What is the current status of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and how safe and secure is it? After an emergency was proclaimed in Pakistan, predictions about President Pervez Musharraf's political future and speculation about his control over Pakistan's security situation are rife. Fears have been expressed over the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets and installations in the US and India; despite claims that Pakistan's nukes are safe, there is much anxiety about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear devices with the continuing unrest in Pakistan.

There are two overarching security concerns. The first possibility is that with an unstable political centre in Islamabad, Pakistan's nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of disgruntled military commanders or scientists. This possibility is not fanciful. Memories of how Abdul Qadeer Khan conducted nuclear trade while embedded in the Pakistani military establishment are still fresh. A chaotic situation offers the perfect opportunity for scientists to proliferate, as Khan did to Libya, North Korea and Iran, despite increased security measures being introduced in 2000. Markets for components, technology or knowledge in the nuclear field are not hard to find, and Pakistan's immediate unstable neighbourhood will be an ideal trading area. Musharraf has given assurances about how those associated with the programme are being monitored for theft or leakage. To stress his point, the general's administration frequently points out how separate parts of the warheads are stored separately from delivery systems, making their theft and assembly difficult. However, this does not reduce the vulnerability of military installations and facilities. The suicide bomb attack on 1 November 2007 on the Sargodha airbase that houses missiles is an illustration.

The second possibility is a failure in the command and control structure in Pakistan. If a breakdown of authority structures occurs, the inability of Pakistan's military elite to control their nuclear assets could become a cause for concern. In a radio interview on Fox News, Musharraf stressed the "custodial concerns" that Pakistan's weapons were under; and also spoke about the national command authority and a strategic planning division in place. However, in an emergency situation, which presupposes a failure of routine administrative procedures, this assurance offers little comfort. The threat posed by an extremist successor government, in the event that Musharraf finds himself out of power, remains unaddressed.

For India, the difference between a Pakistani Islamic Bomb and the Al-Qaeda--Taliban Sunni Bomb is only marginal. The two countries have come close to what Musharraf calls "an unconventional war" in his book, In the Line of Fire. A working relationship with a Pakistani army headed by Musharraf was achieved with great difficulty. Both sides have shown restraint, informed by the state of nuclear deterrence obtaining. Naturally, if Musharraf goes, India's relationship with the Pakistan army will change. If his likely successor, Gen. Kiyani is unable to control the crisis, then India's fears of nuclear weapons changing hands will escalate further.

In this situation, it is vital to observe US policy towards Pakistan. From a frontline ally in its War on Terror, Pakistan is increasingly becoming Washington's biggest problem in the region. Presently, the American nuclear debate centres on Iran. Meanwhile, Pakistan that has nuclear weapons but has shown lapses in nuclear security in the past has been relegated to the backburner. This may not be possible for too long. If Musharraf goes, this opens up numerous possibilities for his replacement. A democratically elected government is a possibility and its relations with the army will shape the security of the country's nuclear arsenal. Another military dictatorship can only maintain control if it continues its good relations with the Islamist forces now present in the capital. In both cases, the US will have to facilitate moves towards securing Pakistan's nukes. In both situations, India must step back from traditional rivalry and offer its support to safeguarding these nukes for its own national security.

President Musharraf's quasi-dictatorial rule has not provided much consolation to pro-democracy forces in India or the US. However, during his rule, Musharraf has been grappling with the internal problems of terrorism and the secessionist movements in Balochistan and Waziristan. Coupled with western pressure to collaborate in the War on Terror in neighbouring Afghanistan post-9/11, the emphasis on nuclear weapons in Pakistani discourse was mitigated. Due to the current political upheaval, the issue of the security of these weapons has staged a comeback and become a cause for concern. Naturally, this highlights the South Asian region as a nuclear flashpoint. It remains to be seen how those concerns will play out in the near-term future.