On 7 July 2008, the Congress-led UPA government "initialled" the India-specific Safeguards Agreement; and, a day later, submitted this document to the IAEA Board of Governors for its approval. The document's preamble states that India will "identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner." This text is only a draft and for the Agreement to come into effect, it must be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

What is the controversy surrounding the Safeguards Agreement?

The Left has criticized the UPA government for keeping the IAEA Safeguards Agreement - the first step in operationalizing the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement - "under wraps." Concerns have been raised also about fuel supply assurances and the nature of the "corrective measures" - mentioned in the preamble - that India would take in the case of fuel supply disruption.

Meanwhile, the BJP has criticized the Agreement on the grounds that the IAEA has not formally recognized India as a nuclear weapons state and that it is no different from the agreements the nuclear watchdog has signed with non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Besides saying that this would cap India's military nuclear programme, the BJP, too, has expressed concerns regarding future fuel supplies and the meaning of "corrective measures."

Does the Safeguards Agreement assure India "reliable, uninterrupted and continuous" fuel supply?

In the preamble of the draft Agreement, India stipulates that it expects "international cooperation arrangements creating necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors." The Agreement also mentions that "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." In addition, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Anil Kakodkar has said that India's civilian reactors will be under safeguards "in perpetuity" only if the fuel supply will be "permanent" (The Hindu, 13 July 2008).

India's ability to receive nuclear fuel, from other nations is dependent on NSG approval, which itself can take place only after IAEA approval. If New Delhi receives the NSG sign-off it will be able to enter into agreements with other states, besides the US. India can therefore, choose from the best proposals and does not have to enter into an agreement that imposes stringent conditions.

What does the phrase "corrective measures" mean?

According to Kakodkar, corrective measures are "unspecified sovereign rights" that India can take in case fuel supplies are disrupted (The Hindu, 13 July 2008). The need for this clause emerged out of the 1974 experience when the US stopped fuel supply to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station following India's first nuclear test; the plant, however, continued to be under IAEA safeguards and was not allowed to access fuel supplies either from other countries or from India's non-safeguarded facilities.

However, what these "corrective measures" are remains unspecified. Therefore, India may face questions from the IAEA Board on what exactly these measures are given that critics abroad have interpreted this phrase as a right India reserves to withdraw safeguarded facilities from inspection.

Is reprocessing fuel allowed under the Safeguards Agreement?

The Agreement does not specifically mention India's right to reprocess; but, paragraphs 79-84 lay out procedures for reprocessing plants.

Reprocessing spent fuel serves several purposes, one of which is of being reused for civilian purposes, for instance in breeder reactors. However, reprocessing can also allow for the separation of plutonium that can be used in nuclear weapons - the source of NSG concerns. The 123 Agreement allows India to reprocess spent imported fuel in a new reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards, thereby addressing both sets of concerns.

Does the Agreement prevent future nuclear weapons testing by India?

The question of future nuclear weapons tests has not been covered in the Agreement. Although one of the basic understandings, identified in paragraph 1, is that "none of the items subject to this Agreement... shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose" or "the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device," the draft does not prevent India from future testing. Thus, should India choose to test its existing arsenal, it will not be legally bound by the Agreement.

This is not to say that there is no risk associated with testing. While not specifically stated as such, "termination and cessation of cooperation" under the 123 Agreement, or "termination of nuclear transfers" under the Hyde Act could occur as a result of an Indian test. Further, the US remains bound by the Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act of 1994 under which sanctions were placed on India after the 1998 tests. This rule states that any NNWS that conducts nuclear tests is subject to economic and military sanctions. However, the US President has the power to override the sanctions, as President George W. Bush did in 2001.