Report of Book Discussion held at the USI on 1 March 2008

Introductory Remarks: PR Chari

This book, the route to which was paved by a series of other books written on individual crisis, represents about 15 years of work. The entire enterprise was set into motion with the first book titled 'Brasstacks'. The second related to the 1990 Kashmir spring crisis, and the third was an edited work on Kargil. The fourth was a report written by the three authors on the Kargil conflict and the border confrontation crisis of 2001-02.

K Subrahmanyam

Even though the title reads “American engagement in South Asia”, the book has India-Pakistan relations as its focus and America's influence on these relations, not US involvement in South Asia per se. While US has been engaged indirectly in South Asia since the Second World War, its real, direct engagement started when President Carter signed the Presidential Directive on 3 July 1979 authorizing a joint US-Pakistan engagement in Afghanistan. 9/11 once again led to direct American operations in Afghanistan, and thereafter, a complex involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through all this, its relations with India have seen both ups and downs.

The book is very valuable as it gives a connected review of what has happened, yet it does not address the entire gamut of US-South Asia relations, but only focuses on American engagement in Indo-Pak relations.

Amb Lalit Mansingh

While there are no basic differences with the conclusions of the book, it is regrettable that the authors give credibility, bordering on respectability, to Pakistan's justification for its attack on Kargil. It was a naked act of aggression and there can be no justification for it.

Kargil was among the most successful Indian diplomatic and military operations, as India's stand that it was a victim of aggression was internationally accepted, and by not crossing the LoC, it established itself as a responsible state. Most importantly, Kargil gave India the breakthrough it was seeking in its relations with the US.

Kargil also taught us many lessons, the most important being the refutation of the belief of Indian military planners that India's nuclear tests had established peaceful relations with Pakistan for all times to come. It also revealed that 'back channel diplomacy' (to which the book also refers), when it operates independently, can create immense confusion.

Operation Parakram was not an “obvious failure.” It was a limited military and complete diplomatic success because the intent of Operation Parakram was to practice coercive diplomacy, not attack Pakistan.

Finally, the last chapter of the book reflects a surprising sense of pessimism. It argues that 'the entry of nuclear weapons into the subcontinent has not made the region more stable or conflict less likely.' Again, one has to disagree because we have the finest state of stability in the subcontinent today, cross-border terrorism has virtually come to a halt, there is a peace process under way, and enormous confidence at the people-to-people level in either country.

NS Sisodia

The authors have correctly highlighted the lapses in intelligence and policy during Brasstacks and the breakdown in communications between the MoD, Service Chiefs, MoS and the Prime Minister, and between the PMO and MoD. They correctly point out that there is a lack of institutional decision-making in India. The general conclusions the book draws is that there is a great possibility of errors of judgment in Indo-Pak relations, especially under conditions of stress and, therefore, it is crucial to have a system of institutional decision-making in place.

As regards the 1990 crisis, an interesting attempt has been made by the authors to show how the crisis could have led to war, but was prevented. However, the belief that the crisis was ultimately diffused because of the impact a conflict would have had on their respective economies is not correct. The presence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of a strike, even if against nuclear facilities, is certain to have acted as a deterrent to the escalation of the crisis.

Air Chief Marshal (retd.) S Krishnaswami

Even though the American institutional views have been liberally explained in the book, since the US was pretty much involved in these crises, it does not essentially reflect the American policy in South Asia. What might be of value is to understand where American interests lie today, for example in Pakistan. It is amazing how the US is required to take a decision about forming a government in the so-called democratic Pakistan, and how dependent the latter has become for guidance and money on the US. However, despite this, Pakistan claims it does not have the technology to fight the Taliban. From our point of view, the Americans have differentiated between the Taliban in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Kashmir due to their national interest considerations. From the perspective of India's national interest, however, the two are the same. America has obvious national interests in the region and has been involved here for very long.

Steven P Cohen

The book is not primarily about America's role in South Asia, but crises in South Asia and America's role in them.

Presently, the Pakistanis are worried that the US present engagement is Afghanistan will get over leaving Afghanistan to the mercy of India, which is one reason why Pakistan is deeply involved in Afghanistan - to counterbalance India.

