Twice, in less than a year, Myanmar made it to the headlines. Its first appearance due to massive protests that were brutally repressed by the military government in September 2007 drew the world's attention to the country's political situation. This time, cyclone Nargis and the disaster it left in its wake brought to the fore Myanmar's dismal humanitarian situation. With admirable urgency, the world mobilized to provide for relief. Among others, Australia released US$25 million, the US US$13 million, the UK US$10 million, the EU US$3 million, Norway US$9.8 million, and China US$4.3 million. India was among the first to react and sent shipments of relief aid.

However, common mobilization has by no means brought down the opposition between partisans of sanctions and pursuers of "constructive engagement". Facing an isolationist and extremely authoritative regime, western countries have chosen to impose sanctions - for some, as early as 1988. On the other hand, Myanmar's neighbours - China, India, and the ASEAN countries, have preferred to engage the military government, at best hoping it would bring about change, at worst blindly securing their national interest. It is a plain observation that such policies have not brought any good to the country, since sanctions have been made literally pointless by the policy of constructive engagement. Sanctions and constructive engagement, having done little but comfort the military in power and impoverish the Myanmarese, have proved a rather poisonous cocktail.

It is now high time to get rid of sanctions and seriously promote disinterested engagement - a midway that both camps could join. Whether a country engages or isolates Myanmar, it should not neglect its humanitarian situation. On the contrary, the world should demonstrate its capacity to forgive, which does not imply courting or systematically pleasing the military, and massively invest in educational, cultural, environmental, infrastructural, and humanitarian projects. Disinterested engagement - unilateral, non-lucrative and not motivated by economic advantages or linked with political pressure - would certainly leave the generals puzzled.

However, for the military government to let in external aid, the international community should prevent further entrenching of the generals in their xenophobia. Strong public reproof, such as Laura Bush's immediate accusation of the government keeping its citizens in the dark about the strength of the upcoming cyclone, should thus be avoided. Following the cyclone, it first seemed that, conscious of the scale of destruction, Myanmar's authorities agreed to open up to international aid, quite unlike their haughty autarchic attitude after the 2004 tsunami. However, despite a death toll growing day by day to culminate over 100,000, it soon appeared that humanitarian workers could hardly get visas and that food and equipments were unevenly distributed. In addition, the government insisted on conducting a constitutional referendum despite calls for postponement made by the opposition. Unsurprisingly, the outcome approved the draft constitution.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was permitted to check the situation in the Irrawaddy Delta. ASEAN and the UN are now jointly organizing a conference scheduled for Sunday, 25 May 2008, to coordinate relief aid and set up a mechanism to facilitate supply. The involvement of ASEAN can only bring positive results, as the Southeast Asian association enjoys more of the generals' trust than Western powers. If international assistance needs to be channeled through ASEAN, to be acceptable to the military government, then ASEAN should be empowered with the means to relay aid down to the common man.

Since disinterested engagement appears as a midway between constructive engagement and sanctions, it can be adopted by both, pursuers of the first (along with transforming Sittwe into an international standard harbour, has India thought of building schools for the children of dockers and sailors?) and defenders of the second (if the West is so truly concerned with the state of the Myanmarese, then why does it refuse to acknowledge the fact that sanctions hurt those they claim to protect?).

Disinterested engagement should aim at building the trust of Myanmar's authorities. Numerous success stories of humanitarian projects in Myanmar seem to prove that despite various obstacles, such confidence can be built as to enable the conduct of meaningful action on the ground. People's welfare and empowerment would be the most obvious mid-term result of disinterested engagement. Improvement in health and education - that the authorities cannot afford - would both prepare Myanmar for a potentially more prosperous future and may become the key to economic and political reform. The positive impact of social, environmental and humanitarian investments could help the generals realize how unviable their policies are. This will obviously not have them relinquish power, but may foster some reform that will open up economic opportunities.

Hence, the international community should use the present disaster as an occasion to reverse its policy on Myanmar and collectively invest to raise health and educational standards as well as improve environmental protection and infrastructure. While incrementally improving the situation for the common man, disinterested engagement could act as common ground for a united international approach, seeking economic and political reform in Myanmar.