On 22 June 2007, artillery shells and missiles were fired by the ISAF from Afghanistan striking residential compounds and a hotel in Mangrotai in North Waziristan. The attack killed 11 people including women and children and wounded 10 others. This appends one more incident of civilian killings in the tribal belt to be forgotten before the next. On 25 June, Musharraf expressed his satisfaction with the strategy to counter militancy and extremism in Pakistan. Is his statement apt given that more civilians are becoming targets of 'accidental' attacks by the NATO and ISAF in North Waziristan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP)? Also, would such attacks provide grounds for a formal entry of these forces inside Pakistan?

The ambiguity over coordination between Pakistan and the international forces persists in the tribal region plagued by increasing Talibanization. Undoubtedly, the ongoing 'war on terror' has increased the influence of the Taliban in the region. Both internal and external factors are responsible for Pakistan's inability to deal with the situation. First, the use of force in the war against non-state actors has proved unsuccessful. Even after six years, Pakistan has 80,000 troops deployed in the tribal belt and Afghanistan continues to demand more vigilance for containing cross border infiltration. US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, during his visit to Pakistan, mid-June, leveled accusation of militants regrouping along the Pak-Afghan border. While, this was not unexpected, such regrouping is impossible without Pakistan's support or atleast concurrence. Moreover, Pakistan's attempt to enter into political agreements with the local warlords and militants in the tribal belt has failed to yield positive results. At the same time statements from the US State Department such as, "Musharraf is an agent of positive change," expose its overdependence on his regime and the lack of other options.

Second, the repeated failure of the government to bring the tribal belt to the economic, social and political mainstream has left the region underdeveloped and vulnerable to Taliban influence. The Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has been in power in the NWFP but its failure to improve the state of affairs does not generate optimism for any advances even if it retains control after the next election. The Lal Masjid's Jamia Hafsa students' trace their pedigree to the tribal belt and their ongoing 'moral policing' programme in Islamabad has put severe pressure on the government already confronting the judicial crisis and anti-Musharraf sentiments. The inability of Musharraf to use force against them or reach a consensual agreement with them indicate both his ineptness and fear of antagonizing the religious extremists.

Third, the unease expressed over claiming responsibility for the attacks in the region by the US and Pakistan has created an agonizing situation with the Pakistani government losing its credibility with every event. The blast in Dattakhel in North Waziristan on 19 June killed 32 people including students of a seminary. The residents maintained that three missiles were fired from the Afghan border while intelligence officials claimed that a US drone carried out the attack. However, the NATO spokesperson claimed that nothing was fired! Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad, Director-General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), claimed that a bomb being made by militants had exploded accidentally. Pakistan's spokesmen have always tried to cover up attacks launched from across the border explaining them as attempts to execute militants. Accordingly, these varied accounts sideline the real issue of taking action against these strikes targeting innocent victims.

After the attack Gen. Musharraf addressed a 'grand' tribal jirga in Peshawar and called upon tribesmen to stop cross-border movement of unwanted elements causing unrest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the success of the jirga has been limited. Most ministers from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) boycotted it in protest against the federal government's policy of not consulting them on important issues.

Another major cause of concern is Musharraf's tolerance and inaction towards the NATO forces allowing them to utilize Pakistani air space. On 19 June NATO military planes violated Pakistan's airspace in Parachinar for approximately 45 minutes. If this 'mutually agreed settlement' on cross border attacks continues, could it encourage the ISAF to set up bases in the tribal belt of Pakistan? The answer is in the negative. There is mounting anti-Musharraf sentiment and displeasure against the US-led war in Afghanistan in most parts of the country. Pakistani society, currently on the streets in favour of democratic rule, could prove a stumbling bloc to such actions.

In this scenario, Musharraf has to balance his policy in the tribal belt with his struggle to survive in uniform and as the President of Pakistan. He has to maintain his dual role as an ally of the US in its war on terror and yet depict himself as the leader of a 'stable' Pakistan. Upcoming political events will determine how far the US can pressure Pakistan to take actions against its national interests and the level of its government resistance to these pressures. Indisputably, it will be harmful for Pakistan's integrity to allow NATO to pursue militants inside Pakistan. The tribal areas need to be calmed through dialogue, economic development and integration to prevent the rising tide of Talibanisation. Else, the increasing 'accidental' civilian killings in the region could open another front of domestic confrontation for a government that is gradually losing control over its territory.