The French novelist Victor Hugo once said that history repeats itself, first as a tragedy, then as a farce. The Pakistani governments from Ayub to Musharraf can be seen in this light, though it is hard to tell which phase constitutes tragedy and which one farce. President Pervez Musharraf has maintained Pakistan's perfect record of not allowing any government to complete its full term, including his own.

Pervez Musharraf, the man at the centre of this spectacle is one of the few who understand how the rules of the game have changed. The Jihadi and tribal Lashkars that he and his predecessors forged into convenient tools are now his most implacable enemies. India, the arch enemy is now irrevelant. It an irony that, while India and Pakistan play cricket, Islamabad is embroiled in internecine conflict.

The state's approach to insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, read Swat, suffers from two problems. The frontier is all but lost. And the failure ranges from military reverses to political and ideological loss. What is happening in Swat is a replay of what we have seen in Waziristan. The Swat district has witnessed over the last week violent battles between the military and local militants led by Maulana Fazlullah, with the latter having got the upper hand. The truce that was declared proved short-lived and the public execution of six military personnel by the militants has demonstrated the boldness with which a non-state entity is flexing its muscles against the Pakistani state. This is not an isolated incident. In early October, Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud, captured some 280 military personnel, and executed three in revenge for Musharraf's anti-terrorism policies.

US President George Bush is trying to walk a tightrope between criticizing Musharraf for setting back Pakistan's democratic transition and alienating a leader the administration considers crucial in the battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But it is a balancing act that also underscores the fact that Washington has few options. Musharraf's emergency decree has dealt an embarrassing blow to Bush, questioning his unstinting support for the Pakistani leader but his broader pro-democracy push in the Muslim world. Musharraf has fooled no one by his rhetoric, certainly not his own people, whose desire for democracy has so inconvenienced him.

It is unfortunate that the elitist stranglehold on power [not clear] should continue to defeat Musharraf's will, as do the narrow strategic concerns of the West. If Musharraf had the confidence to replay his 1999 coup and do a volte face on his much-publicised plans for a democratic vote, it is because he knows that he is indispensable to the West, whose fears about Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into rebel hands has made it turn a blind eye to the general's failings.

The US-led war on terror and its fallout in Pakistan has helped organise the Islamic militants, but the way they have been pursuing the establishment of fiefdoms in their appropriated territories is part of a bigger, political juggernaut. If the Islamist thrust is ignored from the militants' quest for power, the situation in areas controlled by them is reminiscent of the crisis faced by Pakistan's eastern command, stranded in East Pakistan, post-1971.

The timing of the totalitarian move - apparently guaranteeing the re-election of the 64-year-old Musharraf but shorn of any justification - implies that its US ally is bent on strengthening his power as president and army chief. More than anything else, he has sought to pre-empt a negative Supreme Court verdict on petitions challenging his candidacy for another presidential term. The jihadists are the prodigal sons of state mischief. They have returned to reclaim their lost territories, with compounded interest. It is time to smell the deadly brew they are offering the people in their respective areas of influence as the antidote to authorities high on absolute power.

Currently, there is dwindling support among soldiers and civilians for what is seen as 'America's war' in the tribal areas, waged by Musharraf as Washington's proxy. A government elected on a popular mandate would be better able to garner public support. Is democracy or dictatorship a better antidote for democracy? Some of the arguments Musharraf has put forward to justify his actions may be legitimate but he needs to eliminate the safe havens created by the militants in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. The general should remember that this emergency, no matter what the general's intentions, will further reduce his minimal popular support to confront the militancy.