CPAPD Delegation:
Mme. Cao Xiaobing, Advisor
Mr. Hou Hongyu, Director of Research
Jiang Ling, Assistant Research Fellow

Opening Remarks
Maj Gen (Retd.) Dipankar Banerjee

The discussion over issues of nuclear disarmament in international organisations such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva or the United Nations has been extremely limited with the international community being unable to come to grips with the situation. Various difficult questions, revolving around issues of weaponization of space, nuclear disarmament as a universal goal, and nuclear weapons policies need to be addressed by both India and China while putting forward the agenda of nuclear disarmament.

Dilemmas Facing Nuclear Disarmament

The current US practice of developing and further advancing its nuclear arsenal would force China to further modernise its nuclear weapons and likely fuel an arms race. The issue of disarmament, which India has been committed to, actually reflects the unequal nature of world politics. After the 1998 nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament has not remained India's topmost priority because the existing inequality does not pinch any longer. Similarly, China remained an ardent advocate of disarmament until it became a member of the P-5.

Sino-Indian Cooperation in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

During the last ten years, no new arms-control treaty has come up and the existing arms control regimes are either being abrogated as in the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or emasculated as is the case with the Biological Weapons Convention. Given this scenario, what can India and China, representing two-fifth of world population, do together to try and improve the existing situation?

The issue of WMD proliferation or non-proliferation has been largely dominated by the discussion over nuclear non-proliferation, setting aside other issues of equal concern, such as biological weapons and chemical weapons. What are the reasons for this nuclear-centric dialogue?

Though, traditional arms-control disarmament steps have remained highly state-centric, it is now a phase where states are neither targets nor actors. Therefore, the focus has shifted towards rogue states or non-state actors. Given this situation, verification is being replaced by interdiction, state-based multilateral organizations are being replaced by concert of power situations, a situation with which both India and China are uncomfortable. What vision do Chinese intellectuals have, which can lead to tranquillity? What type of mandate or membership does CPAPD have in China?

National Interests, Nuclear Disarmament and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

There is a possibility that in the ongoing Conference on Disarmament, where the FMCT is being discussed, the P-5 will agree to an acceptable text since four of them have declared an official moratorium on fissile material and China has done it unofficially. Will there be any Chinese opposition to the American draft of FMCT? Is China pushing PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space) or has it agreed to go ahead with the FMCT? Is there any research being conducted by the CPAPD on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)? What stand does China take on the bench-mark of FMCT? Is China planning any Outer Space Treaty and will such a treaty come within the P-5 framework? Can India and China engage bilaterally in dialogue on the issue of disarmament?

India's Priorities in International Disarmament and Arms Control

India's main concern has been to prevent terrorists getting possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, non-proliferation is very high on India's agenda. Though India fully agrees to and adheres to the objectives of the treaties, it has difficulties in entering into any legal commitment based on a treaty which it sees as unequal and discriminatory.

Promoting Sino-India Strategic Cooperation

The major obstacle to Sino-Indian cooperation on nuclear disarmament is their mutual ignorance and lack of political trust. Both countries need to develop their expertise on each other.

The present institutional set up has limitations and cannot be pushed beyond a point. There is a dire need for countries like India and China to be innovative and define the agenda of non- proliferation the way they want it rather than pushing the agenda laid down by the big powers. This way they would be able to address the mushrooming threats from non-state actors.

Responses from the Chinese Delegation

• China opposes the weaponization of space. There is an increased arms race in outer space. Though there is a treaty structure, there is an urgent need to conclude a new treaty. There is talk of a 'code of conduct' for outer space activities which could certainly improve transparency.

• The present stalemate in the negotiating process of disarmament is fairly dangerous, since the existing treaties are continuously being violated. Countries have taken positions based on their national perspectives on security which hinders the process of negotiations. To come up with consensus is very difficult due to preconditions and issues related to their security concerns.

• The fundamental difference between the US policy of armament and that of China is that the latter does not seek hegemony but only minimum deterrence. The US programme of developing the Nuclear Missile Defence System has forced China to modernise its arms programme in order to maintain the survivability of its forces.

• The issue of the nuclear programme of Iran has created a complicated situation for China, given the dual-use nature of nuclear plants. Iran had previously declared that its nuclear programme is mainly for civilian purposes, but recent statements indicate its military objectives. China has been persuading Iran to implement UN Security Council resolution and believes the Iran nuclear issue should be resolved through diplomatic and peaceful means.

• There is already a convention on chemical and biological weapons, whereas there is no convention on nuclear weapons and therefore, there is a need to focus more on creating just such an agreement on nuclear weapons. The proposed US draft on FMCT maintains that every country has to use its own national means to verify other countries' FMCT programmes. This in effect means that the US can verify the programmes of other nations but others can not verify the US programme, given the limited technology available to others.

• While China does not wish to join the PSI, it does agree with the aims and objectives of PSI since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a challenge not only to the US but also to China. Terrorists can use these technologies to harm any country.

• The US, since 2004, has imposed many sanctions on Chinese and Indian companies which have reportedly transported sensitive technologies, especially on ballistic missiles to countries like Iran. Various sets of laws and regulations have been adopted and several ministries of the Chinese government are working together to oversee the illegal transportation of sensitive technologies. In fact, the Ministry of Commerce has hired more than 40 experts to evaluate the sensitive nature of items.

• With regard to any provision for a future treaty on outer space, China can work together with India. However, the US position is that there is no deployment of armament in space and existing international laws are enough and, therefore, there is no need for any treaty.

Concluding Remarks

A ten point agenda for disarmament has been put in place at Geneva. There is consensus on the agenda but not on the implementation aspect of it. However, a balanced approach is required to counter any possibility of the use of WMDs by terrorists. Also, a consensus on fissile material control must be adopted to move the process forward. There has to be a check on both vertical and horizontal proliferation and both, India and China have important roles to play in this regard. A substantial dialogue is however, required for this purpose.

An effective approach towards countering weaponization of outer space needs to be developed. Since the weaponization of space has further complicated non-proliferation efforts, an agreement in this regard needs to be concluded at the earliest.