The Indo-US civilian nuclear deal was subjected to a fresh round of controversy with the release of an eight-month old communication from the US State Department by Congressman Howard Berman. Berman, Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee who has a known hard-line position on the nuclear deal timed the revelation of the 26-page document containing a set of forty-five questions and responses from the State Department addressed to Tom Lantos, former Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The document dated 8 January 2008 though not classified was kept confidential by Lantos but was "leaked" to the press on the eve of the NSG meet in Vienna on 4-5 September.

The release of the letter has given the deal breakers at home a fresh opportunity to further complicate the debate on nuclear deal. Both the BJP and the Left parties have left no stone unturned to mislead the public by accusing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of misleading the country. There is no surprise in the political drama staged by the deal naysayers. Nonetheless, a look at the contentions raised by them in the 26-page communication needs an examination. . The US State Department has stated that in case India conducts a nuclear test, Washington will immediately terminate nuclear cooperation and demand the return of its equipment and fuel. The letter also states that Washington will refrain from transferring sensitive enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies.

The "leaked" 26-page letter was known to exist four months ago. On 9 May 2008 Glenn Kessler reported in The Washington Post about a communication from the US State Department to a questionnaire on Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation from US Congressmen with a "gag order" on it. It stated that the State Department had imposed unusually strict conditions to the answers it provided to questions posed by Congress members. Recently in an interview to NDTV, AEC Chairman, Anil Kakodkar, stated that he knew about such a communication although its details were unknown to him. Presumably, then, there is nothing secret about the communication; its contents have been deliberated on several occasions.

The "leaked" letter states the termination of both US nuclear cooperation and all fuel supply assurances in the event of an Indian nuclear test. It makes clear that the US will uphold important presidential commitments consistent with the Hyde Act. It conveys that the disruptions the US might be required to safeguard against are contingencies that might result from actions that are not necessarily India's fault. It further states that nuclear fuel supply assurances are not meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear test.

An in-depth analysis of the letter would immediately convey that this letter is not from President Bush but from Jeffrey Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, US State Department. Even if for the sake of argument, it is contended that the letter reflects the views of the White House and in that sense it is from President Bush, one has to understand that it is an internal communication amongst the US Congressmen. The White House's understanding of the 123 Agreement conveyed in an internal communique is not an international law which can influence the Indo-US bilateral understanding as inked in the 123 Agreement. Despite, the non-proliferation lobby's insistence that the US Government demands provisions for immediate termination of civil nuclear cooperation if India conducts a test be written into the NSG waiver deliberations, the American interlocutors refrained from do so. This in itself indicates the degree of influence the State Department's "secret" letter had on the Capitol Hill representatives in Vienna.

Before coming to conclusions on this letter in question, it must also be borne in mind that the US elections are scheduled in November 2008. There will be strong wheeling-and-dealing and political and diplomatic compromises by the Congressmen to secure the best for their constituencies. At this moment, support of Congressman Berman is crucial to garner support for the passage of this legislation. in the US Congress this year.

To assuage the deal-naysayers at home who were prompt to demand the ouster of the Manmohan Singh government, India's position on nuclear testing is clear. The right to test is a sovereign right, which will be exercised only if there is a dynamic change in our strategic imperatives. The 123 Agreement takes into cognizance this aspect of India's concerns. That is the understanding between India and the US.

India has traveled a long and arduous way since 1974 to this moment when it can reverse a thirty-four year old technology denial regime. Despite temptations galore, India has remained anchored to an impeccable non-proliferation record. This has been acknowledged by Washington and some important NSG countries. NSG's call for a second round of meeting in Vienna is itself approval of the cardinal fact that India can effectively strengthen the NPT regime. The domestic naysayers and the US Congressmen must understand the stakes involved for India and the non-proliferation regime. What is needed is creative diplomacy from all quarters to seal the nuclear deal.