Pakistan - A Failing State
26 Oct, 1999 · 277
Dr. Subhash Kapila says no domestic factors seem to emerge that could revive Pakistan on a pathway towards a modern democratic state
State. Political theorists would keep splitting hairs as to what factors really constitute a failing state. Conventional wisdom would have it that a state, which is unable to guard democracy and its political institutions, whose economy has failed; a state that lacks social development and is plagued by sectarian strife, is heading towards a failed state status.
Failure of Democracy and Political Institutions
1. In 52 years of independence, democratically elected governments have been punctuation marks in a long reign of military and autocratic political rule.
2. Pakistan Army has had the longest spell of over 24 years of direct political rule over the country.
Failed Economy
In 52 years of independence, both civil and military rulers of Pakistan have been unable to put Pakistan's economy on a stable footing despite having rich resources of energy and inheriting the best irrigated portions of British India and a small population to sustain.
The economic picture today is dismal with a foreign debt of over $ 30 billion, foreign currency reserves under less than $ 1 billion alongside IMF’s refusal to release $280 million of a $ 1.6 billion aid package.The core reasons for Pakistan's failing economy are its heavy defense expenditure in a bid to reach symmetry with India and rampant corruption of Pakistan's civil and military rulers.
Provincial Divisiveness, Sectarian Strife and Lack of Social Development
The common saying is "
Impediments in Progressing towards a Modern state
Prospects for re-emergence of democracy, sound political institutions and progressive political thought are dim due to the following factors:
1. Pakistan Army will not permit any dilution of its controlling role in
2. Emergence of a sizeable and strong Pakistani middle class seeking political empowerment is unlikely due to limited economic and social mobility.
3.
4. Emergence of a rabble-rousing, rigidly fanatic Islamic fundamentalist core at the lower ends of the social structure would seriously complicate and inhibit
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis suggests that