India-Taiwan Relations: In Delicate Minuet

27 Jun, 2007    ·   2322

Jabin T Jacob evaluates recent developments in India's relations with Taiwan


Another visa issue, another China, only this time it is the Republic of China (ROC) instead of the People's Republic of China (PRC). India's two recent brushes with the Taiwanese - the denial of visas to Indian sportspersons from the state of Sikkim and the visit of Taiwanese opposition party Guomindang (KMT) candidate for the Island's 2008 presidential elections, Ma Ying-jeou - appear on the surface to be a case of misunderstanding in the first instance and in the second, of trying to rile the PRC.

To take the visa issue, first, two Indian archers were denied visas because they looked "like ethnic Chinese or Tibetans." While the matter was eventually cleared up and the visas issued, considering the fact that it was an official Indian body that made the visa application, it is difficult to believe that the visa denial was simply a mistake or that it was part of a genuine Taiwanese worry about the influx of illegal Chinese into the island. What then? The answer might lie in the timing of the event - Ma Ying-jeou was in New Delhi during the same period.

The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that heads the current government in Taiwan and the KMT have diametrically opposite views on the issue of the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Also, the KMT's increasing closeness with Beijing angered the pro-independence camp on the island that seeks to renounce all links with the ROC's one-China policy. The visa denial was perhaps the DPP's subtle reminder to India - coming soon after New Delhi's spat last month with the PRC over the denial of a visa to an Indian citizen from Arunachal - of the KMT's antecedents. When the ROC government under the KMT fled the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, it did not mean that the ROC had given up its territorial claims - Sikkim is not one of its claims, true, but Arunachal is.

Coming to the Ma visit and its implications, it was clear that the he came with a very clear economic agenda - the stated aim for several years now, has been to combine India's software prowess with Taiwan's computer hardware and communication technology expertise. In addition, there are other areas of potential cooperation such as agriculture and infrastructure development where the Taiwanese experience could prove extremely valuable for India. But, those who believe (particularly in India) that Taiwanese investors will target India primarily as a way of protecting themselves from overexposure in China are mistaken. First, Taiwanese investment in China has been driven by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) based heavily on shared cultural and family links. For the same reason, these SMEs are unlikely to be interested in India in the near term. Second, owing to the unique political situation, both small and large Taiwanese enterprises in China receive special treatment and patronage from both central and provincial government authorities in the mainland - something India cannot replicate. Without an active Indian involvement at the level of cultural exchange, including the development of Chinese language skills, India cannot hope to attract substantial Taiwanese investment.

In political terms, the view that India was courting a Taiwanese leader simply to spite China is too simplistic. With the KMT improving its links to Beijing over the last couple of years and given that India has, in the past, reportedly denied visas to DPP leaders, Ma's 'unofficial' visit to India appears to hint actually, at a continued Indian deference to Chinese sensitivities. However, to weave economics back into the argument, two points need to be remembered. One, China is not opposed to any country developing economic links with Taiwan, and two, the taishang (Taiwanese businessmen in China) have over time, developed considerable political leverage on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The majority of the taishang are for maintaining the current status quo and have successfully restrained the DPP from pushing too far ahead with its independence plank. Meanwhile, increased contact with China has also helped reinforce, for many Taiwanese, their differences from mainland Chinese, a factor that has compelled the KMT, too, to take a more 'Taiwan, first' agenda with respect to reunification. Ma and many younger KMT leaders are believed to support such a position within the party.

India could thus, be taking a more nuanced position on Taiwan - keeping its focus on economics while simultaneously keeping tabs on both the island's politics and the PRC's positions. While Ma met two government ministers and other Indian politicians and delivered an address at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), this could be construed as a gentle testing of the waters by India as a prelude to visits by DPP leaders next, who perhaps, would not be given the same 'high honours.' Given India's distance in the Taiwanese imagination, developing economic ties using the visits of politicians - both the KMT and DPP have extensive ties with Taiwanese big businesses - is not such a bad idea.

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