There is a sea change in Pakistan's view of itself. It still does not trust India. However, they see the rising Islamist extremism as their real problem. This represents a profound change in India-Pakistan relations as they could become more accommodating to deal with their problems.

We picked these four crises because these were the most important. Of the four, three were similar, provoked as they were by one side or the other. The 1990 crisis was different; it was made up of several smaller sub-crises which came together at the same time in 1990. However, all the crises involved a major miscalculation or misjudgment, and bad intelligence by one or both sides, including the United States.

PR Chari

There are certain difficulties in writing about recent history. While there are human sources, one nevertheless has to consult the chronicles of the past - newspapers, journals, apart from meeting people involved in the events. This poses a problem, because people may have strong prejudices and maybe unwilling to uncover particular facts. One has to talk to two or three people to check.

Another problem is people's memories, particularly with regard to chronology. Therefore, one has to go back to the chronicles of that time and cross check the facts.  

Then there is the question of how to bring together the diverse view points of the three authors? There were two options. The first was to have three different stories. Second, and the more difficult approach, which is also what the book attempts, is to put all the three versions together, which may not satisfy any of the authors with regard to what they believe really happened.

DISCUSSION

Comments

• Kargil was not a war but an incursion. It demonstrated lack of ammunition and long-range weapons like Smerch missiles. There is greater need to improve and expand the Manali-Leh Road.

• Kargil was in retaliation against India's role in the Neelam Valley.

• Brasstacks started off as an exercise to examine whether commanders were capable of handling large operations. Personalized operations later got converted into a crisis.

• During Operation 'Parakram', US engagement was the most intense. The US launched multi-level diplomacy in Pakistan and India to deter India and coerce Pakistan without compromising its own objectives.TheTravel Advisory was an example of reverse coercive diplomacy.

• Operation Parakram was not an instance of coercive diplomacy at all. It was a very serious operation.

Questions

• The leadership is now changing in Pakistan. Will the crises replicate themselves? Will there be a different peace process? Will there be a change in the nature of US engagement in South Asia?

• What were the objectives of Operation Parakram? Was it a shadow game?

• 'Four Crises and a Peace Process' reflect a particular mindset. If that mindset continues, what will be the nature of the peace process?

• Can you analyze the behavior of  institutions during Operation Parakram?

• I doubt whether Pakistan really started deploying nuclear missiles during the Kargil crisis. Was Kargil such an important objective for Pakistan? Do you think Pakistan would have used nuclear weapon to defend the intrusion in Kargil?

• Why has the book confined itself to only four crises, when there was US engagement even during 1962, 1965 and 1971?

• Is nuclear terrorism becoming a plausible scenario in South Asia?

• While Nawaz Sharif did not know about Kargil, Rajiv Gandhi was unaware about Brasstacks . Can we conclude that ambitious generals can lead the subcontinent to war?

The conclusion of the book is that Brasstacks was merely an exercise. If so, why was it kept so secret?

Responses

Lalit Mansingh

India was very serious about going to war during the Kargil crisis, which would not have been preventive, but punitive. The international community would have reconciled itself to an Indian attack, but invading or occupying Pakistan did not make military or diplomatic sense. Pakistan was determined to use nuclear weapons in the case of an Indian offensive during the Kargil crisis - a perception shared by the US establishment.

K Subramaniam

There are enough checks and balances, both institutional and political. There is not even a remote possibility that ambitious generals will be able to push the countries to war.

Steven P Cohen

The prime movers of the peace process are people in the subcontinent rather than the US administration. There was a growing realization in the US Congress that the Musharraf regime is working like an autocratic regime, a trend not beneficial for the country and the sub-region.

PR Chari

Regarding the choice of these four crises, the book's title is 'Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia' and not vice versa. The reason we chose these crises is that we wanted to concentrate on those with a nuclear dimension. Therefore we started with Brasstacks.

Yes, there was a nuclear angle in the Kargil crisis and it is better to rely on the American version in this regard because it was their technology which was able to pick up the fact that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were being moved. However, the intention behind moving these weapons is not clear.