During the past few weeks in Jammu and Kashmir, there has been an increased emphasis on demilitarization and withdrawal of troops. General Musharraf had put forth this proposal to India with the objective of resolving the conflict in Kashmir. The political parties based in the Valley, especially the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the separatists led by the Hurriyat, have also been advocating the same. In early March 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a categorical statement rejecting it.

What are the perceptions on the ground? Following is an interview with Mr. MM Khajooria (MK), former Director General of Police.

IPCS: How do you see the demilitarization proposal? Why is there a sudden upsurge?
MM Khajooria: The demilitarization proposal was initiated by Gen Musharraf. He indicated two areas in particular -Baramulla and Kupwara districts. Both these districts abut PoK and have been the traditional infiltration routes for the militants. When he initiated this proposal, militancy was on the decline; new recruits from J&K were difficult to obtain. Besides, the militant groups were in disarray. Obviously, Musharraf was buying time in order to give time to the militants in PoK to regroup and continue their jihad in Kashmir.

IPCS: Does the ground situation warrant demilitarization?
MM Khajooria: Have the terrorist network in Pakistan and PoK been dismantled or weakened? What exactly are the capabilities of the militants to inflict damage on security forces and innocent people in J&K? What is Pakistan up to?

Any impartial analysis of the ground situation in PoK and J&K will reveal that the terrorists have the capability and fire power to take on the security forces at any time. The initiative to accelerate or slow down violence is in their hands. Their infrastructure is intact. In fact, it has been updated.

Hence the kind of demilitarization that Pakistan is talking about is not an option for India. However, all militarization obviously aims at demilitarization at some time or the other. Militarization by the State is actually a response and reaction to a change in the ground situation. Once that ground situation is restored, it will pave the way for demilitarization. The Indian forces cannot be deployed forever.

Before 1988, there was no deployment of Union forces in any civilian areas. Deployment was in response to the violence by non-State actors. Once the situation reverts to the original condition, the troops are bound to be shifted out.

IPCS: How do you see the demand within J&K for demilitarization?
MM Khajooria: Those demanding demilitarization within J&K should seriously work towards the collapse of terrorist network in the region. Every group today is attempting to gain attention by populist slogans. If occupation of schools, orchards and local buildings by the security forces are the issue, this issue should be discussed with the concerned forces and the department of revenue.

In this context, psychological warfare against militants and their supporters is important. Pakistan and the militant organizations have excelled in it. The sex scandal and encounter killings have been blown out of all proportions to paint the government and security forces in a bad light. By being defensive, the government and security forces could not achieve much. Suddenly one sees encounter killings and issues of human rights being linked to demilitarization.

If a section is claiming that the situation warrants demilitarization, then the following questions should be asked. What is the extent of improvement at the ground level? Who should certify the same? It should be kept in mind that the security forces and administration are constantly reviewing the situation at the ground level. They are better situated to comment on this issue.

IPCS: Is the J&K Police better placed to address the situation now? Can the police forces be increased, slowly leading to the withdrawal of Union security forces?
MM Khajooria: What is important is the nature of the strategy employed to address militancy at the ground level. It does not matter whether it is handled by the military, Rashtriya Rifles, CRPF or local police. What matters is the level of training, quality of officers and the strategy pursued. It is unfortunate that the Indian State, despite almost sixty years of experience, has failed to evolve a comprehensive strategy.

Militancy cannot be fought by conventional means. The strategy should be reoriented and based on hunting them, instead of defending the people and establishment against militants. Dominating the heights at night should be an essential ingredient of this policy. The local population should be made a part of this anti-militancy strategy. Unfortunately, none of the anti-militancy units have developed a strategy to fight an unconventional war. Merely increasing Police battalions will not solve the problem at the ground level. Increasing the number of police will only increase the reach of the State; to fight militancy, a specialized unit is essential.