The unilateral ceasefire announced by the 'A' and the 'C' companies of the 28th Battalion of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has been hailed as a positive development towards peace in the insurgency-affected state of Assam. The truce offer came on 24 June 2008, and was a culmination of a long-drawn effort and of sustained and targeted policies by the state government and the paramilitary forces to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table. There had been concerted efforts using various channels of communication between the counterinsurgency establishment in Assam and the insurgents in order to convince the latter to abandon the path of violence. This had resulted in numerous instances of surrenders by ULFA cadres in recent years, most of them being ordinary foot soldiers, being highly dissatisfied and demoralized, given the continuing pressures of being involved in the insurgency.

The recent truce offer involves the top commanders of the 28th Battalion, who were under pressure from various quarters, including their own cadres and had faced a lot of casualties in the past few months. This was accompanied by a series of arrests of top leaders of the outfit, particularly of the 27th Battalion operating in Karbi Anglong and the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh and of the 28th Battalion which had its operating base in Upper Assam. The truce call comes through talks with the leaders of ULFA's 28th Battalion lodged in jails in Upper Assam, with top leader Mrinal Hazarika being released on bail from prison in Dibrugarh shortly before the announcement came from its headquarters in Sadiya.

The question that arises at this moment is whether this is really a truce in spirit and a move towards peace, or just a tactic used by the Battalion to regroup its cadres and use this ceasefire to strengthen its organizational base as has happened earlier. ULFA has been facing a lot of trouble in its operational logistics in the Northeast India-Myanmar corridor as it is not on good terms with Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN I-M), given its alliance with the NSCN Khaplang faction. Moreover sustained Army operations in Upper Assam against the ULFA have virtually crippled its supply networks.

It has been evident in the past few months that there is a clear split between the ULFA in Upper Assam and the ULFA based in Lower Assam, the latter being controlled by its top leadership in Bangladesh which includes its Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah and Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa. The June 2008 truce has no sanction from the outfit's top leadership and they have officially disbanded the companies in the 28th Battalion. On the other hand, the leadership of the 28th Battalion in Upper Assam feels that its central leadership has sold out to fundamentalist groups and is under the influence and control of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) in Bangladesh. The split has now become more manifest and is based on strong ideological grounds. The 28th Battalion's call for peace has been seen in many quarters as formalizing this split in the organization of ULFA.

The implications of this unilateral ceasefire announcement could be several, depending on the way the state and the central government handle the situation, and on the real intentions of the 28th Battalion's leadership. The state government has announced that it will cease all counterinsurgency operations against the two companies of the 28th Battalion, but will continue operations against the other battalions of ULFA elsewhere in Assam. This itself will have a lot of operational difficulties as there is no way that one can differentiate between the cadres of the 28th Battalion and other battalions of the ULFA. Moreover the complete list of the cadres of the 'A' and 'C' companies of the 28th Battalion has not been given to the state government. This will ensure that many cadres will switch companies, thereby making this breakthrough lose its significance. There have been reports of cadres abandoning their respective companies in fear of retaliation from within the ULFA. The 1990 split in ULFA had seen a lot of cadres coming into the mainstream, but who were mostly eliminated afterwards, either from within the organization or killed in the infamous 'secret killings' involvement and reprisals.

There is an urgent need to work towards establishing a congenial atmosphere for peace talks and build sufficient trust for other such groups to come into the mainstream. The process should start immediately and the central government's acceptance of the state's policies in this regard is a welcome development. A repeat of the political manipulations, of using one faction against the other as witnessed following the 1990 split and any undermining of peace processes as seen more recently, should be avoided at all costs. A close monitoring of the situation by civil society institutions is required, and good faith must be shown by the government for creating sustainable peace in Assam.