Report of IPCS Seminar held on 2 September 2008

Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee and Prof. PR Chari visited Islamabad, Pakistan from 24-28 August to participate in an international conference on "Pakistan-India Peace Process" convened by the Islamabad Policy Institute and the Hans Sidel Foundation. They shared their impressions and discussions in a seminar held at IPCS on 2 September 2008. Their presentation was preceded by a brief overview by Dr Suba Chandran on the current developments in Pakistan.

Suba Chandran

With regard to recent developments in Pakistan, five major issues hold relevance at this point. The foremost is that of restoration of the judiciary and the reinstatement of the Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Choudhary. Differences over this issue have resulted in a split in the ruling coalition with Nawaz Sharif walking out. There has also been a schism between the two main parties, the PPP and the PML-N, over the nominee for President as the latter was made to believe that there would be a consensus on the same.

There are certain legal and political constraints over the restoration of the judiciary. The PPP has taken up this task in parts. So far eight judges have been reinstated in the Sind High Court and this would be followed in Punjab High Court as well. But the real question is whether Chaudhry will be reinstated. The PPP, and also to some extent the military, would not be happy with the reinstatement of Chaudhry. The lawyers meanwhile have threatened to go for another agitation if the Chief Justice is not reinstated.

Another pressing question arising from the ongoing political crisis is whether Asif Ali Zardari is the right choice for the President. Zardari has failed to realize many of the agreements which he himself had drafted. His remarks that agreements were not the Koran and hence can be broken or that even if half of the stated agreement had been achieved, it was good enough, do not project an encouraging image of the man. Recent reports have also questioned his mental stability thereby questioning his ability to lead. The issue of whether Zardari will abrogate the sweeping powers of the President is also out in the open. This would be a major concern for the PML-N as the party has a major stake in the Punjab provincial assembly where they do not enjoy a majority and will need the support of the PPP.

The second important issue is that of the civil-military relationship. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is seen as apolitical today following the withdrawal of officials from civilian postings particularly during the elections. There seems to be some sort of understanding with Zardari on Musharraf's removal and on the restoration of the judges. The military has a lot on stake over the reinstatement of Chaudhry as he would question the military actions in Baluchistan. With this in background, how would civil and military relations turn out in the coming days? The first fault line was seen when Prime Minister Geelani attempted to put the ISI under the control of the Interior Ministry. This was strongly opposed by the military. Another important question is whether other generals in the military share the same views as Gen. Kayani. What will happen in 2010 after the retirement of Gen. Kayani?

The third issue is regarding the prevailing situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA). Three kinds of violence is prevalent this region; first in form of military violence in the North and South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency; second, the sectarian violence in the Khurram Agency; and finally, the turmoil in the Swat Valley. The objectives of the groups fighting in these regions are different and the approaches to deal with them are also divergent. The JUI (Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam) and the ANP (Awami National Party) recommend a go-slow approach with peace deals and no military action. The government has proposed a ceasefire in the Swat Valley, but the Taliban has rejected this until the military leaves the Swat Valley. Do the people of Pakistan outside FATA support a political or a military approach? Given the failure of the earlier peace deals, will a political approach in FATA help?

The fourth issue relates to Afghanistan, the US and the war on terror. The US has been exerting pressure on Pakistan to do more as a frontline state in the war on terror as also stability in Afghanistan. For the last two to three years there has been a general backlash from the Pakistani public and civil society to reorient its policy towards Afghanistan and the war on terror. What strategies would Zardari and the PPP like to adopt vis-a-vis Afghanistan and also towards the war on terror?

The last major issue is as regards the future of the Indo-Pak peace process. Will it be affected by the exit of Musharraf who played a major role in the ceasefire process? Would this ceasefire hold good even under a civilian government in Pakistan? Moreover, Pakistan is also irked by the Indo-US nuclear deal and is demanding a similar deal with the US. And finally, a lot hinges on what strategy the PPP adopts to these above questions and also the ongoing unrest in the Kashmir Valley. The current crisis in Jammu and Kashmir has received one-sided coverage by the Pakistan media with emphasis on the Valley alone. Given these circumstances, can one expect a decline in support of the peace process from the Pakistani people?

