Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 24 March 2008

Speaker: Ravi Bhoothalingam
Founder and Chairman, Manas Advisory

What could the likely approaches to the Tibet issue be, that takes into account practical realities rather than reaches back into history? The problem in Tibet could be approached through two concepts articulated by China in the last few years: first, the concept of a "harmonious society" and second, the concept of a "harmonious world."

A Harmonious Society

The concept of the "harmonious society" is a wide-ranging concept. Its main characteristics are democracy, rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and vitality. The concept also includes issues such as guaranteeing respect for the people's rights and interests, the environment, enhanced creativity of society as a whole and the development of an innovation-based nation. This concept has been generated due to a recognition within the Chinese leadership that even though massive economic development in the last 25 years has reduced poverty in China, all this has come at a heavy price such as growing income disparities, regional imbalances, social unrest, corrupt local leaders unfettered by the rule of law, and a highly-degraded environment.

A Harmonious World

This concept is related to the first because a benign external environment is needed to facilitate the development of a harmonious society. The concept of a harmonious world is the opposite of Huntington's doctrine of the "clash of civilizations." This concept calls for inclusiveness by recognizing the interdependence of nations, and also for mutual learning from the great diversity of human experiences. It recognizes the need for each country to deal with others on the basis of trust and fairness. This concept is closely related to the Confucian position which is "maintain harmony, though differences exist." However, when it comes to the injustice in Tibet, China seems far from practicing the concept of a harmonious world.

The Tibetan Question

In the post-1959 period, the Chinese adopted a much firmer role in Tibet in comparison to the period between the liberation of Tibet in 1950 to 1959. Post-1959, the situation along the India-China border became tense. Tibet certainly complicated the situation since the Dalai Lama was granted refuge in India after fleeing from Tibet in 1959. However, in the early 1970s, some kind of contact between the Dalai Lama's representative and China was initiated. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping responding to a representative of the Dalai Lama stated that anything short of independence of Tibet could be discussed across the table. During the next 10 years there were some informal exchanges between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's emissary. However, the Dalai Lama's declaration of the five-point peace plan for Tibet in 1987 during his address to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus and the rioting in Lhasa in 1988, both led towards a deadlock in discussions between China and the Dalai Lama. Thereafter, due to a lack of trust between the two sides, the issue of Tibet took a backseat in the Chinese state of affairs. However, in 1998, the Clinton administration urged China to resume talks with Dalai Lama and ultimately in 2002, talks were resumed. Since then, there have been five rounds of discussions, without any significant progress. The main conflicting issues in the five-point agenda presented by the Dalai Lama are as follows:

Question of Autonomy

It is a very significant issue as far as the Tibetan problem is concerned. Various kinds of autonomy have been mentioned from time to time in the China-Dalai Lama discourse, such as the Dalai Lama's concept of "genuine autonomy," the existing autonomy that is practiced in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and the high-level autonomy based on the Hong Kong model. As a result, due to the lack of consensus between China and the Dalai Lama over a common model of autonomy for Tibet, the question of autonomy still remains unresolved. Moreover, the western conceptualization of autonomy has further complicated the situation as China perceives it as a step towards Tibet's independence. However, there is a Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) in China that provides the basis for the governance of China's autonomous region. It is a remarkable piece of legislation and can offer a solution to the Tibetan question. However, unfortunately, it is not being implemented properly.

Movement of Han Population into Tibet

According to the Chinese census of 2000 there are only 8 per cent non-Tibetans in the 2.6 million population of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). However, the Tibetans claim that in 1985 there were 1.7 million Chinese in the TAR. Colin Mackerras, in a study done for the UN, analyzed the issue and concluded that while the figures quoted by both sides were exaggerated, the Tibetan exiles' statistics were even more so. Even though Lhasa and other main towns have a high concentration of Hans, in interior Tibet, they are not present in significant numbers. This situation leads to conflicts between developmental needs and local identities. Development demands skills. However, when skills come in, the situation becomes complicated since this involves an inward movement of outsiders to fulfill the demands of skilled labor. A better way to resolve this issue is to take into account local sensitivities by leaving this decision to the elected local bodies. It should be their right to decide what kind of development they need. However, China's development focus in Tibet does not adequately take into account local sentiments. As a result, Han migration is becoming a source of conflict.

