Seven years have passed since the terror attacks of 9/11 and the launch of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' by the US. However, in spite of efforts on the political, military and economic front, why is Afghanistan tethering on the brink of slipping into anarchy? There are some fundamental problems that plague US policy in Afghanistan. The fall of the Taliban had generated immense euphoria and expectations amongst the Afghans. The first four-odd years that followed the Taliban's ouster witnessed some progress on the economic fronts and women's rights and enrollment in schools exceeded all expectations. However, from mid-2006 storm clouds began to gather over the Afghan horizon as the US had to confront a resurgent Taliban, mounting civilian casualties, increasingly hostile public opinion, rampant corruption in the US-backed Karzai government and record levels of opium production, pegged at a huge 6,100 metric tones, amongst a host of problems.

However, the current turmoil in Afghanistan does not come as a surprise, given the frail foundations on which a new order in Afghanistan was sought to be built upon. To begin with, barring some success in building the Afghan National Army, the US failed to engage in any 'nation-building' activity that could have played a key role in whittling down support for the Taliban. In fact, there was a conscious attempt not to engage in 'nation building,' reflected in the downgrading of the army and civil affairs units of the US army that play a key role in 'nation building' activities. Another crucial empirical indicator of a lack of commitment to 'nation building' is the paltry levels of per capita investment that stood at a mere US$57. This figure appears more dismal when compared to other major areas of US intervention such as US$100 in Bosnia or US$679 in Kosovo. Moreover, even of the aid that did trickle in, some 86 per cent was estimated to be 'phantom aid,' that is, it was spent on goods and services from the US as opposed to being spent on developing indigenous capabilities.

Second, the US-backed Karzai government has failed to provide effective governance to the war-weary Afghan population. US policy failed to effectively build up the capacity of the government, which is afflicted with rampant corruption, particularly in crucial branches like the police and judiciary. The Taliban in contrast, curbed crime and delivered instant (if, brutal) justice through the Sharia courts. The secular courts on the other hand, are disdained, not because of their secular legal character, but because of the endemic corruption that plagues them. A glaring faux pax that further undermined the fragile governance capacity was the US decision to prop up warlords in the countryside - a measure that undermined efforts to disarm and pacify the countryside.

This failure to demonstrate any tangible change on the ground, coupled with mounting civilian casualties (1,500 in 2007), often in NATO-led air strikes, has transformed initial public sympathy for US troops into hostility. The Taliban have shrewdly seized the opportunity to play upon prevailing public sentiment. Taliban resurgence, especially strong in South Afghanistan, would not have been possible without some degree of local support. In his testimony on 11 December 2007, the US Joint Chief of Staff, Michael Mullen, stated that "Taliban support had tripled to about 20 per cent over the past two years." This surge in local support reflects not so much an endorsement of Taliban policies, as it reflects the fatigue with the continuing political, economic and social morass. Such an assessment is attested to by the Human Development Index report for 2007, which ranks Afghanistan 174 out of 178 countries, thus, putting it in the company of some of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

In particular, three other factors have helped fuel the Taliban resurgence. First, the US policy of not applying the Geneva conventions to the alleged Taliban prisoners held at Guantanamo and Bagram has served to inflame passions. Second, there has been a failure to work out modalities for encouraging Taliban fighters to return to the mainstream and also a failure to distinguish between the moderates (with whom a compromise could have possibly been hammered out) and extremists within Taliban ranks. Third, the diversion of technical, human and financial resources to the Iraq war played its part in developing a fertile breeding ground in Pakistan. However, remains particularly intriguing is both the sheer confidence with which the Pakistani establishment lied about its purported links to Taliban and al Qaeda and the naivety with which the Americans appear to have initially bought the argument.

The inept handling of the Afghan theatre represents a major failure of US policy in the 'war on terror' and highlights the need for a radical reconceptualization if Afghanistan's gradual descent into anarchy is to be curtailed. Some of the key policy blind spots outlined above have significantly contributed to the instability that is tightening its grip on Afghanistan and demonstrates the urgent need for a course correction.