Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 5 November 2008

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta
Speaker: Dr. Rhoderick Chalmers, South Asia Deputy Project director, International Crisis Group

Ashok Mehta

The term "New Nepal" is frequently used to denote the fundamental change that the country has witnessed. For the first time we have seen the ascendance of a radical left-wing guerilla group to power through the ballot. Not only has there been a power shift, what we see instead is a regime change. Also, New Nepal is more inclusive as seen, for instance, in the diverse composition of its constituent assembly including one-third each of women members (the largest in South Asia), Dalits and Madhesis. However, the question that beckons us is whether this 'New Nepal' has the collective political will to realize its vision.

One can also safely say that the peace process was owned by Nepal with minimal outside influence including that of the UN. The biggest threat to the peace process emanates from the ranks of the Maoists themselves as they grapple with an internal power struggle. In fact, the implications of the peace process for India to a large degree hinges on the potential fallout of the internal power struggle. The two parameters that will play a key role in ensuring a successful outcome of the peace process are: the writing of the new constitution and integration of the Maoist forces and the Nepal Army into a single national army.

Rhoderick Chalmers

Given the militarily intense and triangular nature of the conflict in Nepal, it had the potential for getting prolonged but what we see instead is a remarkably successful peace process. Not withstanding its flaws, the peace process has made the ceasefire hold at the military level, while politically, the elections have yielded a more inclusive constituent assembly. What stands out is that we now have a government being led by the rebels and a transition from monarchy to a republic. The world has digested this change with maturity. India, in particular, has wielded influence on certain aspects of the peace process.

It is also important to remember what happened in course of the elections. Maoists were shocked to receive more that 50 per cent of the seats. It also shocked the mainstream political parties such as the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) [UML] both of whom had expected to fill in as the two largest parties with the Maoists finishing a distant third.

Some background becomes essential for it allows us to grasp the complexities of the current security tangle. From the very outset of the peace agreement it was observed by many that some of the time lines set for meeting demands such as return of the land seized by the Maoists during conflict were over ambitious. >From the very start of peace negotiations, the future of the two armies was a key issue. Although there was an understanding on the integration of the two armies reflected, for instance, in two paragraphs of the peace agreement which talk about making the Nepalese army more democratic and inclusive and rehabilitating the Maoist army. However, apart from this, there was nothing written down in black and white on the integration process.

It appears that negotiators and leaders from the interim government led by the Nepali Congress did not want to implement the verbal agreements on army integration based on the calculation that a poor showing in the elections would humiliate the Maoists thus eroding much of their political leverage.

Ironically as the peace process progressed the Nepali army increasingly slipped out of political control. Thus far the Nepali army had been controlled by the royal palace which took a number of critical decisions and thus politicized the armed forces. However, following the king's removal, the palace lost control over the army and the Ministry of Defense in the interim government failed to institute a credible civilian control over the army. Whatever little semblance of control was visible was mostly in the form of one-on-one and often un-minuted meetings.

While at the same time the Maoist army was put into the cantonments, was well paid and used cynically by the Maoists on the eve of the elections to remind the people of their power. The Maoist army with 3000 weapons and 19,000 cadres proved to be a very efficient fighting force. Following the initiation of the peace process their armed force has become far better integrated and structured.

Resistance to the integration process also emanates from quarters within the Nepalese army who argue that recruitment of politically motivated cadres on a mass base could potentially destabilize the only stable institution in the country, thus putting the entire country and the entire political process at severe risk. Also, it is likely that induction of the Maoists into senior levels of the army would trigger off friction in army ranks as it would imply Maoists leapfrogging other senior members in the national army which is against military culture and ethos. Also, if inducted in large numbers it would lead to a politicization of the armed forces. Instead, they hope that the problem could be resolved by training and using putting Maoist cadres in jobs such as guarding vital installations, forests and borders, with a very small number being absorbed into the ranks of the national army. However, it is not just the Maoists but even groups like the Madhesis wish to see a more open, democratic and accountable army which has for long been a monopoly of a few at the exclusion of numerous other ethnic and regional groups.

What makes the task at hand more difficult is the decision of the Nepali Congress to sit in opposition by arguing to the effect that the Maoists have failed to implement earlier political agreements such as return of land seized in course of conflict. If the Nepali Congress is not brought on board, then the political logic for them would be to see the current government fail politically. The Nepali Congress stance has demonstrated how thin the consensus was and that the alliance between the Maoists and the mainstream political parties was based on passing convenience rather than a shared vision for the future.

