After keeping the civilian nuclear deal with the United States in storage for a long time, the Congress (I) led UPA government finally chose to operationalise the deal by approaching the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for an India-specific Safeguards Agreement, even at the risk of losing the support of the Left parties. The UPA government, even without the support of the Left parties, survived on the floor of the Lok Sabha with the combined support of the Samajwadi Party and other smaller parties. But, a lot of valuable time was lost in this regard. The UPA government finally realized that later is better than never, as far as operationalizing the nuclear deal is concerned. However, the time for operationalizing this nuclear deal within the tenure of the present Bush administration is very short.

The IAEA board of governors approved the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement on 1 August. After this, if the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approves an exception for India, then the Bush administration can submit the US-India 123 Agreement to the US Congress to consider and approve. The NSG usually meets once a year but the US may call a special NSG meeting to get its approval for the nuclear deal. But, the crucial question is whether the US Congress will have sufficient time to get a seal of approval. The Congress is scheduled to reassemble for only a three-week period (8-26 September) after it goes into recess on 1 August before the Democratic and Republican parties hold their national conventions. Approving any legislation, in the US Congress, is normally a lengthy process and usually takes forty-five days of sitting to either approve or disapprove legislation. Further, the Bush administration will find it difficult to get the deal approved in a lame duck session of the Congress after the November elections. At this time, the Congressional leadership may not be inclined to spend limited legislative time on an important and controversial foreign policy matter right after an election dominated by domestic policy concerns.

At the present time, it is difficult to predict how the next US administration will view the deal. Although a Democratic President heading a Democratic administration is unlikely to overturn everything that the Bush administration has done so far, there is a chance that it might take a different approach towards finalizing the nuclear deal with India. In this context, it is significant that the two US Presidential candidates - Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator Barak Obama - have supported the nuclear deal with varying degrees of enthusiasm. But, if the nuclear deal is not approved by 20 January 2009, the new President will have to make new determinations and then submit the deal to the new Congress. The new President may not want to spend much political capital on a deal done by his predecessor until several of his own promised goals have been achieved. Moreover, within the US political establishment, critics of the deal believe that the Bush administration has already bent too far backwards to salvage the deal, without attaching enough importance to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. They are deeply puzzled as to why the Indian government took so much time to clear the domestic political roadblocks for an agreement, which is widely seen in the US as lopsided in India's favour. It is quite possible that a Democratic administration would also favour a very strong partnership with India, but is more likely to look at the issue of nuclear non-proliferation more closely than the Republicans and might put more stringent conditions relating to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation into the nuclear deal than what the Republicans have done so far. Therefore, failure to operationalise the nuclear deal within the tenure of the Bush administration, will not necessarily kill the deal altogether although it would make nuclear deal more uncertain from India's interests.

However, it is widely acknowledged that the nuclear accord reflects a bipartisan desire to cement relations with India in recognition of its track record on nuclear non-proliferation and its strategic place as a stable democracy embracing a free market economy in a region of vital importance for the US in its battle against Islamic terrorism. For the US, India is a very valuable partner. India is a key player on every issue that matters to the US today - from combating terrorism, nuclear proliferation, balancing China, spreading democracy, containing HIV/AIDS, climate change or energy security. Therefore, the argument behind improving Indo-US relations is compelling, irrespective of who is in power.. And, for the US, signing the nuclear deal is an important part of this strategic partnership.