Despite international relief at the release of Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, it was widely recognized that the mechanics of the deal set a poor example and could encourage further kidnappings. What has been not been recognized is that the case actually represented a significant new development which will unquestionably lead to a new and effective tactic of insurgency.

From an Italian point of view, the immediate reasoning behind the deal was understandable and not entirely unprecedented. In fact, it is an open secret that in 2004 and 2005, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi paid large cash ransoms in exchange for the release of at least three hostages in Iraq. Moreover, the transactions broadly coincided with upcoming general elections and broad political and public opposition to Italian involvement in Iraq. Similarly, in November 2006, Italian freelance photographer Gabriele Torsello was released by his Taliban captors in exchange for US$2 million.

The abduction of Mastrogiacomo occurred at a particularly awkward moment for Romano Prodi's frail coalition government which had already lost one vote of confidence over Italy's engagement in Afghanistan. Despite this history, however, the Mastrogiacomo incident marks a watershed and is notable in three important ways.

First, in place of a monetary ransom, the Italian journalist was only allowed to return home to Italy after the reciprocal release of five imprisoned insurgents. The trade represented the first instance of Taliban prisoners being openly exchanged for a hostage since the US-led invasion of 2001. Indeed, the logic behind exchanging five insurgents for one foreign journalist was immediately called into question when one of the released, Taliban spokesman Ustad Yasir, was quoted on the internet stating that he was "grabbing two rifles to begin jihad again to hunt down invaders and fight non-believers."

Second, by freeing five prisoners, it was the Afghan, rather than the Italian, government that effectively compromised in order to conclude the bargain. Many figures in the Afghan government actively sought to obstruct such action. President Karzai in particular was seen to be directly involved in trying to save the life of a foreigner, but was perceived to have refused to make a similar sacrifice in order to protect two Afghans in an identical situation. Immediately after the deal, a 150 people protested outside the Italian-run hospital in Lashkar Gah accusing the government of double standards.

Third, the murder of Mastrogiacomo's two Afghan colleagues, Sayed Agha and Ajmal Naqshbandi, represented a definite tactical move by Taliban leaders to weaken public faith in the Afghan government, and more specifically Karzai. In particular, the killing of the journalist Ajmal, occurring as it did immediately after details of the trade to save his Italian colleague were revealed to the country, was intended as an opportunistic and successfully visceral reminder to ordinary citizens of the unequal treatment of different nationalities. Their deaths seriously damaged the government's standing and made Karzai appear more concerned with appeasing foreign governments than with protecting his fellow citizens.

A spokesman for the Afghan president told reporters in Kabul that the blunder was an "exceptional measure taken because we value our relations and friendship with Italy." Unfortunately, because of the three factors described above, this "exceptional measure" has handed a new tactic to any insurgents intent on weakening the central government's credibility.

Three Afghans and two French nationals have subsequently been kidnapped in Nimroz. In an internet statement on 20 April, their captors issued demands similar to the Italian ransom, calling for French NATO troops to withdraw and for imprisoned rebels to be freed. However, it is the combination of foreign and Afghan abductees that is especially significant. According to the Mastrogiacomo paradigm, the best case scenario for the Taliban would see another exchange of prisoners for the two French hostages followed by the gruesome execution of remaining three. The recent release of one of the French captives, apparently without any ransom, is ominous. For even if the Karzai government holds firm in the face of French pressure and refuses to deal with the hostage-takers, it is likely that the remaining Frenchman will be set free at the expense of his unfortunate Afghan colleagues. Whatever happens, and especially if one or more of the hostages is videotaped being killed, the growing preponderance of abductions will begin to enter the security calculations of reconstruction workers and journalists in the country and may deter certain humanitarian organizations from continuing in the country - another key aim of the insurgent movement.

Admittedly this particular line of attack does represent a slightly risky approach for the Taliban, mainly because the murder of innocent Afghan citizens will also negatively impact on public support for insurgent action. The careful targeting of Taliban-claimed suicide bombings which, unlike Iraq, concentrate on military and foreign targets rather than civilians, demonstrates the sensitivity of the movement to public opinion. They too are struggling to win the hearts and minds of the populace. Nevertheless, the calculation by insurgent strategists is likely to be that the negative impact on the government will be far greater, creating a perception of incompetence and double-standards.

Thus, even if NATO does manage to formulate a common policy on dealing with such situations, the Italian fiasco may have unleashed a new insurgent strategy that will continue to hold the Afghan government hostage in the coming months.