Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

India has border disputes with almost all its neighbors (Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar) but none of these have led to major wars. However, China's border disputes have led to wars with India, Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 1962, 1969 and 1979 respectively. China has however, also been active in the 1960s and later in the 1990s in border dispute resolution.

China's basis for the resolution of border disputes

China has based its resolution of border disputes on the concept of nation-states with territorial limits rather than of civilization states and has been critical of the western unequal treaties which were signed in the 19th century.

A key feature of China's border resolution has been its flexible attitude towards smaller countries. This could be because of the US role (especially in the SEATO) in trying to attract smaller countries to its fold.

China has preferred waiting for the right moment for border resolution waiting till its comprehensive national strength is substantially larger than the opposite party. In this context, Zhou-en-Lai's announcement in 1956 that demarcated the 12 nautical miles limits for exclusive sovereign territory and the 1992 National People's Congress resolution extending the territorial limits to about 200 nautical miles are significant. The 1990s saw was a spurt in activities aimed at resolving territorial disputes taking advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

China's policy frameworks towards border dispute resolution

China believes in recognizing, revising, abrogating, renegotiating border disputes left over from history and in opposing unequal treaties. It advocates solving current border disputes through peaceful negotiation based on justice and reasonableness. In terms of application to different territories, suzerainty was rejected vis-a-vis Tibet, the one-country-two-system initially enunciated for Taiwan was applied to Macau and Hong-Kong and the One-China principle that binds China has been stressed with respect to other diplomatic partners across the border. China's strategic objective is one of creating friendly neighbors to promote a favorable security environment. The strategic objective of solving border dispute with India is to create a favorable security environment to facilitate the rise of China.

In cases where border disputes could not be resolved, the Confidence Building Measure (CBM) approach for joint development and mutual benefit was resorted to, with demilitarization being one of the concepts.

How has China solved its border disputes?

China has followed the principle of mutual accommodation and mutual benefits (MAMB) of joint development for economic benefits.

• Central Asia: In the post-Soviet Union era, border disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan were solved or reduced following the mutual understanding concept.

• Soviet Russia: In the case of Russia, China had been critical of the czarist expansion into far-east and imposition of unequal treaties. The disputed area has been reduced, a treaty has been signed and ratified and a CBM approach is being followed for the minor disputed area.

• Vietnam: China has a 1300km border with Vietnam. The Vietnamese were willing to solve the border dispute on the basis of Sino-French conventions. A deadline was set and the dispute was solved.

• Pakistan: The China-Pakistan engagement has been more of a balance of power equation. The 1962 war acted as a catalyst in solving border problems leading to an all weather relationship. The Shaksgam valley was transferred to China and recent reports indicate that the Chinese actual line of control has been extended to about 60,000sq km in the western sector (including the 5,180 km of Saksgam valley, 38,000 of Aksai Chin and further Chinese incursions).

• India: With the Indian parliament resolution in 1994 to include the POK areas in their claims, the Chinese position has also changed slightly. The Indian PM's stated commitment to recover the Shaksgam valley led to hardening of the Chinese stand and after exchanging maps of the Middle sector there has been no progress in the process till date. However, from June 2003 China agreed that it had only 14 land neighbors instead of the earlier claim of 15 (the claim on Sikkim was dropped and its accession to India was recognized).

• Nepal: The tri-junction still remains a contentious issue between India, China and Nepal. China has transferred 900 km out of 956 km of disputed area to Nepal reflecting the aforementioned flexible attitude with smaller neighbors.

• Bhutan: There was a border disputes in three areas amounting to nearly 1000 km. 17 rounds of talks have taken place and the disputed area has been reduced to 269 km.

• Burma: The Burmese border problem involving some 2000 km was solved using the mutual understanding principle at a time when the Burmese were discussing plans to enter the SEATO. The Chinese apparently fast forwarded the dispute settlement negotiations though the Diphu pass dispute still remains to be solved
  
  India and China

Nehru was insistent that there was no dispute since China had recognized roughly the McMohan line with respect to the Burmese. There was also a possibility that China could recognize the McMohan line in lieu of Aksai-Chin being recognized as a part of China. Border talks took place thrice but nothing substantial came of them. After the war, however, the Indian Parliament passed a resolution that every inch of land lost in 1962 was to be recovered. The next major step came when in the 1980s the AICC passed a resolution calling for give and take on the border issue. One of the options has been the swapping of territory. The issue is examined sector by sector and package deals are being explored and discussed.

There are currently 14 areas under dispute - eight in the Western sector and six in the Eastern sector. In the Middle sector the disputes have more or less been solved though there is a fear on the Indian side that Chinese would have advantageous artillery deployment positions. Moreover, the last two years has seen increased Chinese patrolling in Chumar which is not a disputed area. The Chinese also now identify the eastern sector as the most important disputed area a shift from their position of several decades ago. There has also been a change in China's position from solving the border dispute "immediately" when talks began to "ultimately" in 1982-83, stating that it was a complicated issue and would be solved by the next generation.

There is a difference between approaches of both the countries towards resolving border dispute. India proposes a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution which is more legalistic. Chinese insists on mutual accommodation and mutual adjustment (MUMA) which is more political in its approach.

