To advance its "Look East" policy, India used multilateralism as a primary tool. Apart from becoming a dialogue partner of ASEAN, New Delhi also took part in other organizations, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Encompassing more than 20 percent of the world population in seven countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand) and a combined GDP exceeding US$1 trillion, BIMSTEC had the potential to emerge as a meaningful economic bloc, were its aim of facilitating and improving ties between member countries realized. Apart from economic integration, which remains the organization's top priority since its creation in June 1997, BIMSTEC has also diversified to counter-terrorism, energy, agriculture, technology, transport and communication, anti-narcotic measures, and handling of refugees, among others. However, BIMSTEC's performance during the last ten years portrays it as an extremely inefficient sub-regional body, mired in politico-bureaucratic complexities.

Although economic integration and trade facilitation undoubtedly constitute the organization's raison d'etre, member countries have not been able to agree on the modalities to implement a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). A FTA was initially expected to be finalized by July 2006, but negotiations stalled and did not regain any pace, despite India's attempt to re-launch the process in October 2006. In order to create an integrated market, the FTA was expected to progressively cut down tariffs to facilitate the circulation of goods, liberalize trade in services, stipulate common commercial rules, and facilitate investment throughout the region by creating a uniform and transparent investment regime. The "least developed countries" (LDC) in the region were allowed a delayed calendar, as early reforms could damage their economies. Trade between India and members of BIMSTEC has grown in the past ten years, but BIMSTEC's role in this development is very uncertain. Moreover, this evolution remains limited when compared to the trade between India-China, India-US, or India-ASEAN.

Similarly, anti-terrorism cooperation has exposed the gap between promises or resolutions and their implementation. In the first summit meeting of the BIMSTEC, held in India in July 2004, member states decided to set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes. The JWG held its first meeting in December 2004 and identified four fields and their "lead shepherds," whose reports were due at the second meeting. No mention of the working group has been made since then.

A major hurdle in counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing is BIMSTEC's lack of a supranational approach. As BIMSTEC's existence relies on national governments, any decision affecting a state's sovereignty (or perceived as such) has no reason to be approved. Thus, one may doubt the readiness of member countries to cooperate on such aspects as intelligence, which are fundamental to national sovereignty. This inhibits BIMSTEC's capability to address issues that individual countries are not willing to address.

From an India-centric perspective, BIMSTEC's immobility as an organization would be compensated if it served India's "Look East" policy. However, this is hardly the case either, as India's involvement in Southeast Asia never employs BIMSTEC. Although BIMSTEC offers India a terrestrial link to Southeast Asia, the project of an India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, linking Moreh (Manipur) to Maw Sot (Thailand) through Bagan (Myanmar), does not show any sign of progress, even though a field survey was launched in February 2003 and a ministerial meeting was held in December 2003.

India has developed its commercial relations with Myanmar in the past decade, but BIMSTEC hardly helped. In fact, the multilateral process of the India-Bangladesh-Myanmar pipeline has not succeeded - and India's presence in Myanmar is being ensured through bilateral deals, such as the US$100 million Kaladan project.

BIMSTEC has given no fillip to military cooperation either. India and Myanmar joint counter-insurgency operations started before BIMSTEC with Operation Golden Bird, and may very optimistically be termed as a partial success. Unfortunately, securing the region through military cooperation is probably a prerequisite for economic integration, as, for example, the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway could not be constructed in an insurgency-stricken environment. In addition, BIMSTEC has not provided a grip on Myanmar for either India or Thailand, any more than ASEAN's "constructive engagement" has made the generals politically dependent on their Southeast Asian neighbours.

Thus, one is forced to conclude that BIMSTEC is a failure on all fronts and will seemingly not take off. Its being out of the mainstream is more a sign of its inactivity rather than its opaqueness Even as it remains an India-driven initiative, New Delhi's sporadic and half hearted engagement holds out no promise of its ever picking up speed. The organization's progress is hindered by the fact that BIMSTEC is only what member countries contribute to the process and has no life of its own. Therefore, it appears to be more of a token platform than a place for substantive cooperation.