India-Pakistan relations have been tense due to the conflict over Kashmir since Independence. Today their relations are marked by the efforts of both sides to settle differences and move beyond the Kashmir problem. It is important, however, to analyze whether the various steps taken by their governments are bearing fruit or both countries are still suspicious of each other's military moves. It is noteworthy that both countries are getting into a missile race despite having promoted various Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Both countries have agreed to provide prior notification of missile tests, which includes only ballistic missile tests, and not the tests of cruise missiles.

In spite of the pre-notification agreement, missile tests by one country are always followed by the other, almost in reply to each other. On 4 February 2007, India successfully tested a Brahmos cruise missile, which has a range of 200 km and can be launched from ships, submarines and aircrafts. In response, Pakistan tested its Hatf IV missile on 23 February, which has a range of 2,000 km and also the short-range Hatf II ballistic missile with a range of 200 km on 4 March. This was followed by India testing its Dhanush missile on 31 March which has a range of 250 km and the capacity to carry a single warhead of up to 750 kg with the declared purpose of studying the control and guidance system of the missile. On 12 April, India successfully tested its Agni III ballistic missile which has a range of 3,500 km. Pakistan believes that Agni III is more capable than any ballistic missiles with Pakistan and said it would therefore upgrade its Shaheen II missile. Another important point is that testing missiles having greater range and capability than those in the other's arsenal will remain an important goal for both countries. Therefore, despite trade agreements, confidence building measures and efforts to have a common gas pipeline, both countries will continue to build up their weapon systems.

This missile competition between India and Pakistan could be very dangerous, not just for the stability of both countries but also for the region. Their nuclear posture is premised on recessed deterrence, implying that warheads are stored separately from delivery systems. The missiles are placed on alert status only when there is likelihood of conflict, like when the Indian Parliament was attacked in 2001. The missiles of both the countries were moved nearer to the border and placed on alert. Many analysts have pointed out that this recessed deterrent posture is destabilizing, because nuclear weapons being placed in an active readiness state in short timeframes has the risk of accidents and misperceptions. However, nuclear weapons are vulnerable to attack in their recessed state.

There is also no early warning system, which raises the chances of accidental war. During the Cold War, the time taken by a missile to travel between the US and USSR was 25 minutes. Therefore, policy makers had little time to decide whether the missile launch was for real or not. In the case of India and Pakistan, a missile could travel from one country to the other in 3-5 minutes. Thus, in the Indo-Pak context, there is no time for policy makers to decide whether the attack is real or by accident, which could result in nuclear retaliation by the other party. A weak nuclear weapons command and control structure makes this situation very dangerous.

This issue is not limited to accidental war. During the Cold War the increase in missile strength (and capability) led countries to search for missile defence, thereby destabilizing the whole region. India has showed interest in getting missile defence systems from the US, Russia and Israel to neutralize Pakistani missiles. Pakistan responded by developing cruise missiles like Babur. On 25 August 2007 it tested the cruise missile 'Raad', which Pakistan claimed was difficult to detect. Even if India purchases a Patriot missile defence system, it would remain vulnerable to Shaheen missiles.

Both India and Pakistan are relying on missile-based nuclear deterrence, which would jeopardize all other measures to develop friendly relations and seek a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir problem. The conundrum will also bring China into the picture because India, China and Pakistan share common borders and India could find itself being threatened by both neighbours. Pakistan and China could also engage in nuclear buildups and strategic military cooperation; China, it must be remembered, has always helped Pakistan with its missile programs.

The solution to this missile race is not missile defence, but CBMs and arms control. It is imperative that India and Pakistan realize a missile race would be disadvantageous to both countries; hence there is need to stop this missile competition. China should stop helping Pakistan's missile development otherwise India would cooperate with the US ballistic missile defence program to counter both China and Pakistan.