operationally hijacked by jihadi elements, with many more facing a similar future. Arms and drugs trafficking has also been rampant, going practically unchecked in the ensuing mess that the government has created, as most 'ceasefire' factions are making a thriving business out of these. This is adversely affecting the security situation in mainland India.

The presence of a large illegal Bangladeshi migrant population in Assam, presents to the jihadi groups another fertile recruiting ground internally, as the government has consciously chosen to painfully delay the political settlement of this contentious issue. The illegal migrants issue rages on in Assam, and as their political future hangs in the balance, they are easily tempted to join forces with the jihadi groups, which they feel would secure their interests.

It is time the Indian government takes matters seriously and engages the Northeast insurgencies politically and solves them purposively and not play a 'split and rule' game hoping that they would fade away. Vested interests within state governments have played a big role in perpetuating this situation as in the case of the Assam government which has continually undermined the insurgents who have come forward for talks.