PR Chari

Six major issues deserve attention at this stage. First is the legacy and future of Musharraf. People were critical of the mistakes Musharraf made after 2007, such as the dismissal of judges, the siege of the Lal Masjid, and the imposition of emergency. As a result the good measures he undertook such as encouraging a secular outlook, improving the position of women in political structures and improving relations with India, were forgotten. There were three broad speculations with regard to Musharraf's future: exile, staying on in Pakistan (like his predecessors Yahya Khan and Ayub Khan) with the possibility also of being assassinated, and the prospect of prosecution. This last appeared remote for it would tarnish the image of the army as an institution and thus risk provoking the army to step into the political domain.

Second, with regard to the future of the democratic government in Pakistan, there appears to be little choice between Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif. The question that then arises is regarding the possibility of a military coup should the democratically elected government fail. Opinion in Pakistan seemed to be divided on this question: the optimists regard a military coup as an unlikely possibility, while the cautious ones do not rule out the possibility in the future.

Third, with regard to civil society what is noteworthy is that the lawyer's movement, despite the use of tactics of coercion and intimidation by the state, eventually succeeded in ousting Musharraf. Thus, it injected a new kind of confidence into civil society.

Fourth, two broad political combinations are seen to be emerging: one is an alliance between the PPP, Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and the ANP while the opposing camp comprises of the PML (N) and the PML (Q). The PML (Q) could witness a three-way split: defections to the parent party that is the PML (N), defections to the PPP for office and the rump party comprising the PML (Q). At present the real danger lies in there arising a situation of confrontation between Islamabad and the provincial government of Punjab. This would have significant ramifications for Punjab, which is the most important province politically.

Fifth, with regard to the 'war on terror' the US feels that Pakistan has failed to do the needful to stamp out the Taliban and al Qaeda. It is stepping up pressure on Zardari to honor Benazir Bhutto's deals with the US. While the US wields a tremendous degree of influence with the government, it is highly unpopular with the masses in Pakistan. Interestingly, while the Pakistani army has shown great efficacy in conducting insurgency operations, it has floundered in counter-insurgency operations. With 20 per cent of the army's rank and file being composed of Pathans, it is perhaps extremely difficult to motivate them to act against their compatriots. Moreover, Pathans have deeply entrenched themselves in Pakistani society through a virtual monopoly over sectors such as transport and the narcotics trade, thus rendering any action against them all the more difficult and also risking a strong retaliation in the form of suicide bombings across Pakistan. The Pakistan army for its part is angry with the mounting American pressure, given the strong perception of Pakistan having to squarely shoulder the responsibility of cleaning up a mess essentially created by the US.

Finally, Indo-Pak relations have been coloured by strong suspicions with Pakistan viewing the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar as launching pads for insurgencies in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA. The peace process too has slowed down owing to confusion and instability at the top in Islamabad.

Dipankar Banerjee

Looking at the present situation, Zardari seems the likely winner in the upcoming presidential elections as there is no strong opposition. However, a cause for concern at this stage is Zardari being elected President with the same powers as that of Musharraf. This would be very detrimental to Pakistani politics in particular and the region in general.

Assuming that Zardari does get elected, his main concerns would revolve around the three A's, America, Army and Accounts. Regarding relations with the US, the understanding reached between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf under the auspices of the US prior to the elections would need to be fulfilled by Zardari. The second concern revolves around the role and powers of the army once he assumes office. Due to Musharraf's actions, the army's image has been badly affected and it would like to remain in the background of Pakistani politics. The third issue is of the illegal bank accounts of the Bhutto family.

