Central Asian leaders have finally come to appreciate the virtues of unity and cooperation for self-preservation and economic development of their countries. The leaders of the three energy-rich countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have for the first time since their independence in 1991 worked in unity in their negotiations with Gazprom, the Russian gas and oil giant, to get "European prices" for their natural gas exports. The press release on Gazprom's website read: "based upon the interests of the national economies and considering the international commitments with regard to the energy supply reliability and continuity, starting from 2009, natural gas will be sold at European prices"

Gazprom is a monopoly buyer of Central Asian gas because it controls the major gas pipelines (Central Asia-Centre) that were built during Soviet times to supply European countries. Surprisingly, unlike previous tough negotiations, this time Gazprom agreed to increase the export price for the Central Asian countries substantially. It is debatable whether Gazprom agreed to increase the export price out of a genuine desire to assist the national economies of the Central Asian countries or out of prudent geopolitical considerations. Another important question is whether Central Asian countries will now still seek to diversify their energy export routes when they are getting a 'fair price' for their gas, or will other routes offer the same "European price" for their gas.

As a matter of fact, Gazprom already has long-term contracts with all the Central Asian countries that have committed most of their gas exports to Russian pipelines. Central Asia is the last part of the former Soviet Union where Russian influence is still more or less unchallenged despite serious incursions by the US and China (through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in recent years. Russia is the largest trading partner of all the Central Asian states, including those not exporting gas namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Millions of Central Asians are migrant workers in Russia; this factor has become increasingly important for the poorest countries of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan whose economies and social stability are dependent on remittances of migrant workers. Not long before being ousted from power, the former president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, wrote a book where he thanked God for giving Russia to Central Asia.

In all other regions of the former Soviet Empire, Russian influence is declining - the three Baltic States have for some time now been NATO members, Georgia and Ukraine are seeking its membership, and Azerbaijan is increasingly looking towards the West.

Therefore, Kremlin is anxious to keep Central Asia its 'backyard,' maintaining its exclusive sphere of influence. Central Asian leaders were not happy with the fact that Russia was not paying them even half of what it was getting from EU countries for their gas, which led them to look for alternative routes to export their energy resources. Interestingly, unlike Ukraine, which made a big issue out of its row with Gazprom over increased prices to Ukraine, Central Asian disgruntlement was never voiced strongly. Instead, Central Asian leaders started looking for alternative routes like the Trans-Caspian pipeline sponsored by the EU and the US to feed the Nabucco project to EU countries, the Trans-Afghan pipeline or TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China. Out of these three projects, only the pipeline to China has been started, while the others seem to have stalled indefinitely.

Russian foreign policymakers seem to have come up with a master stroke this time by increasing the export prices for Central Asian countries, hoping that this move will keep Central Asian energy resources under effective Russian control and stop the Central Asian search for alternative routes. It remains to be seen whether this Russian move will bring the desired results, since it is in the strategic interests of the Central Asian countries to create alternative routes for their energy exports while keeping the existing alternatives alive. The fact that, on 5 April 2008, Turkmenistan signed a MoU with India on oil and gas cooperation testifies that the prudent Turkmen leadership has a strategic vision regarding the present geopolitical situation.

Finally, it can be said that the geopolitical situation in Central Asia is changing very fast with increasing unity and understanding in the face of common challenges and threats. Central Asian leaders are putting aside minor disputes to speak with a united voice and are trying to resolve regional problems in cooperation with each other. It will not be surprising if the next step for their leadership will be developing a common strategy on Afghanistan. Only after they are united can the Central Asian countries withstand outside pressure and resist great power rivalry from again disrupting their regional stability and peace.