While there is enough evidence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (especially the al Quds Force) providing logistical and other support to Iraq's Shia militias, there is inadequate evidence linking Tehran to the bolstered Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Many Bush administration officials admit they have yet to find concrete evidence that weapons shipments have the explicit endorsement of the highest levels of Iran's government. The administration's admission is significant for it leaves room for the possibility that drug smugglers or other criminal networks, and not the Iranian government, are behind the weapons flows into Afghanistan.

It is widely accepted that Afghan drug lords have been able to penetrate the long and porous Iranian border with ease. Officials and analysts alike agree they have undoubtedly been involved in buying arms in Iran with their drug proceeds for both themselves and the Taliban, who protect their drug routes. It was in this context that US Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently issued relatively strong denials of Iranian involvement. According to Gates, "We do not have any information about whether the government of Iran is supporting this, is behind it, or whether it's smuggling, or exactly what is behind it" (Reuters, 4 June 2007). The comment was further buttressed by General Dan McNeil, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, who seemed to suggest the possible role of private organizations/drug lords in the alleged arms smuggling. The General opined, "When you say weapons [are] being provided by Iran, that would suggest there is some formal entity involved in getting these weapons here... That's not my view at all" (Reuters, 5 June 2007).

Bush administration officials, however, continue to vacillate with their claims and opinions. Admittedly, this is a result of ambiguity arising from a dearth of evidence incriminating Iran. Barely a week after Defense Secretary Gates issued the above denial, he contended that the sheer quantity of weapons flowing into Afghanistan suggest the shipments are taking place with the knowledge of the government in Tehran.

The question that inevitably arises at this juncture is: What possible gains does Tehran envisage by playing both sides? The prospect of Iran, a Shia country, directly aiding the Sunni Taliban is particularly worrying to US officials, because it would demonstrate that Iran is ignoring sectarian considerations in order to undermine American efforts in the region. Many analysts argue that Iran is content to see a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan keep NATO busy. Keeping US and NATO forces occupied in a war of attrition against Taliban insurgents eases American pressure on the Iranian regime for its perceived anti-Western policies. The longer the Americans are engaged in Afghanistan, the more likely they are to concede to Tehran's demands in exchange for cooperation/support. If the above were indeed the case, one may safely assume the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to be playing the role of spoiler.

However, it is not in Iran's long-term interest to see Al Qaeda, or the Taliban, gain strategic ground in the on-going war. The reasons for this are several. First, when the Soviet-backed Afghan regime in Kabul was being toppled, Iran had predicted that a strong Sunni fundamentalist regime in Kabul would come into conflict with Shia Iran. Sure enough, the Sunni Taliban was vehemently anti-Iran with seven Iranian diplomats serving in Mazar-e-Sharif killed by the Taliban in August 1998. The ouster of the Taliban by the Coalition forces was therefore a direct gain for Iran. No longer does a hostile Sunni regime flank Iran's eastern border. Today, Iran feels far more secure with a pro-Iranian government in Kabul. Consequently, the continued security and stability of Afghanistan is of concern to Tehran. Second, Iran has lent NATO forces tacit support for the war in Afghanistan by carrying out reconstruction projects of various types and dimensions in Afghanistan, pouring in vast amounts of aid money. Iranian Foreign Ministry officials place the total amount of aid to Afghanistan since 2001 at approximately US$600 million. These projects have led to strengthened inter-state relations. Deliberately undermining this strategic partnership (by supporting the anti-Iranian Taliban) would be futile. Third, inter-state trade is a major component of the emerging strategic cooperation between Tehran and Kabul. Afghan cities offer an outlet for many Iranian goods, the sale of which has helped provinces such as Herat generate handsome revenues. Currently, Afghanistan receives key imports such as electronic equipment, cars and spare parts, food, clothing and other essentials from Iran. Fourth, Shias comprise fifteen percent of the Afghan populace and Iran enjoys close contacts with the community. If anything, Iran would like to see Shias receive/enjoy fair dispensation in all aspects of Afghan life, be it political, religious or economic. By supporting the Taliban insurgency, Iran would not only be jeopardizing the aspirations (and security) of the Shia community, but also risk losing their goodwill.

Given the above arguments, it is difficult to believe Tehran is playing a hedging game of simultaneously cooperating with both the Karzai administration and Taliban elements and waiting to see who comes out on top. This view is lent credence by Afghan Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, who recently touted Afghanistan's close relationship with Iran saying, "... throughout, we have had good relations with Iran and we believe that the security and stability of Afghanistan are also in the interests of Iran." (Daily Times, 15 June 2007)