An analysis of events in Pakistan during 2006 establishes that it was a year of violence, though, paradoxically, 2006 proved to be in general a more successful year for Gen. Musharraf.

2006 witnessed violence in every possible spectrum - separatist in Balochistan, jihadi in Waziristan with clear cross border implications, and sectarian in Sind, Northern Areas and even in the FATA. Violence in Waziristan took the most lives; the victims included local tribesmen, who were killed in the crossfire and also targeted by Taliban and their supporters in the region. Though a peace agreement was signed in October 2006 between the political administration and the local tribesmen (read local Taliban), targeted killings continued in the name of 'punishing' 'American spies' and even pro-government tribesmen. Security forces also suffered significant casualties as a result of encounters, militant ambushes and suicide attacks. The last was used as a successful strategy vis-à-vis the security forces; for example the suicide attack in Dargai in FATA in a militant camp alone led to more than 40 casualties in November 2006. Finally, local militants - those who support the Taliban - also suffered in counter-militancy operations. According to government reports in one attack on a madrassa in Bajaur in October, more than 80 militants were killed.

Compared to 2005, violence in Balochistan, was a lot lesser in 2006. Though militant attacks continued throughout the year, the targets were soft, random and sporadic. In most cases, the militant attacks were aimed at blowing gas pipelines, railway tracks and pylons. Explosions and not encounters formed the main strategy used by the militants in Balochistan. The security forces however, continued their excesses in an attempt to crush the separatist movement - both political and militant. This was evident from the killing of Akbar Bugti by bombing the cave in which he was hiding.

Sectarian violence continued all over Pakistan in 2006. Two sectarian incidents are worth mentioning - the Nishtar Park carnage and the killing of Allama Hasan Turabi. In April 2006, more than 60 people were killed in a suicide attack in Nishtar Park, where the Sunni Tehreek, a Barelvi organization was holding an event. The entire leadership of the Sunni Tehreek was wiped out. Though the Shia groups were immediately blamed, later reports indicated possible involvement of other Sunni organizations including the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. In July 2006, Allama Hasan Turabi, a prominent Shia leader was killed in Karachi, again in a suicide attack. Suicide attacks are now increasingly being used to settle sectarian scores, Pakistan suffering maximum casualties from suicide attacks in the region in 2006.

However, for Gen. Musharraf himself, 2006 was not a bad year. If he were to rate his performance in 2006, he certainly could pat himself for the relative successes in Balochistan and a resurgent economy. Balochistan is unlikely to pose as serious a problem in 2007 as it has been for the last three years. The killing of Akbar Bugti illustrates this point. Contrary to expectations, Bugti's killing evoked neither a political backlash nor militant violence. Clearly, the insurgency in Balochistan is waning. Despite the enormous wreckage caused by the earthquake in October 2005, Pakistan's economy performed better, thanks to foreign direct investment, which was over $3 billion in 2006. Also, for the third consecutive year, the growth rate remained at six percent.

Second, on the political side, there was no credible opposition to Gen. Musharraf in 2006. His popularity and the support for his policies may be waning, but no other leader or party is gaining at the cost of Musharraf's declining image either. This is an important point that should be noted and underlined while analyzing Musharraf's support. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif has been able to capitalize so far on Musharraf's declining popularity. Unfortunately, their joint meeting in London in mid-2006 and the subsequent Charter for Democracy raised interest but they were unable to sustain it. The reason is quite simple - national politics in Pakistan cannot be directed from London by either Sharif or Bhutto or even both together. Altaf Hussain could do it for the MQM in Karachi, but not the other two at the national level. The Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) existed only in paper and in occasional press briefings.

The Mutahida Majlis Amal (MMA), the alliance of regional parties, failed at both the national and provincial levels. The MMA could not capitalize on any of the following - American attacks in Bajaur, Musharraf's pro-US policies vis-à-vis Taliban and Afghanistan, military action in FATA and Balochistan including the killing of Akbar Bugti, and finally the Women Protection Bill. While the MMA promised political opposition to all these issues, it failed to launch any credible movement. Either the MMA has been over estimated in terms of its political strength or is internally weakening or both. Certainly, this should be good news for Gen. Musharraf, who is to face Presidential elections in 2007.

To conclude, 2006 may have been bad for Pakistan, but certainly not for Gen. Musharraf. His popularity may have declined; but no one has gained from it either.