The Myanmarese army's second-in-command Gen. Maung Aye's visit to New Delhi is widely believed to reveal India's power and influence over Myanmar's military government. The four-day visit enabled India to advance its interests in Myanmar, with the agreement on the US$130 million Kaladan project - a vital infrastructural development for India's landlocked Northeast - being finally signed on 2 April. Worthy of note, this visit happens despite India's discontinuing weapons supplies to the Myanmarese army after last November.

Maung Aye's visit to New Delhi comes at a critical time for the military junta, six months after its violent repression of pro-democracy protests in September 2007 prompted a new set of international sanctions. China's image being tarnished by its attitude on Tibet, it is unlikely to show strong support for the Myanmarese government. Therefore, securing India's confidence appears a crucial necessity for the Myanmarese leaders, which places India in a position of strength.

On the agenda figured connectivity, economic cooperation, energy and security. Negotiations on the agenda's highlight - the multi-modal Kaladan project - succeeded a few weeks ago after India stopped insisting on build, operate and transfer (BOT) terms, and accepted Myanmar's demand to keep the ownership and management of the Sittwe port, leaving India with the right to use the installation (build, operate and use, or BOU). The reopening of the Stillwell road linking Assam to China's Yunnan is also an important project under discussion for the improvement of Indo-Myanmar connectivity.

Concerning economic cooperation, the two countries had set the objective of raising bilateral trade to US$2 billion within three years during President Abdul Kalam's 2006 visit to Myanmar. At around US$650 million in 2006-2007, bilateral trade seems very unlikely to reach the target by 2009. However, the signing, during Gen. Maung Aye's visit, of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) may change this situation. The need to promote border trade by opening more border trade posts - such as the Pangsau Pass, on the Stillwell road - was stressed. Adding more items to the trade agreement should also been considered.

Maung Aye's visit should further India's energy interests in Myanmar. During the rather untimely visit of the Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Murli Deora, to Myanmar in September 2007, India pledged to invest US$150 million in three exploration blocks. Several other major energy projects are on the table, such as a pipeline and a hydroelectric project.

Maung Aye also paid a visit to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in Bangalore, expressing Myanmar's space ambitions. There is a paradox in the fact that a country that tries to cut itself from the world also attempts to develop a satellite. India, however, is unlikely to help.

Apart from the planned agenda, Maung Aye's visit showcased what some journalists have baptized India's "charm offensive." Bilateral relations between India and Myanmar have significantly improved since Maung Aye's first visit in 2000. Maung Aye is reputed to feel strongly anti-China - he is presumably responsible for eviction in 2004, of the pro-China Khin Nyunt. Since countering China remains the cornerstone of India's Myanmar policy, New Delhi has tried to ensure stable, reliable and trusty relations with Maung Aye. The recent visit saw the Myanmarese general received practically as a Head of State by India's highest dignitaries, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the Vice-President, Hamid Ansari and the President, Pratibha Patil.

India should keep exploiting the rift between the State Peace and Development Council's head, Gen. Than Shwe, and Gen. Maung Aye - an opposition which recently came into the limelight apropos the order to shoot on protesting monks last September. The latter is believed to have opposed the order. While Maung Aye is Than Shwe's designated successor, the divide, apparently has become more exacerbated than ever, and may well change the scenario. As Than Shwe's civilian organization - the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) - increasingly acquires political power, it will, for example, monitor the upcoming referendum on a new constitution in May. Therefore, India should make it clear that Maung Aye's preeminence over an ailing Than Shwe has made him New Delhi's interlocutor, and support the faction that resists Than Shwe.

Some reshuffling in the military government may open the way to reforms from which India would surely stand to gain. In fact, Maung Aye's faction is more likely to engage in a tripartite dialogue with the democratic forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic groups represented by the Ethnic Nationalities Council. As a result, international sanctions could be alleviated and international assistance resumed. In addition, the government may push for economic reform while corruption's grip on the administration relaxes, spurring economic growth. Such a political and economic stabilization of Myanmar can only open up opportunities for India.

Thus, India has great interest in upholding Maung Aye's faction against Than Shwe's entourage and the USDA that will gain prominence thanks to the referendum. This would not only favor India's economic and strategic stakes in Myanmar, but would also facilitate political change and economic reform, from which the common Myanmarese - as well as India - will benefit.