Speaker:
Dr. William Maley
Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy

Opening Remarks: Amb Salman Haidar

A very warm welcome to Dr. Maley, who apart from his extensive knowledge on the topic of today's discussion is also very well versed with India-Australia relations. He travels often to Afghanistan and facilitates discussions that help in the formulation of policy.

Dr. William Maley

There has been a long engagement between India and Afghanistan. Recent developments in Afghanistan are indicative of problems that were easily discernable during the process of the Bonn Agreement itself. The challenges following the overthrow of the Taliban were not adequately addressed in the Bonn Agreement, although it was the best agreement obtainable at that point in time.

The wider context of Afghanistan's problem involves the disintegration of government and the collapse of the state. During the communist rule, denial of access to the countryside undercut the domestic funding of Afghanistan's economy, making it completely dependent on Soviet aid. The resistance forces that took over next inherited the symbols of the state, but not its substance. The battle for the capital city of Kabul stems from this attempt at de-legitimizing the new authority that has now taken over this symbol of power in Afghanistan.

There was also a fragmentation of the political elite. Ideological divergences led to major schisms between the radicals and those supportive of the return of the exiled king, Zahir Shah. Afghanistan also experienced massive social dislocation. Six million Afghans became refugees which is indicative of how very large numbers were extracted from their economic and social activities. This is what gave the Taliban a toehold; rather than being "village vandals", the Taliban were a pathogenic movement that led to a breakdown of Afghan society, which was potentially dangerous. There was also the destabilisation by neighbouring powers, most importantly Pakistan. In addition, the American toleration of the Pakistani policy of interference in Afghanistan had horrendous consequences in terms of its domestic ramifications for Pakistan.

Although some measures of the Bonn Agreement were met and the Loya Jirgas were held in 2002-2003, there were key limitations to the agreement. The first was the design of the political institutions, embedded in the constitutional process, which lay emphasis on the old structure of administration and brought back the problem of widespread nepotism. The second problem was that since the government was imprecisely defined and existed mostly only on paper, ferocious rivalries came about in the wake of foreign aid being injected into the Afghan economy. The third problem was that of the transition of justice. After decades of bloodshed, the norms of justice applied to Afghan didn't address the argument between the ethic of forgiveness and that of absolving criminals from the past. The fourth problem was that of security. There was no capacity to provide basic security for the ordinary people and there was no immediate solution to this problem, only the anticipation which in turn led to the demand for the deployment of the ISAF in the capital. This deployment was then blocked in provinces beyond Kabul due to the momentum of the transition process and other political factors.

President Karzai tried to identify potential spoilers to his authority and used the strategy of incorporation to discourage people from going the other way. This policy however had adverse long term consequences, for it damaged the state's reputation and squeezed out tribal leaderships. These leaderships had already been marginalized during the Taliban rule and this was multiplying under donor activities and the presence of international agencies. The under-resourcing of transition meant that the recipients of direct assistance ensured that reconstruction entailed far greater costs than what it would have been under the local Afghans. Showcase projects were completed rapidly, eventually leading to the demand that the government be responsible for the maintenance of rapidly depreciating assets.

Although President Karzai had a clear mandate in his election and some very notable skills, his political environment was one without a concept of a state, a system based on reliance-building, not state-building. The Bonn Agreement created a presidency too strong on paper and too exacting in the President being at the centre of a politics where he had to deal with political rivalries, apart from being overburdened. The clear electoral victory would have given him procedural legitimacy but only in a consolidated system of government, not in Afghanistan. The election process was heavily criticized for ethnically mobilising different blocs, leading to an erosion of legitimacy.

The campaign in Iraq also sucked out the resources out of the Afghanistan campaign. Afghanistan is not Iraq and needs better signaling as Afghan actors are more aware of what is going on. A political process, the complexities of which are not understood by the ordinary people, might dwindle in the future. There must be international pressure for a clean and competent administration. There is no substance in pressurising Pakistan intermittently. There is a fear in the US that pressurising the Musharraf regime will lead to its downfall and that it will be replaced by a fundamentalist government. There is no possibility to negotiate with the Taliban and no guarantee for deliverance on the ground. Instead, it is a mere spectacle that will affect the legitimacy of the present government and take away from the support to the coalition forces, in the perception that the Taliban might come back.

Discussion

Comments

• What were the reasons for not deploying beyond Kabul and what is the situation on the ground regarding counter-terrorism?

• Instead of relentless pressure on Pakistan, in the face of an army weakened by the situation in Balochistan, is there a possibility for increased dialogue between the NATO and Pakistan?

• What is India's role in Afghanistan vis-Ã