Report of the IPCS Roundtable held on 4 December 2008

The Mumbai terror attacks were not so much an attack on Mumbai as on the entire country. It was a suicidal attack by trained commandos. The reference of these attacks to 9/11 is misleading for this was a unique terror attack different from what we have seen in the past in India or anywhere else in the world.

Perpetrators of the Attacks

A great deal of confusion surrounds the details of the attacks. For instance, the sole terrorist captured alive claimed that he was educated only up to the fourth grade but it was later revealed that he is fluent in English. When the Pakistani intelligence agencies, accompanied by the international media, investigated the details of the suspect's claimed village of origin, it was proved that his entire story was false. Clearly, the security agencies have to be more circumspect and refrain themselves from making snap judgments.

It seems a nexus between the Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is the most logical explanation for this outrage. This is due to several reasons. One, it is widely known that India is a prine target of the Al Qaeda's Jihad against Crusaders, Jews and Hindus. It is also known that LeT has close links with Al Qaeda. Several of the Al Qaeda camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), FATA region and NWFP are being hosted by LeT. Al Qaeda has also been known to have links with the Jaish-e-Mohammed, LeT's sister organisation. This attack did not resonate with the aim of liberating Kashmir; it seemed part of the global Jihad that Al Qaeda has been waging. Al Qaeda is a franchising organization that provides a platform for other terrorists to mount their attacks and operations.

Karachi has been a favorite site for the terrorists to plan and execute their attacks. 9/11 was planned in Karachi, and so was the 2001 attack on Indian Parliament. The Mumbai attack was also launched from Karachi. Al Qaeda had planned the 9/11 attack, while the 2001 attack was masterminded by the LeT. Clearly both organizations have a presence in the city. Also, hotels have been a favorite target for the Al Qaeda. The attacks on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and Marriot Hotel in Islamabad are recent examples.

This was a fidayeen attack, a trademark of the LeT. It has been used by them since 1995, when Lashkar terrorists took over the Finance Ministry building in Srinagar for three days and fought until death. The general idea of taking over a building and killing as many people as possible is used by the LeT since 1995.

Motivation behind the Attacks

This is not merely a revenge attack. The various possible aims of the terrorists range from increasing hostility between India and Pakistan, ensuring troop withdrawal from Pakistan's western to its eastern borders against India, and weakening the civilian government of President Zardari.

However, there seems to be another aspect to this issue which focuses on the complicity of the Pakistan Army and ISI. It cannot be ruled out that the ISI was involved in the attack but neither can it be confirmed at this early stage. The moot question is whether the Mumbai attack serves either the interests of the ISI or Pakistan Army, since it is clear that this incident will strengthen the ties between India and the US, a prospect which Pakistan clearly does not wish.

Another way of analyzing the attacks is to see how it benefits various actors. It is in the Pakistan Army's interest to create a situation where they have to move from their western to the eastern border to avoid confronting the Taliban and al Qaeda elements. ??The attack on Mumbai would generate enough reasons to justify their doing this. The weapons used by the terrorists have been traced back to Pakistan. Pakistan has the license to produce the Chinese-make weapons. But the most damning evidence is the fact that Pakistan's army began its movement from the western to eastern borders immediately after the news of the attack, ??before any talk of retaliation was voiced by the Indian side. Still the question remains as to whether Pakistan Army was involved? If so, what was the degree of their complicity? It is too early to opine definitely. We shall learn more by seeing how Pakistan cooperates in this matter over the coming weeks.

One has also to look at some aspects that are being missed today. The terrorists obviously had local logistic support. Several eye-witness reports indicate that the terrorists were inside the hotels well before the attack to provide operational support. This is a point that is being missed in the flurry of activities in New Delhi, Mumbai and by the media. What about the locales involved. However, one must refrain from making snap judgments and wait to see how the situation develops.

Intelligence Failure

An underlying feature of the spate of recent blasts across the country has been the failure of the intelligence network to gather timely information and take preventive action. A section of the population has repeatedly criticized intelligence failure by the government and the Mumbai attacks have added weight to their accusations. A more sympathetic view of the intelligence network speaks of the 'unknowable' element in such attacks. According to this view, the warnings issued prior to the Mumbai attacks on the available intelligence were not "actionable" enough to take preventive action. For instance, the intelligence available about the coordinates of the fishing trawler used for infiltration prior to the attacks was dismissed by the Navy as being too vague and general.

