Nearly 1,000 Pakistanis were killed in suicide bombings in 2007, with the country falling only second to Iraq in the number of suicide attacks. Besides, in August 2008, there have been several bombings. While Gen. Pervez Musharraf is out of the political canvas, but the coalition government is struggling to survive. It seems clear that the changing dynamics of Pakistan's internal politics must be given serious thought if India hopes to have an edge. It would not be offensive if India reminded itself that Pakistan foreign policy is balance on a tripod - Army, Allah and America.

The Pakistan army is at the crossroads - facing rebellion in tribal areas, Pakistani Taliban threatening to strike and army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani reversing his predecessor's policies. In fact, with Gen. Kayani at the helm of affairs, it is to be seen what shape the military-mullah alliance takes. Pakistan's army has had a long history of using the Mujahideen to serve its own agenda in Kashmir and elsewhere. In fact, the Kashmir policy has time and again been used to justify high defence expenditure and legitimize regimes. Speaking to his troops at the Line of Control (LOC) on 12 February, Gen. Kayani had averred that the Pakistani army will not let down the Kashmiris.

Moreover, Pakistani Army chief has previously served as the director of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and, hence, is well versed with its dirty tactics. Islamic militant groups have in the past served as instruments of Pakistan's regional policy whose contours are defined by the ISI. Pakistan's intelligence agency is known for its notorious ways - its support for Kashmiri militants and the Taliban are open secrets - and to what extent the civilian government will be able to rein in the army and intelligence is anybody's guess.

On the other hand, fighting a counter-insurgency war in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), under US pressure, is not what Gen Kayani is keen on. Rather, the opening up of channels of communication with the jihadis and negotiation of "peace deals" only reiterates that militant Islam cannot be completely wished away. It would be too naive to disregard the fact that General Kayani was commanding the 12 Infantry Division located in Mureee between 1998 and 2000, a period when cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir was at its peak.

Meanwhile, the symbiotic relationship between the US and Pakistan becomes obvious when one analyses the workings of former president Pervez Musharraf. Why did General Musharraf agree to join America in the 'war on terror' even if it meant displeasing the Islamists within the ranks of the Pakistan army? In an interview to a television channel General Musharraf said, "We were on the borderline of being or not being declared a terrorist state - in that situation, what would have happened to the Kashmir cause?"

At the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan, it was the anti-India syndrome that Musharraf resorted to for convincing his generals in favour of Pakistan becoming a US ally in the war on terror. The Pakistan military, which considered its support to the Taliban as part of the country's strategic national interest, would not have wanted to see India gain favour with the US and for Afghanistan to have a pro-Indian government. Though General Musharraf is given credit for making amends to the Indian government's Kashmir policy, it was a double game. The Taliban were given asylum and allowed to regroup in Pakistan, when most of the Afghans and Arabs were being killed in Afghanistan. Though the US did urge Pakistan to check infiltration at the LOC, it did not exactly pressurize its ally. The restrain on Islamist fundamentalists was only temporary, till such time Musharraf's political ambitions were fulfilled and Pakistan could achieve a favourable (anti-India) government in Afghanistan.

For, Pakistan politics continues to revolve around the axis of the relationship between military power and the politicians with Islam being a major factor and civil society growing in strength. At the same time, it would not be unreasonable to keep a close watch on the Pakistan-US configurations, with the US presidential elections round the corner. The Democratic presidential candidate Senator Barrack Obama, in his speech on 1 August, had stated, "If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will." Obama's principal South Asia adviser Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official, has also suggested that resolving the Kashmir issue would prove crucial to the efforts of the new US President in "weaning away Islamabad from its relationship with terrorist outfits."

How far India can manipulate America's foreign policy to its own advantage would again be a task in hand. If cross-border infiltration and terror attacks in Kashmir continue, will India be able to convince Washington to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism? It is time Indian political leaders and policymakers updated and revised their notes. At home, for the past three months, Jammu and Kashmir has been burning and how fragile the Valley is, is for the nation to see. Can India afford to take things for granted?