After India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 the startled international community led by the United States sought to strengthen the control of nuclear exports to prevent countries from acquiring a nuclear deterrent under the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) established in 1975 was a cartel that was India-specific since it sought to curtail the transfer of nuclear materials, technology and equipment unless India signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It also mandated Non Nuclear Weapons States to pledge not to use such nuclear materials for military purposes and commit to allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of their nuclear establishments. This nuclear regime was based on pressuring nation-states to accept the asymmetrical power equations in regard to nuclear weapons in international politics. For this purpose the NSG, NPT and IAEA have become important pillars of the non proliferation regime which seek to curb India's ambitions through its sanctions. Further, the regime cannot convince aspiring powers like India how nuclear weapons are legitimate with a few and illegitimate with others.

Today, after several decades, all the elements of the non- proliferation regime targeting India are floundering. Washington understands that any strategic curtailment of an aspiring power like India will not yield the expected results. The non- proliferation regime needs to seek new roles and face newer threats. The existing nuclear order and structures are being reviewed by the United States, not only because of its recognition of India as a rising power but out of its fear of the non- state actors. If US - Indian animosities could be overcome by providing freedom to India's nuclear program, Washington will do this enthusiastically because by doing so, it could closely associate with a large democratic country like India to fight non-state actors who are challenging the United States. It is unreasonable to argue that India will become a stooge of American hegemony. After all, non-state actors (terrorists) have harassed India more than the United States. The new non-proliferation regime in which India will be a partner would be an association of democratic countries to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors and state actors who are beyond diplomacy, rationality and reasoning.

Under the new non-proliferation regime, the bargains of the NPT would be less demanding for democracies. Civilian nuclear supplies will no longer be the prerogative of the superpowers, and attention would focus on diffusing nuclear technology to countries that can be responsible. The recent IAEA's India-specific safeguards agreement is a testimony to this fact. The expected NSG clearance would enable India to effectively play its part in the new non- proliferation regime. Whether the clearance is India-specific or envisages a complete change in its basic guidelines, the NSG clearance would prepare India to play an effective role over the long run by assuring its energy security that would enable India to act as a de-facto superpower in the new non-proliferation regime. If a big democratic country like India becomes a US partner to garner support for the new non-proliferation regime, it will also gain energy security and global recognition, which will be a win-win situation for India.

It is important to acknowledge that it is too early to answer some of the relevant questions pertaining to the new non- proliferation regime. For example, it is not clear whether India's association with the new regime will bolster disarmament. Nuclear technology diffusion to failed states would be in serious debate. How the new regime would contrast with the old one is another question without clear answers. However the neo nuclear order which stresses democracy, righteousness, and responsibility could be distinct from its hegemonic and illegitimate predecessor.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the twin towers are two significant events in contemporary strategic history; the former sought to preserve nuclear weapons with select nation-states and the latter sought to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation outside the nation - states. The non-proliferation regime floundered in the past and could not prevent the emergence of rogue states. The new non-proliferation regime would be tested to ensure that non-state actors or actors beyond diplomacy will exercise restraint. A daunting task for democratic countries like India is to prevent the new non-proliferation regime from floundering.