Following the collapse of the USSR, the concept of deterrence underwent a change as the actors themselves had changed. While the efficiency of deterrence may have been proven by the absence of a major world war for 60 years, no one can predict that deterrence will not lead the world to a nuclear conflict. Even if the debate on nuclear disarmament has been re-launched worldwide, deterrence is not yet considered a concept of the past. Nuclear deterrence has been revived in doctrines, proving how alarmingly fragile nuclear disarmament is today.

First, nuclear disarmament appears to be an objective of the already weaponized states. At the end of 2007, the US Department of Defence removed 5,100 nukes from its arsenal that would be dismantled by 2023, putting the global number of remaining nukes at around 5,200. Des Browne, the UK Defence Minister, said in February 2008 that the UK had decided in 2007 to reduce by 20 per cent its nuclear stockpile, putting the total number of warheads below 160. French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, announced in March 2008 that France would reduce by one third its air-launched nuclear weapons, putting the number of warheads below 300. Also, Russia and the US agreed in 2002 to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) to reduce by 2012 the number of strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200.

However, reduction of the quantity does not mean reduction of the quality - all the already weaponized countries are modernizing their nuclear stockpiles significantly. The Bush administration asked Congress to support the development of new nuclear weapons in the Reliable Replacement Warhead Project, to replace all the warheads the US has today; the "Complex 2030," is a programme to rebuild the existing facilities for assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons. Russia has also heavily modernized its strategic forces, with the production of new land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles, and new strategic submarines. France is also improving its nuclear capacity, with the recent launch of a new strategic submarine, Le Terrible, and the replacement of its airborne leg - the current 60 Mirage-2000s will be replaced by 40 Rafale aircrafts fitted with new-generation missiles.

These developments prove that now there is no need for the 65,000 nuclear warheads that existed in the 1980s, but their modernization is still important to adapt to the new challenges, as conveyed in nuclear doctrines. With the Bush administration, the classical doctrine of deterrence has evolved towards a doctrine of practical nuclear-war fighting, with pre-emptive nuclear attacks, bombing of terrorist camps with mini-nukes (a project that was stopped in 2005 by the Congress), and a strong emphasis put on nuclear weapons whose direct effect has been to undermine the international nuclear regime - the Bush administration has refused to ratify the CTBT, to extend verification provisions included in START I which expires in 2009, and to begin negotiations on a FMCT if the US were required to submit to the inspections needed.

This US position has not only had a global negative effect on the international nuclear regime, but has incited Russia into following this position. Nuclear weapons are playing a leading role in insuring Russia's national security, and it even admits the possibility of a "selective and limited combat use" of nuclear weapons in order to de-escalate an aggression. In 2006, France also extended the role of its nuclear weapons by threatening to use them against states supporting terrorist groups.

Even if there is no fear of a global-scale nuclear war and if the dimensions of nuclear deterrence are changing, it nevertheless remains the cornerstone of defence policies for all the nuclear-weaponized states. All of them envision the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, and all of them, except China and India, have a "first-use policy," which means they may use nuclear weapons in response to a major conventional attack or to pre-empt or prevent an attack with weapons of mass destruction. It proves how nuclear weapons are still important in the national security calculus and how it is unlikely that any country would seriously make a first step for the elimination of its nuclear weapons. Nuclear arsenals are being reduced, but are not being eliminated: the trend is toward a minimum deterrent, trying to find a new equilibrium in a changing context.

All these developments prove that complete nuclear disarmament cannot be envisaged now - countries have to first undertake several steps to reduce the relevance of nuclear weapons in defence policies. Then, the next step could be a global agreement on a "no first-use policy," which would reduce the risk of a "nuclear holocaust" a bit further. And even if Barack Obama would assure us that as President he would say, "America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons," as long as nuclear weapons are considered as part of the solution, they will not be treated as a problem.