Karbi Anglong: Theatre of Violence
14 Aug, 2007 · 2354
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman underlines the confluence of factors behind the recent burst of violence in the Karbi Anglong district
The recent upsurge of violence in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam has sent the entire government machinery and the security establishment into a tizzy. It is a logistical nightmare for the state government and the paramilitary forces, given the remoteness of the areas where this violence has erupted. At least 29 people have been killed in separate incidents of violence - all belonging to the Hindi-speaking community in the district - by suspected militants of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF). The Unified Command Structure in Assam, comprising the administration, police and the paramilitary forces, has failed to check terrorist activities in the region.
The geographical location of Karbi Anglong is of crucial significance for understanding the genesis of this recent increase in violence. Karbi Anglong is one of the largest districts in India in terms of territory and shares its district borders with the states of Nagaland and Meghalaya. Its extended neighbourhood includes Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Kaziranga National Park cuts through this district and most of the area has dense forest cover. This district, therefore, provides the most suitable area for militant organizations to operate in and from. The supply of arms and ammunition is also facilitated by the porous borders of nearby states and countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Policing in areas like Karbi Anglong has been largely ineffective due to its large tracts of dense forests and riverine nature. Also, there are very few police outposts in the district; in some places, the nearest police station is about 50kms away. The district headquarters in Diphu is also cut off from most of its remote areas. The Hindi-speaking people living in Karbi Anglong are scattered in as many as 80 clusters, which makes it virtually impossible for the paramilitary forces and police to provide them effective security at all times.
The vast and well-consolidated terrorist networks of the ULFA, KLNLF, NSCN (IM), and other militant outfits have been operating out of Karbi Anglong at will. The Karbi and Dimasa tribes in this district have been fighting for a long time for control over this territory, with the last major bout of violence occurring two years ago. This ethnic conflict has been fuelled by the Naga militant outfits to gain control over more land for their proposed Greater Nagalim state. They have been providing support to the Dimasa tribe against the Karbi tribe, which has resulted in a vicious cycle of violence in Karbi Anglong.
Another theory floating around about the recent attacks on Hindi-speaking people in Karbi Anglong is that they have been orchestrated and funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and other jihadi outfits within Bangladesh. Flushing out the Hindi-speaking population from this region would facilitate the influx and settling of illegal Bangladeshi migrants for labour-intensive jobs in the district, which have till now been controlled by the Hindi-speaking people.
The ULFA has also been targeting these migrants in Karbi Anglong along with other areas in Guwahati and around many districts of Upper and Lower Assam to drum up sympathy among the indigenous Assamese population as its popularity has been waning. It has long been accused of attacking mainstream Assamese-dominated areas, where many Assamese have been killed. The ULFA has also been seeking to expand its recruiting base beyond the predominantly rural areas to urban areas, banking on its anti-Hindi speaking migrants stand. The ULFA has had enough breathing space and time to regroup and bolster its network during the ceasefire announced by the state government over the last two years.
As regards the political dynamics of the Karbi Anglong region, the Assam government and the Unified Command have to face several challenges. They have to contain the violence and provide security to the Hindi-speaking people in the region. Further, they have to undertake effective policing in riverine and forested areas, and build an effective logistical network in the huge Karbi Anglong district. They also have to check terrorist activities and the arms and ammunition inflow from neighbouring states and countries. The ethnic conflict in Karbi Anglong has to be effectively countered; else it has the potential to spiral out of control and lead to a greater escalation of violence in the region.