Whither China's Democratic Transition?

31 Oct, 2007    ·   2406

Bhartendu Kumar Singh argues that the CCP continues to consolidate power instead of ushering in democracy


Just before the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), democrats all over the world expected some developments in the conclave to further the prospects of democracy in China. But the Party Congress has only brought them disappointment. Democratic reforms were not on the agenda nor were any official statements made in this regard. This suggests that China will not undergo democratic transition, at least in the near-term future.

It is indeed a paradox that, while China has placed itself among the front ranking economies of the world, earning laurels for its developmental model and poverty eradication programmes; politically, it is still a laggard. One-fifth of mankind is being denied the fruits of democracy. In a recent book, Capitalism without democracy (Cornell University Press, 2007), Keller S. Tsai has revealed that the gap between the economic empowerment and political expectations of the Chinese people is only widening. There are many symbolic parties, but the CCP enjoys a complete monopoly over power. As was amply evident during the Party Congress, the CCP is also the monopoly of some twenty five to thirty leaders. Despite talk about inner-party democracy, only those leaders have made it to top positions who swear by Hu Jintao's theory of 'scientific outlook on development' or were able to manipulate personal ties with power brokers within the party.

It is also unfortunate that, instead of looking for ways and means to usher democracy in China, the CCP has used the five-yearly Party Congress to consolidate its hold over power. The latest amendment to the Party Constitution to 'foster private sector' and 'allow freedom of religious beliefs' demonstrates how the CCP seeks to expand its support base to new constituencies. Currently, nearly three million of the Party's 73 million members belong to the private sector. Similarly, China is home to 100 million religious faithful, largely Buddhists, Taoists, Christians, and Muslims.

These members may not be sufficient to guarantee the CCP its monopoly over power and hold over 1.3 billion people. Rising inequality, widespread corruption, and social protests have complicated the Chinese political system, already characterized by political intolerance, human rights violations, guillotined media and an all powerful state. People are not satisfied with the 'band-aid' approach of marginal re-adjustments to shore up the existing social and political structures by co-opting and controlling society; they want a democratic form of government, which exists in over 120 countries.

The rising number of mobile phone and internet users means that the Chinese are able to connect with the virtual world, or what Marshal McLuhan has called the 'global village', and have access to information despite curbs by the Chinese state. The economic empowerment, proliferation of English language and increased mobility of the Chinese people to other parts of the world has only fuelled 'rising expectations' in the new generation. The 4th generation leadership led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao has continued with their repressive methods to curb democratic expectations, and the just concluded Party Congress has only provided them a mandate for another five years.

China's fascination with an authoritarian system does not augur well for international relations. Western leaders and scholars at loggerheads with China on the concept of 'democracy' have much to worry about. In other countries of East Asia, pursuing a developmental model akin to China, democracy was ushered in after reasonable levels of development were reached. This is not true of China. In fact, there is a rising debate - what if China does not democratise? Most conclusions are pessimistic. An authoritarian, aggressive and nationalist China will continue to support autocratic regimes in North Korea, Pakistan or Myanmar, apart from creating new sources of instability in international relations. Conversely, if China takes the democratic route, its relations with US, Japan and India will be more pacifist.

Where does China go from here? It is difficult to visualize a time frame in which China would acquire a democratic culture, though some scholars have placed a deadline of 2020. While people's democratic expectations would naturally rise, it is doubtful if the 4th generation leadership would do anything to assuage them. At best, they would support the current 'soft authoritarianism' model. The mantle may, therefore, fall on another generation of leadership that comes to power in another five years. They could have more incentives to bring in democratic procedures to meet the rising discontent in the people and ensure support for the CCP. We may therefore have to wait for the eighteenth Party Congress to see if China has a democratic future.

Note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the Indian Government.

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