Apart from Pakistan and separatist groups, which have been demanding demilitarization, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) has also threatened to break up the ruling alliance if Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is not demilitarized and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) not repealed, thereby raising the ultra-sensitive issue of the politicization of national security yet again. As state elections, likely to be held between August and October this year approach, pressure for the fulfillment of these demands will continue to increase. So far, both the Centre and State governments have ruled out any large-scale troop reduction in the militancy-infested state of J&K.

The deployment of troops along the border and within J&K, affected by external dimensions of terrorism (cross-border infiltration), is a sensitive security issue and therefore requires detailed professional inputs and assessment. The strength and deployment of troops along the border are decided on the basis of assessed military and non-military threats (including infiltration) from neighbouring countries, and internal security requirements. Additionally, the increase or decrease in troops and their redeployment, which depend on information, local and overall assessments, and operational missions, is also subjected to constant review. The demands of the PDP have thus, been more political than related to the security situation.

Troop-withdrawal has been consistently linked to existing levels of militancy in the state, and the latest J&K terror data has cautioned against troop-withdrawal. According to the data collected by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and security agencies, as of November 2007, terrorism-related violence had hit 16 of the 22 J&K districts with varying gravity, leaving 460 terrorists, 151 civilians and 105 security personnel dead in 1054 incidents. The database of the Institute for Conflict Management indicated that the fatality index in 2007 decreased by 30.38 per cent in comparison to 2006. While there was a substantial decrease in civilian fatalities - 164 in 2007 as against 349 in 2006, and those of terrorists - 492 in 2007 as against 599 in 2006, there was only a marginal decrease in the number of Security Force (SF) personnel killed - 121 in 2007 as against 168 in 2006.

Diminished violence, however, doesnot indicate a necessary decline in the capacity for terrorism, as there are clear indications that the infrastructure that supports and sustains the Kashmiri jihad remains intact in Pakistan. Official sources disclosed that at least 52 terrorist training camps were still operating, including 30 in Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, and the rest in the area of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). At least one-third of these camps are known to be fully active at any given point of time.

The decrease in jihadi violence in J&K has been paralleled by a shift in focus of the Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorists', to the Indian heartland, with as many as 140 civilians killed in Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K during 2007, in locations as varied as Varanasi, Lucknow and Faizabad in Uttar Pradesh, Ajmer in Rajasthan, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, and Panipat in Haryana. By comparison, 164 civilians were killed in jihadi terrorist attacks in the whole of J&K in 2007. These trends suggested that J&K was gradually emerging as a launch pad for terrorist attacks across India. Investigations into these attacks have confirmed that each of them had linkages to the Kashmiri jihad in terms of human and logistics support.

The incidence of infiltration with the melting of snows in Srinagar and acts of violence by separatist militants are likely to increase in the coming days. The jihadi cadres crossing the LoC are now better-trained and equipped than in the past. According to the CRPF, the new ranks of militants in J&K are more lethal, motivated and well-qualified, and dare to seek direct contact with security forces. Even though fewer in number, militants are now using new ways and means to sustain their operations not only in the State, but across the Indian heartland.

The security situation is very dynamic and not easily quantifiable. Given the present security situation in the state, demilitarization in Kashmir will impinge adversely not only on India's capability to address the problem of terrorism in the state, but also its ability to deal with the military threat posed in that sector by Pakistan and China. Officials in New Delhi also contend that the continued presence of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) cadres indicates that the demand for troop-withdrawal was premature.

Deciding a sensitive issue such as demilitarization without professional consultations or by using political and street pressure, to ensure such changes in policy, implies a sidelining of professional advice for political expediency. Moreover, military pressure alone cannot resolve internal security or law and order problems, unless there is good governance. Indeed, political leaders must take note of public grievances and discuss them with the concerned authorities, particularly when they happen to be part of the ruling coalition. However, if such demands are likely to compromise national security, they must also correct public impressions and not exploit them for political reasons. As the 2008 elections draw closer, the PDP will more likely than not become more strident in its demand. The people of Jammu and Kashmir can only hope their lives will not be sacrificed to serve their leaders' quest for power.