The recent attack of 26/11 has led to strong reactions all over the world and the reaction within India has been more vigorous as compared to previous terror attacks. The reason for this change is probably because the victims of this particular act belonged to the elites of society.

The media has been giving wide coverage to the terror attacks for the past three weeks The Prime Minister, along with the Ministers for External Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs have reacted in a manner that suggests that if Pakistan fails to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure within its boundaries, then India shall be forced to take a 'hard decision'. The term 'hard decision' has been widely interpreted as India preparing itself for declaring a war on Pakistan. Decisive or indecisive, India will never enter into a war with Pakistan These reactions are due to the unprecedented damage that 26/11 has inflicted and the profile of the victims. Nothing concrete is going to emerge out of all this rhetoric, for reasons as follows:

First, the 13 December 2001 attack on the Parliament and the consequent mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces along the border in December-January, the Kaluchak and Amarnath killings and continued cross-border infiltration despite the then president Musharraf's assurance, also gave rise to varied speculations in India and abroad about India going to war with Pakistan. History bears witness what the successive Indian Governments did after that.
Second, the very objectives of the Indian policy planners are ambiguous and devoid of a clear course of action. There are no defined vital interests or non-vital interests of the country. That much is evident from the inter-party differences regarding the security scenario of the country. They all want to safeguard the sovereignty of the country and ensure security of Indian territory and people, but what constitutes a threat to the security of the country is never explained. Hence, it smacks of rhetoric, based on political motivations. When the army was ordered to march to the border in 2001, there were impending elections in Uttar Pradesh, which would have proved decisive for the fate of the political party desirous of ruling the center. This time, elections were due in five States as also elections to Lok Sabha in mid 2009.

Third, the Indian leadership has hardly ever taken policy decisions, which could amount to aggression in the eyes of the international community, even at the cost of losing territory to their neighbours. They have always shown their impotence so far as taking a decision to launch an attack is concerned. They did not allow the armed forces to cross the Line of Control (LOC) during the Kargil war and kept the war limited within Indian territory, even though that decision eventually led to the death of significant numbers of Indian soldiers.

Fourth, India lacks defence preparedness to wage a war. There was an absence of major acquisitions by different wings of Armed Forces, throughout the nineties. Consequently, the forces were technologically inferior to their adversaries. After its experience of the technological inferiority faced during the Kargil war, India had struck deals for sophisticated armaments to ensure qualitative superiority which is yet to be achieved. An Indian victory of any measure could only be attributed to its numerical superiority in soldiers and weapons.

Fifth, the inordinate delay in weapons procurement and modernization procedures is one of the most common features of Indian defence policy makers. The role of an aircraft carrier is very vital as it provides cover to other ships by dominating the airspace when the combat fleet advances to cut into the maritime sovereignty of an adversary. The Admiral Groshkov, for which India had signed a deal with the Russians, is yet to be inducted into the Indian Navy. The latest Sukhoi aircrafts (SU-30MK-I) have started arriving from Russia but the full squadron is yet to be completed. These aircrafts are supposed to provide technological superiority to the Indian Air Force vis-??-vis the Pakistani Air Force.

Sixth, the assurance about reform and modernization of the Indian police force is not new. It is revived with every such attack, to provide solace to both the police and the people. Rather, the expansion of National Security Guard (NSG) will transform this elite force into just another ilk of Indian police.
Last, but not the, least, nuclear weapons on both sides of the border along with the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, have deterrent effects. The present challenge, therefore, is to immediately engage in a sensible dialogue and political negotiations in order to evolve a constructive solution to the present impasse and reduce the immense expenditures on account of constant high alert. India should not allow an "enormous opportunity" to the US and others to 'create a new balance of power' in the world. India must frame its external policies cautiously, to address the challenges of domestic security.