In 2006, the US Quadrennial Defence Review had identified the prospects of a nuclear capable state losing control over its weapons to terrorists as the greatest danger facing the US. Today, the international community is faced with precisely such a scenario in Pakistan. With the A Q Khan revelations of a sophisticated, lucrative and widespread nuclear black market still fresh in public memory, it is not surprising that apprehensions about 'loose nukes' in Pakistan run high.

Of course, Pakistan has worked hard to raise its credibility. In September 2004, it adopted export control legislation and its export control system has been laboriously explained at several international forums. This system includes an institutionalized, professional, organization, called the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) which is charged with the safety and security of nuclear assets. The SPD claims to have established formal oversight over strategic scientific organizations to insulate them from outside interference. This freedom was used by A Q Khan to travel and move material or documents without any accountability. Today some 8000 military personnel are employed in the security division headed by a two-star general. A separate security directorate for counter intelligence works under the SPD to coordinate with intelligence agencies on external threats, with the ISI forming the outermost security ring.

Pakistan has also benefited from US financial and technical assistance., Some US$100 million (which is actually only 1 per cent of what it has spent on aid to Pakistan since 2001, estimated at US$11bn), has reportedly been spent to provide equipment and training for nuclear safety and security. Despite being constrained by Pakistani sensitivity on sharing information on nuclear assets and locations, as well as legal limits on its own ability to help a non-NPT state, the US has nevertheless taken several relevant steps. However, no one knows how much has slipped out of the country before 2003, since A Q Khan is shielded from investigations.

The systems in place now provide some notional sense of security. However, three factors, none of which were present when the USSR broke up and loose nukes last made headlines, make the situation far more complex in Pakistan. These are: firstly, the presence of armed, motivated, foreign and national, religious terrorist organizations on Pakistani soil that are as anti-West or anti-India as anti-Pakistani, and are known to desire acquisition of WMD. So, there is a clear external threat; secondly, the presence of Islamist sympathizers within the Pakistani military, intelligence and scientific organizations who constitute a threat from inside that could lead to leakage of nuclear material, technology or know-how to jihadi outfits; and thirdly, the likely continuance of remnants of the A Q Khan network who may use political instability to revive nuclear transfers for personal monetary gains.

Given the above, two specific dangers stand out. The first and more probable is that of radioactive nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium, both of which Pakistan has) being acquired by a terrorist organization, and used along with conventional explosives to build a radiological dispersal device or dirty bomb. This would certainly have a great psychological impact, causing massive disruption, and entail high costs in damage control, but may not result in greater loss of life than conventional explosives.

The second, and more difficult exercise, is the acquisition and use of a full-fledged nuclear weapon by a non-state actor. This appears less probable for three reasons - one, because fissile cores and other components are physically separated in Pakistan, making deliverable nuclear weapons unavailable; two, nuclear weapons need a delivery system, which may not be available unless the terrorist outfit manages to get that as well; and three, Pakistan claims to have some sort of locking mechanisms or safety devices on nuclear weapons to obviate chances of unauthorised use.

It can be assumed that, as long as a government is in charge of the state (civilian or military, since the military retains control over Pakistan's strategic assets), there should be little danger of loose nukes, unless the military allows this on purpose. As President Musharaff is realizing, there is no guarantee that nuclear dangers will not backfire on their creators. Therefore, it would be in the interests of the Pakistani state to maintain control over its nuclear assets, and use this period of political instability to restore its credibility as a responsible nuclear power. Meanwhile, New Delhi must step up its border controls (on infiltration routes, ports and other entry points), and enhance civil defence preparedness for damage limitation.