What led to the setting up of the Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College in Kanker, Chhattisgarh?

Over the last few years, Chhattisgarh has witnessed an upsurge of Naxal activity and violence resulting in a dramatic increase in casualties. The Naxals numbering around 4000-5000 in and around Chhattisgarh have consolidated themselves in the Abhujmad region of Bastar district, an area practically untouched by the government, and have upgraded their explosives and weaponry. The use of 80kg of landmine by rebels is unprecedented in India.

Trained to deal with criminals and law and order issues, the police are often found lacking preparedness and strength in dealing with such well-trained and well-equipped guerillas. A sense of helplessness reign among the police as they continue to suffer heavy casualties at the hand of the adept guerillas as indicated by the attack in Rani Bodli, Dantewada district on 15 March 2007.

In early 2005, 120 Chhattisgarh policemen were sent to the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare (CIJW) College run by the Indian army since 1970 in Vairengte in Mizoram for training in counter-insurgency operations. However, the prevailing state of conflict in Chhattisgarh demanded a massive reorientation of the entire police force and their training in unconventional warfare. The idea to establish a training college in Chhattisgarh on the lines of CIJW was conceived and initiated by the then Governor of Chhattisgarh, Lt Gen K N Seth, who personally asked me to take charge of the college.

Perched on the hills of Kanker about 7km away from town and spread across 300 acres of land, the college became functional by June 2005. Selected police officers trained in this college constitute the Special Task Force which then led the joint surgical operations conducted by the Chhattisgarh police and the paramilitary forces stationed in the state. The training is for all age groups and across all levels from hawaldar to constable to senior most gazetted and non-gazetted officers.

What is the prime objective of the training?

Fight a guerilla like a guerilla is the main motto of the college. The training strives to strengthen the human body, both mentally and physically and instill insurmountable confidence in the police officers to face the enemy. To fight in the jungles is very tough with poor communications, dense vegetation and little visibility. More than sophisticated weapons, it requires mental strength and confidence. The idea of the training is to make the policemen think like guerillas, to familiarize them with the land and tactics of the enemy. At the same time, the training also seeks to train them in soft aspects of policing such as their behavior and interaction with the locals while conducting operations. The ultimate mission of the training is the resolution of the Naxal problem.

What does jungle warfare entail? What does the training comprise of?

The college is structured like a battle field with 14 firing ranges for different scenarios including ambush, quick response shooting, encounter and pursuit, and so on and boasts of training officers with a rich experience in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency.

The bedrock of the college is a set of 48 principles collected over the years through various counterinsurgency operations in India. These principles are categorized as 'character qualities' and 'operational' qualities. Character qualities aim at mental reorientation and strengthening of the police force without which operational effectiveness is hard to bring about, and includes principles like devotion to the job, leading an honest life, consideration to the weak, emotional control and personal discipline among others. Operational qualities strive to improve the tactical efficiency of the police force and includes principles like - fight a guerilla like a guerilla, treat the human body as the best weapon, never break contact with the enemy during operations, update professional knowledge, know your environment, know and understand your enemy, no use of roads in Naxal areas, always be in buddy pairs and keep the enemy on move constantly among others.

The training is conducted through a number of lectures, discussions, case studies and outdoor exercises. A number of live demonstrations are conducted to judge and train the response of the officers. The officers are taught to live in difficult and hostile terrain, eat and sleep like the guerrillas and strike as silently as the guerillas. Training courses also include study of the land and its vegetation, study of the nature of Naxal conflict, their tactics and sanctuaries, the arms used by them and their basic demands. In addition, the officers are also taught to cultivate networks among the locals, to interact with them regularly in order to generate confidence among them and earn their respect.

What results has the training produced?

The college has so far trained 7,500 police personnel including 6,000 of the Chhattisgarh police alone. Among the trained commandos, only 600 odd constitute the Special Task Force (STF) while the remaining help in coordinating operations in the police. Training at the college has now become a requirement for promotion across the board in the Chhattisgarh police.

Since 2005, approximately 330 police officers have been killed in the conflict but only 16 of them belonged to the STF trained in the college. Six states have so far sent their officers for training, namely, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Kerala, Bihar and Chhattisgarh. The college mandate has expanded to include paramilitary forces, forest, jail and railway guards. Among the 100 odd Naxals that have been killed since 2005, 95 per cent of the killing was carried out by the STF. In the last four years, the ratio of SF killed to Naxals has altered from 5:4 to 1:2.

The police have now begun to cross the Indravati River separating the liberated zone of Abhujmad from the rest of the Bastar district. In the last three years, 12 police posts have been set up in the Abhujmad area, a remarkable feat for the Chhattisgarh police. Several enemy camps have been destroyed and many IED's have been detected. There has been a visible shift in the support enjoyed by the Naxals in the southern districts. An indication of this is the growing intelligence forthcoming from the locals. The success of the STF has reinvigorated the police force.

What is the typical procedure of a counter-Naxal operation?

Counter-Naxal operations are typically of three kinds - raid, ambush, and patrol. Raids are carried out based on actionable information secured about Naxal presence. Following the confirmation of information through surveillance, detailed briefing is given to commandos who are then divided into three groups. First is the cordon group that moves ahead and surrounds the targeted area followed closely by the fire assault group that is responsible for physical attack on the Naxals and their hideouts. The third group is the reserve group in charge of chasing the Naxals following direct assault. The basic guiding principle in conducting a raid is to not break contact with the enemy.

An ambush takes place in an area identified as Naxal-dominated. For example, once a particular route has been identified as frequently used by the Naxals, the commandos plan an ambush at night.

The third type of operation includes patrolling in the surrounding areas in order to maintain contact with the villagers and establish the state's dominance in the area. The basic objective of patrolling is to gain information regarding the enemy. Emphasis here is laid on reaching out to the villagers through civic action programmes and earning their respect and trust.

What are the main problems/limitations faced while conducting operations?

The biggest limitation while conducting counter-Naxal operations has been the lack of helicopter support from the government. While helicopter service has been given for providing logistic support and medical aid to the police, the government has not been forthcoming in providing helicopter support for conducting operations. This is primarily because the government feels that the police force is not trained enough to use helicopters, a fact which further reinforces the significance of the training being imparted to the police.

Notwithstanding the government's reluctance, other problems in using helicopter services include the control of large area of land by the Naxals, rendering it difficult to firstly conduct aerial surveillance over controlled territory, and then to follow it up with ground action in the controlled territory. This was the problem faced by the UAV that was deployed in the region for one year in 2006. But the government is increasing the forces deployed in the region to tackle this problem.

What has been the reaction of the Naxals to the college? Has the college received any threats?

The Naxals definitely consider the college as a threat and have issued warnings in local newspapers against the college to shut down its operations. However, the college premises are well protected with natural obstacle systems such as eco-fencing created for the purpose. In addition, a 24-hour vigil is maintained in at least three hillocks surrounding the campus such that even if the Naxals were to attack the college, it will be difficult for them to escape. Apart from this, if there's still an attack, my men and I are waiting to fight them.

Do you feel jungle warfare is the answer to left-wing extremism?

There is no doubt that training in jungle warfare will prove to be very effective in combating the Naxals. From hiding away from the Naxals, the police have now begun to engage with them in direct combat. At the same time, the solution does not stop with fighting the guerillas alone. A combined socio-politico-economic-psychological approach is imperative for a long-term solution. Each section of the state - the government, politicians, administration - and the society at large has to fulfill its functions effectively. Security measures have to be accompanied by political and socioeconomic measures.