CTBT Review: An Indian way out

19 Aug, 1999    ·   247

Kanchan L. argues that India needs to resolve the basic divergences between the position of the USA and its allies and its own core strategic interests. More than reactive posturing, the new government ought to adopt a proactive strategy to modify the negotiating framework to suit Indian concerns
Kanchan Lakshman
The Review Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is scheduled to take place in September, 1999. This Conference assumes added significance in the context of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan [both non-signatories] in May 1998, and the fact that the United States of America , the first of the 152 countries to have signed the CTBT, has failed to ratify it. The primary goals of the CTBT which opened for signature in September, 1996 are the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the abolition of nuclear weapon test explosions. Although these considerations are significant for the Conference, the negotiating dynamics would bring to the fore the efficacy of the CTBT. The challenges facing Indian diplomacy in the post-Pokhran II era are linked to whether India could sign the CTBT or not. A critical scenario has developed in the domestic arena viz.- the lack of a consensus regarding the Indian standpoint  and the absence of an elected government at the centre.

 

 

India participated constructively in the negotiations on a CTBT which began in 1993 with a mandate this treaty would lead to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India also sought to situate the treaty in a disarmament framework by suggesting its linkage with a time-bound programme for nuclear disarmament. The treaty text makes India 's signature and ratification a pre-condition for its entry into force. On June 20, 1996, India announced that, while it would not sign the CTBT, it would not oppose other countries adopting it. The entry into force clause which India vehemently opposed stipulates that 44 countries including India would have to ratify it before it could come into force..

 

 

Following Pokhran II, India announced a moratorium on further nuclear tests and promised to initiate a de jure formalization of this obligation. By announcing a moratorium, India has accepted the basic postulate of the CTBT. This would make a consequential difference to its negotiating  strategy since earlier, India could not adopted a policy of restraint since this would have meant an erosion of its capability and compromising its national security. The present government has said that the formalization of a moratorium on nuclear testing is being explored through bilateral dialogue with key interlocutors. But, the only interlocutor that is seriously involved is the U.S. This  is bound to take a different trajectory in the post-Kargil era. Although the U.S.A. appreciated the policy of restraint adopted by India , its future policy the CTBT lies currently  in the realm of conjecture..  Pakistan is still holding onto a its linkage of signing the CTBT only if India does.

 

 

One of the significant questions that has cropped up is whether there is any a real compulsion for India to sign the CTBT before September, 1999, especially since the U.S. itself, besides China and Russia are not ratifying it. The lack of a viable consensus will hamper Indian diplomacy vis-a-vis the CTBT. The lack of any effort on the part by the present government in this direction is appalling. There has been no substantive  debate on signing the CTBT between the government and other political parties. Moreover, there has been no transparency either regarding the government's thinking.. The new government at the centre will have to carry on the process of engagement. The lack of consensus can be underplayed by appreciating the lack of consensus on ratification in the U.S.

 

 

If the U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT, it would still be bound by its provisions by being a signatory. India 's dilemma is that it is neither a CTBT adherent nor is an acknowledged nuclear weapon power. One of the routes to solve this conundrum might be joining the CTBT with certain conditions like changing the cut-off date of 1 January 1967 for recognised nuclear weapon powers or gaining  access to nuclear technology.

 

 

India needs to resolve the basic divergences between the position of the USA and its allies and its own core strategic interests. More than reactive posturing, the new government ought to adopt a proactive strategy to modify the negotiating framework to suit Indian concerns.

 

 

 

 

 

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