The Concept of Greater Tibet

The actual deal-breaker between the Dalai Lama and China was the concept of 'Greater Tibet.' The Dalai Lama's proposal advocates the administrative unification of all the Tibetan-inhabited cultural areas. These include not only the present-day TAR, but also some parts of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. This concept of Greater Tibet or the historical Chulkha Sum however, is not acceptable to China, which perceives this demand as a plan to undermine its territorial integrity. However, as far as the question of maintaining the religion, culture, and the Tibetan way of life is concerned, the creation of Chulkha Sum as an administrative territory seems unnecessary because it leads towards large-scale restructuring of existing entities. Thus, it makes China more suspicious about Tibet's motivation.

Danger and Opportunity for China

The present crisis could prove dangerous for China in two ways. First, the Tibetan crisis has become internationalized and is no longer China's domestic matter. China's plans to organize the Olympic Games could also suffer due to the worldwide anti-China campaign, organized by the Tibetans. It could also make relations between the US and China more complicated and intensify the strategic rivalry between the two. China has already been criticized by the US on the issue of Taiwan, and human rights violations and the recent crisis in Tibet could further facilitate the closeness between the US and the Dalai Lama. The crisis could also damage China's plan of creating a harmonious world and benign external environment, which it urgently needs to tackle various challenges on its political, social, economic, and environmental fronts.

The second danger for China comes on the harmonious society front, since the Tibetan unrest questions China's governing capacity and its strategy to solve its problems through economic means alone. It is evident from the Tibetan case that only pushing forward developmental activities will not solve every problem. However, at the same time this crisis can prove to be an opportunity for China if it learns to address the growing social dissatisfaction not only in Tibet, but also in other parts of China, where it will have to use its economic clout more efficiently.

Danger and Opportunity for India

There is also an opportunity for India to play a proactive role in the settlement of this problem, since it has provided refuge to the Dalai Lama and also enjoys global credibility. To this extent, India's involvement will not be controversial or seen with suspicion because it already has recognized the India-Tibet boundary as the India-China boundary. India's role as a facilitator of dialogue between Dalai Lama and China could also help in enhancing the understanding between India and China. However, there are also possibilities that such attempts could be prove dangerous for India, as it might, for instance, fall into the populist trap of China-bashing. This might annoy China. Therefore, instead of open negotiations, a discrete back-channel engagement is advisable with India acting as an honest broker between China and Dalai Lama.

Danger and Opportunity for Tibet

For the Tibetans, both in Tibet and outside, the continuance of the ongoing crisis is dangerous. It could lead Tibet towards permanent conflict. However, the opportunity for Tibet is that it could consolidate and intensify all the efforts being made for a creative and peaceful resolution of this longstanding problem.

DISCUSSION

Questions

• In 1950, when Tibet was invaded, did the newly-formed Indian government have the capacity to deal with the issue at that time?

• How is the Dalai Lama's demand for de-nuclearization of Tibet to be explained?

• What are the demographic changes taking place in Tibet?

• How can India play a proactive role in promoting dialogue between Dalai Lama and China?

• What is India's national interest in Tibet?

• What are the chances of the continuation of the ongoing crisis in Tibet?

• What are India's interests in becoming a broker between Dalai Lama and China? Has India considered the possible implications of the growing disharmony among the Tibetans themselves?

• Can India not instead help in generating economic opportunities for Tibet by building closer economic linkages across the border?

Responses

• By 1950 it was too late as far as the Indian capacity was concerned, to deal with the issue. China was hostile to India during that time, and even Nehru was called the running-dog of imperialism by Mao. India did not have the capacity to deal with the problem in 1950 because it believed it was not in the interest of the newly-emerging independent countries to go to war with each other.

• As far as India's role in the Tibetan issue is concerned, India should engage in this through back-channel arrangements rather than engage in open negotiations. Moreover, a multilateral engagement could also be explored as an option.

• The issue of the population of the Han community in Tibet is very contentious. Figures, claimed by both sides are exaggerated. It depends on who are counted as Tibetans - PLA and migrant labor on three-year contracts or those who have the hukou or household registration in Tibet. Clearly, in Lhasa and other towns, Chinese presence is significant, but in the interior parts, Chinese population is not as significant.

• There are nuclear installations in the TAR, just as there are nuclear and missiles stations in Qaidam in Qinghai province. Naturally, India would be happy with the Dalai Lama's demand for de-nuclearization of the Tibetan region because it puts China in a disadvantageous position and India will be the immediate beneficiary of this.

• India can definitely play a role in the economic sphere, where Tibet is concerned, but the acceptability of India's unilateral moves to the Chinese in this regard is a determining factor.

• As far as the question of India's interest in Tibet is concerned, even though at present it does not seem directly linked with India's interests, if this problem persists, then it will become important for India's interests because of geographical proximity.