Pakistan: Emergency Times
14 Nov, 2007 · 2420
Siddharth Ramana assesses the reasons behind Musharraf's declaration of an Emergency
The decision by Pakistan President to impose an emergency on 3 November 2007 has met strong opposition, both domestically and internationally. While the judiciary has been the most significant threat to Musharraf's quest to continue in power, the immediate cause for the declaring emergency is traceable to the military setbacks in Waziristan and SWAT valley. Musharraf was increasingly apprehensive of the judiciary, which was to pronounce its verdict on the constitutional validity of his bid for re-election, while continuing as the Army Chief.
Musharraf won through a farcical re-election process on 6 October; but the active opposition of the judiciary helped to organize the opposition and the filing of lawsuits against him. In one protest, hundreds of lawyers clashed with policemen, after which a media blackout was imposed to mitigate the fallout of their protests. Musharraf's moves however resulted in a mass resignation of legislators, which made the election less than credible.
These undemocratic acts did not deter Benazir Bhutto from returning to Pakistan under a secret power sharing agreement, with Musharraf. It provided that all corruption charges leveled against her would be suspended to pave the way for "democratic" rule with Musharraf continuing as President. However, the Supreme Court by accepting a petition against Musharraf's presidential election opened a Pandora's Box, threatening the political survival of Musharraf. If the decision goes against Musharraf, it will unravel the deal with Benazir, and force him to vacate the all powerful position of army chief. Additionally, the petitions against Musharraf for deporting former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif would also attract contempt of court by the court, which had allowed his return. Musharraf's wrangles with the judiciary had their origins in the intense protests which gripped Pakistan after Musharraf sacked Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March. Musharraf had to bow before the Supreme Court's directives and reinstate him in office.
Benazir, fearing that her own deal with Musharraf would come under the glare of the judiciary placed it on the backburner, on the pretext that Musharraf was not providing her with adequate security. It is interesting that Bhutto left the country just hours after talks stalled between herself and Musharraf. The emergency was declared soon after.
However, it is arguable that Musharraf's drastic measures can be linked to the parading earlier this month of 48 soldiers of the Pakistan army, who surrendered to the militant forces in the SWAT valley. Musharraf, who rose to power in 1999 on the basis of his uncontested popularity among the armed forces, was now losing his support base. Several reports indicate that the Pakistan army was fast losing its morale, and were disinclined to fight the Islamists. To others, the loss of their comrades was unacceptable, because they were fighting America's war. Adil Najam, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the US, while writing for The News (20th September 2007), said that "not since 1971 has the Pakistan military been under such internal strain".
Additional reasons for declaring emergency was the suicide bombing in Islamabad, which occurred close to Musharraf's residence. An attack only half a mile from his residence, must have been connived with some disgruntled security forces. Musharraf would have realized that with sapping military morale and increasingly difficult political alliances his political life was in danger, but the bombing revealed that he was himself in mortal danger from the Islamists that he had helped to nurture.
When one country's army relies on another country's armed forces to do its job, it reflects on their professionalism. The strike on a militant hideout in Waziristan by a suspected American drone, is evidence that the Americans are not going to hesitate in using their military power against the Islamists. Musharraf is popularly referred to as "Busharraf" for his close ties with US President George Bush. Indeed, the United States had gained such strong leverage over Musharraf that he was under persistent pressure to negotiate with Bhutto. Reports reveal that US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had prevented an earlier declaration of Emergency. The air strike would have emboldened Musharraf to play his final card in his battle for survival, and adopt repressive measures in dealing with his critics.
A beleaguered Musharraf's decision to impose Emergency should be viewed from the perspective that he realized his political survival was at stake, not due to judicial activism, but the increasing resentment against him by the armed forces. The only factor which prevented Musharraf from imposing the Emergency earlier was the threat of the United States. American intervention has also strengthened rebel factions in his army; hence Musharraf chose to disregard western opinion. Judicial activism can be viewed as a slowdown for Musharraf, but losing military approval would have been the cause for the showdown.