Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled to arrive in New Delhi on 29 April for a short six-hour working visit. Energy issues are on the agenda of talks between India and Iran. The visit has wider geo-political significance and, hopefully, the Government of India will avoid diplomatic lethargy and gainfully utilize this opportunity.

The timing of the visit is crucial. The Bush administration has focused attention on isolating President Ahmadinejad. In March 2008, the third round of Security Council sanctions was imposed on Iran. Despite the adverse findings in the National Intelligence Estimate of December 2007, the US continues to view Iran as a major threat and seeks to increase international pressure on Iran to suspend its Uranium enrichment. Given the cordiality of Indo-US relations, President Ahmadinejad's visit can become an unnecessary irritant in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the US has recently lost much international support by branding Iran as a rogue state. President Ahmadinejad has visited Arab states and addressed the Gulf Cooperation Council. India will have to balance the growing regional popularity of President Ahmadinejad and the US abhorrence for the Iranian regime.

The visit of President Ahmadinejad was not planned. The Indian Government had received a request for re-fuelling the Iranian President's plane in India on its flight from Sri Lanka to Tehran. The technical stop-over was tactically converted into an official visit by India. This was a shrewd move for correcting the seemingly negative perceptions of the Indian government towards Iran. India has further demonstrated diplomatic deftness by refusing to be pressurized by the US. The US has advised India to use the coming visit of President Ahmadinejad to insist on Iran's compliance with the Security Council resolutions and the abandonment of its Uranium enrichment plan. The Government of India has refused to accept any third party guidance in framing its bilateral relations with Iran. Moreover, India has asserted the responsibility of the IAEA, rather than the US, to judge Iran's legal non-compliance with the non-proliferation commitments.

The US has attempted in the past to dictate India's Iran policy. In January 2006, the US Ambassador to India, David Mulford, stated that the Indo-US nuclear deal could be stalled in the US Congress if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA. After the visit of Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister to Delhi in September 2007, Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary for State, expressed concern over India's military relationship with Iran. On both occasions India had countered the US pressure by issuing verbal statements. The visit of President Ahmadinejad provides an opportunity to go further and improve India's relations with Iran.

India appears to be involved in a damage control exercise following its vote against Iran in the IAEA in September 2005. The Indian government realizes that Iran can meet India's energy requirements in the next decade. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is expected to provide crucial energy supplies for India. Apart from being its traditional friend Iran has supported India on the Kashmir issue in the OIC. The huge Shia Muslim population in India shares a natural bond with the Iranian Shiites. Iran and India have joined hands in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and to support the development of alternate access routes to it via Iran's Chahbahar port. Hence India's relations with Iran go beyond formal symbolism, and have diplomatic advantages for the future. The Iran policy needs to go beyond publicizing India's non-alignment to concretizing its national foreign policy objectives.

The test of India's diplomatic capabilities lies in consolidating its relations with Iran, without unduly antagonizing the US. India has traditionally faced the problem of balancing its relations with other countries by displeasing some and appeasing other countries at regular intervals. India should be unapologetic about pursuing her national interests by building bilateral, regional and global partnerships. For realizing these goals it is essential that India remains committed, in letter and spirit, to agreements concluded with the US and Iran. The 2004 New Delhi Declaration on strategic partnership with Iran is as important as the Indo-US Nuclear Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2005. For ensuring the stability of Afghanistan, India needs to cooperate with the US and Iran.

According to Morgenthau's theory of Realism, nation states are not judged by universal moral principles; their success depends on their ability to define national interest in terms of power. Hopefully Indian diplomacy realizes that interactions with the Iranian President should be guided by the goal of serving India's national interests, not appeasing either Iran or the US