In line with the best parliamentary tradition of ensuring political accountability, the Home Minister and the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra have resigned following these attacks. However, it must be noted that accountability does not end at the highest administrative levels. The concerned officials in the Navy, Intelligence Bureau, local police and the National Security Advisor must be brought to account.

Intelligence failure must also include the lack of information about the Lashkar-e-Taiba, an outfit that is constantly expanding its objectives and activities beyond Kashmir. How many officers in the IB understand its changing objectives and the way it functions? How many officers track the website of al Qaeda regularly? There is a sense of complacency that permeates the Indian administration. Despite a series of blasts in Indian cities, security has not been beefed up in major public places like railway stations. Basic measures like creation of a centralized database of suspected terrorists, a witness protection program, upgradation of police stations, among other police reforms are yet to be implemented. This reflects a general apathy in the society at large towards violence in general and the threat of terrorism in particular. Lack of coordination among the various agencies involved is yet another grey area resulting in failure on the ground.

Way Forward - What are the Options before India?

The attacks in Mumbai were unprecedented in their scale and therefore India must respond effectively.

Military option

There are four issues within Pakistan over which its civilian governments, irrespective of who is in power, have no control: the Kashmir issue, India-Pakistan relations, defense budget, and nuclear policy. The army that has used the policy of "bleeding India with a thousand cuts," was never comfortable with the rapprochement between India and Pakistan. On the one hand, the army wants to bring the Kashmir issue back on the agenda, which had receded into the background following 9/11. From this point of view, the army benefits from inimical India-Pakistan relations. At the same time, the Pakistan government has been in a denial mode regarding the terrorist groups operating from its territory and has refused to cooperate with India on ground of insufficient evidence being provided. They have repeatedly asked for more proof from the Indians, setting a trap for them in the process. This is primarily because there are forces opposed to the normalization of relations between the two countries, who cannot be tackled by diplomatic means. The international community will not provide much assistance to solve our problems, and the US has its priorities set and would not like to get involved in the Kashmir issue. One way of judging the US commitment to pressure Pakistan would be to test its willingness to withdraw military and economic aid to Pakistan.

For the above reasons, the diplomatic options must be put on hold, and India must take aggressive action to convey a strong message. Measures like an attack on terrorist camps in PoK, increase in covert operations in Pakistan, engaging it in an arms race to cripple Pakistan economically and mobilizing international support to declare it a rogue or terrorist state need to be seriously explored.

Diplomatic Options

The Mumbai attacks have created a strong wave of sympathy for India in the international community and India can leverage this situation if it plays its cards well. Already, the international community has come down heavily on Pakistan for not doing enough against terrorist groups operating from within its territory. In the days to come, there will be immense pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with India in its investigations, and any reluctance on its part will evoke a strong reaction. While it is believed that the US may go soft on Pakistan because of its reliance on the latter for its war on terror in Afghanistan, the US does not benefit from the current Pakistan situation and should strengthen its efforts to pressure Pakistan into acting. In addition, the wave of anger in Israel following the killing of five Jews, including a rabbi and his wife, would add support to the US pressure on Pakistan. Secondly, there are positive signs emanating from within both Pakistan and India, displaying maturity on both sides. For instance, according to reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan has called for a meeting following the attacks and demanded that action be taken against anyone found guilty in their own territory. This drives home the point that a strong alternative viewpoint does exist in Pakistan, and that the civilian administration is not a powerless body.

The same maturity was visible in the Indian governments' reaction that ruled out the military option outright. Even within army circles and the strategic community, a great deal of skepticism prevails about the military option. A strong reason for this is the nuclear dimension. Two nuclear powers going to war is not in the interests of anyone. Even the concept of limited war, as used during the Kargil conflict, is no longer feasible, because of the nuclear dimension. Therefore, diplomatic options are not as irrelevant, as being urged.

Ultimately, India will need to take action in all spheres - economic, political, social, diplomatic and military - at three levels: preemptive, reactive and offensive. The military option is only available as the last resort for a democracy, and India must use its skills to exercise the diplomatic option to the fullest.