Defence cooperation today includes many dimensions such as the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment, transfer of technology, intelligence sharing and coordination for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, cooperation in jointly providing relief and succour after natural calamities, coordination in transnational anti-drug trafficking activities and the joint patrolling of sea lanes of communication against piracy and terrorism.

Though India has been a user of defence equipment produced in the US since the 1960s, the defence relationship had remained stagnant since the US had perceived India to be firmly in the Soviet camp during the Cold War. Enterprising defence initiatives like the 1984 MoU on technology transfer, 1987 Lindstrom report, 1991 Kickleighter proposals and 1995 Agreed Minute on Defence, driven largely by the US, kept military relations alive but lacked strategic underpinnings. During the 1990s India had differences with the US on various issues like the NPT and the CTBT. Just when India's relations with the US had begun to improve, the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 set back the relationship by several years. The Bush Administration for the first time was appreciative of India's potential as an emerging power in Asia and supported engagement in a genuine dialogue on cooperative security issues.

The US has always recognized Indian military expertise, both at the high and low end of the spectrum of conflict, especially India's excellence in high-altitude warfare, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. While the US military has been keen to improve interoperability, India has coveted US high technology and advanced weaponry. The two countries entered into a mutually beneficial strategic partnership during the tenure of the BJP-led NDA regime. This led to the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) under which several layers of sanctions on India were removed by the US. The US began to look beyond sales of defence equipment and expressed its readiness to discuss defence transformation with India, including in the areas of command and control and early warning. The US now sees India in a different light and the Framework Indo-US Defence Agreement signed on 28 June 2005 was on co-equal terms.

The new relationship is mutually beneficial both for India and for the US. The US has technology and hardware and India is a leading player in the knowledge economy and has demonstrated its soft power potential. The US now accepts that India has good information security SOPs and is capable of ensuring the 'security' of technology transferred to it. The US has realized that the lower cost of production in India, particularly of manufacturing sub-systems and components, will make the US products more cost-effective. Lower repair costs are also attractive. Factors that will sustain this relationship in the long-term are people-to-people contacts, industry-to-industry relations and a military-industrial partnership. The US is now more flexible in its approach to technology transfers. This does not imply that the US will cut short its export control procedures. The US officials have explained to India in great detail the various clearance processes that are mandated by US domestic laws and their efforts to expedite these processes.

Four new sub-groups are now working under the aegis of the Defence Policy Group (DPG) towards keeping up the momentum of the process:

• Military Co-operation Group: Army-to-Army, Navy-to-Navy, Air Force-to-Force discussion on exchange of personnel, joint exercises, training courses

• Defence Procurement and Production Group: Very strong forum to make the relationship sustainable. Issues: Co-production, joint development, supply relationship to leverage Indian capabilities for cost-effective production

• Joint Technical Group: This deals with defence R&D and cooperation in life sciences, aerospace, and simulators etc.

• Senior Technical Security Group: Exchanges on technical security

India and the US are working closely on maritime co-operation including joint commitment to the free flow of commerce, safety of maritime assets, search and rescue, marine pollution and natural disasters. The post-Tsunami disaster relief operations carried out by India were much appreciated in the US in terms of their strategic outreach. Indian concerns on the "reliability" of technology transfers have been openly expressed and the US is working to allay these concerns. The US and India have begun to share civil (narcotics and terrorism) and military intelligence. In future, India will work towards cooperation in joint R&D, joint production, more reliable supply arrangements and greater openness in transfer of technology.

The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will lead to the lifting of most of the remaining sanctions on dual-use technologies and India will at long last be rid of the draconian technology denial regime that it has been a victim of. This will result in the free flow of US defence technology to India and will considerably aid India's quest for self-reliance in weapons technology. Defence cooperation is not just about defence or nuclear energy; it is also about working together to maintain peace and stability in Asia. There should be no question of India's national interests ever being compromised or of India playing a subordinate role in the relationship.