The UML too hopes to use the outcome of the peace process to clip the wings of the Maoists and steer away from strictly adhering to some of the radical political agreements they signed under duress. The Maoists, on the other hand, hope that the induction of 3000-6000 cadres in the army would give them a sense of moral victory. For, if the integration process is kept in limbo for too long and discontent in the cantonment mounts against the Maoists leadership, there is the danger of Nepal once again drifting towards conflict.

The need today is for building up a National Security Council, strengthening the Ministry of Defense and facilitating a national open debate on the strategic purposes of Nepal's security establishment.

DISCUSSION

Q. What has been the nature of discussions with China?

While Prachanda did pay his first visit to China for the Olympics and defense minister Ram Bahadur Thapa did attend Chinese military exercises, though in the company of counterparts form thirty five other countries. Moreover, these instances do not reflect a gigantic re-orientation of policy. Nepal has always sent officers to China besides the US and Pakistan other than India for training. Prachanda's recent visit to New Delhi demonstrated that his government is aware of the nature of Nepal's relationship with India though they now wish to take a more assertive stance as a sovereign country in foreign policy. Also it is worth noting that the Maoists have moved from a fiercely anti-India rhetoric to engaging with India once in power.

Q. How many officers will be eventually inducted into the Nepali army through the
integration process?

The 146 committee, as it is known, has met only once since its institution, as the Nepali Congress has demanded a re-writing of its terms of references and the inclusion of two of its members in the committee. While there have been no discussions of the committee, there have been informal exchanges between the Nepalese army and PLA representatives. In fact, the two sides have worked successfully on the UN committee overseeing cantonments. The expectation is that once the committee begins to function, the issue will be addressed in the stipulated six month period.

Q. What is the extent of downsizing of the Nepalese army that we could be looking at?

Nepal does not possess the capacity to maintain a vastly inflated security sector. Thus, there is a strong fiscal incentive to downsize the army. However, thus far only the Maoists have lucidly put forth ideas in the public domain on downsizing the strength of the army to 20,000-30,000. But at another level, Maoists have internally been talking of imparting military training to all the adult male population.

Q. Would the present levels of Nepali army contribution stay in the UN peacekeeping missions?

The Maoists have been keen to keep afloat the current levels of Nepal's commitment to UN peacekeeping missions and if possible increase it. This is a good way to earn money for the soldiers and enhance Nepal's international reputation.

Q. What implications can one discern regarding Prachanda's statement on the regulation of borders?

The question of border regulation goes back to the 1950 Treaty which is the basis of the€ porous nature of the Indo-Nepal border. The Maoists through their forty-point demands that were promulgated in 1996 indulged in anti-India rhetoric and saw the border as facilitating Indian expansionism.

Q. Is there a role for the King in Nepal's politics in the future?

The institution of the monarchy was perceived by many to be the glue that held Nepal together as a country, and it is worth noting that Prachanda till as late as 2004 was willing to work with the palace against an 'expansionist' India. The end of monarchy, it was felt, would lead to activation of centrifugal forces and weaken the country. However, in the current political matrix it is difficult to envisage a role for the king given his extremely low level of personal credibility in public eyes although he is still revered as a cultural and religious figure by some sections of Nepalese society.

Q. Does the Nepali Congress have a future at all in Nepalese politics?

The Nepali Congress is in a state of disarray. It is writing itself out of Nepali politics and it is difficult to be able to foresee a Nepali Congress majority government in power in the future. The party has been the architect of its own electoral defeat. There are no political debates within the party nor is there an attempt to reconnect with the voters and neither does the party have anything of substance to say on policy issues.

Q. How far can Nepal's current state be attributed to India?

India's overall role in Nepal can be termed as positive. India took a radical decision to bring the Maoists into the political mainstream and pushed for elections at a time of severe international opposition, especially from the United States which saw everything through a narrow scope of the 'war on terror'. But at the same time India tried to excessively micro-manage the process. Also, on the election front New Delhi got its calculations wrong by hoping that the Nepali Congress and UML would do well. Further, its attempt to roll back the Maoists by attempting to use Madhesi political activism by initiating and backing one Madhesi party backfired as it was routed in the elections.