The economy of Pakistan is at one of its lowest ebbs. With 21 per cent inflation, most of the commodities are highly priced and with the beginning of the Ramadan period this should be a major concern for political leaders. Although speculations about complete collapse are rife, Saudi Arabia, the US and may be even the IMF, would not let that happen since they each have a great deal at stake.

Looking at the issues that were raised at the conference in Pakistan, no one from the Pakistani side raised any major questions on the Kashmir issue. The discussion on foreign policy issues saw many positive improvements. Most of the issues that were raised by the Indian side such as Siachen, getting back to the 1949 line, financial and ecological costs of continued occupation on the Himalayan glaciers and also converting region into a peace block were addressed. Resolution of the Siachen dispute can play an important role as a confidence-building measure and generate trust between both sides.

DISCUSSION

The Peace Process

• What has the peace process achieved in concrete terms? Has infiltration declined? Has the Hurriyat been reined in? With the Pakistani army at least temporarily 'retreating to the barracks,' will there be a reversion to old policies of shelling along the LOC and brewing of fresh trouble in the Kashmir valley? And has the ceasefire been to India's advantage or Pakistan's? The ceasefire enabled Pakistan to move 80,000 troops to its eastern frontier with Afghanistan.

• The peace process appears unlikely to take India very far. Backchannel dialogues are also not likely to be effective till major attempts at interaction with the Pakistan army are made. Moreover with a change in political leadership at the top in Islamabad, it will take time for leaderships on both sides to gain the confidence of each other and only then can a backchannel dialogue acquire a fresh impetus.

• The lack of tangible progress in the peace process also reflects to an extent the inability of the Indian leadership to be able to sell the peace process to its domestic constituency.

Is Pakistan Emerging as a Failed State?

• Although Pakistan has all the measures to qualify as a failed state, given its geopolitical realities, it is far too important for the international community in general and the US in particular, to allow it to become one.

• Pakistan cannot be called a failed state owing to the following four characteristics: first, the military as an institution is dominant and has much at stake to allow Pakistan to fail. Second, Punjab which is politically the most important state remains fairly stable as does much of rural Sindh. Third, the US will not allow Pakistan to fail especially because of its possession of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the feudal structures in society will not let Pakistan fail.

Civil Society and Prospects for Democracy

• Civil society has expanded considerably and has made effective use of the media as a platform to put forth its views and articulate a sharp critique of government policies. The rise of this civil society in the immediate context can be understood against the backdrop of an expansion of the middle class during the last decade.

• The public perception in Pakistan vis-a-vis India has witnessed a steady change, with civil society engaging in a critical questioning of their governments policies such as those on Kashmir.

• The coming in of Zardari is calamitous for Pakistan. It is difficult to foresee a space for democracy - which even by optimistic accounts would last for not more than three years - after which public opinion will force the army to step into the political domain again. Meanwhile Nawaz Sharif has pushed himself into a corner and cannot turn to the army. Thus, as things stand the prospects of the army stepping in have been delayed but not precluded.

• Politically, the army still continues to be the most important pillar whose support is indispensable for the political establishment. Although the army is unlikely to intervene in day-to-day affairs, it will nonetheless continue to remain in the background wielding control over the nuclear arsenal, the ISI and the Kashmir policy.

The State of the Pakistan Army

• It is too early to asses why the Pakistan army has failed to tackle the insurgency it faces in its frontier provinces. Unlike the Indian army that has considerable experience in dealing with insurgency since 1954, the Pakistan army's close association with their US counterparts while equipping them well for the technical and military aspects of combat but leaves them unable to operate in the harsh terrain they are currently engaged in. Further, given the feudal nature of the society, fractured along clan lines, it is difficult to motivate Pathans in the army ranks to take up arms against their kin. Moreover, the current set of operations is being primarily carried out by the Frontier Corps with the army playing only a supporting role.

• The Pakistan army lacks both the will and the necessary tools needed to undertake counterinsurgency. The army's use of helicopters and gun-ships to target militants is leading to collateral damage. By comparison the Indian army has displayed a greater willingness to fight and accept casualties.