There is a long rough route ahead for border talks. In the last twenty five years there have been eight discussions, 15 Joint Working Groups, 15 expert groups meetings and eight special representatives meetings. It was in the backdrop of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that the talks were started in 1980s. Now in the post 9/11 period, the increased American role in Asia and in part, the Indo-US nuclear-deal will cause China to engage increasingly with India on the border issue. A possible proposal would be the setting up of demilitarized zones and creating some kind of security guarantees for both China and India. The two countries already have the Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and the CBM Agreement of 1996. Border personnel meetings take place almost every month, including discussions on violations and courtesy calls. While these CBMs were supposed to lead to withdrawal of troops and India has withdrawn large numbers, there is no sign of any substantial withdrawal on the Chinese side. The 1998 nuclear tests, in fact, triggered transgressions especially in the western sector.

Conclusions

There has been lot of inconsistency on both the sides. Claims remain more or less unilateral in nature. There have been steps towards border domination by both sides and more so by China (through the militarization of Tibet) and China is in a more advantageous position owing to its efforts in this regard.

It is now increasingly stressed that people have to be educated on both sides about the compromises that would be necessary. On the Indian side, the views and expectations of the people of Ladakh, Kashmir and Arunachal have also to be taken into account.

The dispute has to be solved as soon as possible. In a strategically dynamic situation when there is an asymmetry in power equation, the dominant power would have imposed its point of view on the solution.

Finally, despite the $20 billion trade, the relationship is largely a sterile one. If the border dispute is not solved, there cannot be any forward movement.

Discussion

Prof. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea

It must be clear that we are here talking about a boundary settlement. We have not yet started talking about the border with China. If we are equating the border with the LAC, it means that India has given up claims it made in 1958 and 1959. We are not discussing the border what we are discussing is the boundary and that too in terms of the LAC. The question of solving the issue "now" is about accepting a broad line of division between China and India. The devil is in the details. It took the Chinese about ten years to get the details sorted out with Russia and the Central Asian republics. So we cannot settle the border "now" but we settle a boundary in 2003, but unfortunately we seemed to have moved backwards since then. The settlement of the border is a totally different issue.

On the territorial state, if we put the question of territory in the context contemporary post-colonial era, how do India and China redefine themselves as modern states? The one characteristic feature of all post-colonial states was their territoriality - the only thing that confirmed their statehood. The reach of their territorial limits showed which colonial power they had won their freedom from. There was no other basis for the territorial limits they claimed.

A part of the territorial problem between China and India arises from different approaches to what should constitute the state and whether territorial limits are important or not important. The Indian problem has been that it has been casual about the significance of firm territorial borders while the Chinese have not. This leads to a dangerous doctrine which espouses that in this globalizing world we do not need firm borders that we can live without fixed borders. That confuses the two things: we must have fixed borders and then open them up. Only subsequently can we convert a divisive border into an inclusive entity.

The Zhou Enlai visit in 1960 had come up with an offer for swapping territories - for India to accept Chinese claims in Aksai Chin in return for China accepting Indian claims in Arunachal. Now that the Chinese have shifted their focus to saying that the eastern sector is the most important, what is the possibility of agreement on an LAC?

The Indian approach on the border is not at all economical. Delhi has never thought of the dividends to its border regions from a settlement of the issue. It is inevitable that the LAC must eventually become the border as neither country is in a position to wage war. This is where the nuclear deterrent must be considered seriously.

Not doing anything is also a possible solution. It has to be noted that the relationship has progressed despite the border dispute. So what is wrong with the status quo?

The Chinese negotiating position has hardened over the years and the longer the delay, the harder the position gets. India need not expect any magnanimity on this score. The Indian military still views China as the principal threat. No one can afford to be sanguine about the Chinese.

India's disputes with its neighbours are not major disputes involving substantial landmass, except in the case of Kashmir.

Why has the process of clarification of the LAC been stopped?

By not solving the border dispute, the issue can be used as a causus belli in the future.

The issue of nuclear preparedness is important. India has to have a credible minimum nuclear deterrent.

From a border issue, the whole dispute threatens to turn into a territorial issue and this is dangerous.

First, we lay a claim or define it in words. Are we defining or delimiting the LAC, right now? The IB based on the letters exchanged in 1958 and 1959 need to be explained as claimed areas by India.

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

The current effort is to clarify the LAC but how is the LAC to be defined, delimited or demarcated? MacMohan talked of demarcation and delimitation of territories in the 1914 Simla conference. The current effort is only about exchanging maps, finding out what are the respective claims, and then on to LAC clarification. The Indian side has stated that the situation as of September 1959 is the international border (IB) and the LAC was imposed only after the 1962 war.

There are also other aspects like the extension of the LAC. On the ground, even the ITBP does not patrol these areas. The difference from the IB to the LAC and thence onwards to the AGPL is approximately 60,000 sq. km. The difference in the western sector at the ground level can be seen in the difference between Old Demchok and New Demchok. There is roughly a distance of a kilometer.

Comments

• Indian forces cannot be physically present on every inch of ground and therefore to say that Chinese have claimed more land over time may be incorrect. Old Demchok was never on the Indian side of the LAC. Moreover, the Indian forces do not recognize a difference between Old Demchok and New Demchok.

• What is the difference between the LAC and AGPL?

• We have vast areas of claims but that is now becoming more and more theoretical. It is not how much either side claims but how much territory they occupy that matters. It is likely that the settlement will finally be made depending on the LAC. Since the LAC also has variations, India has sought to get the Chinese to state their claims on a map. Thus, maps were exchanged on what the Chinese claim is the easiest sector - the middle sector - following which they were supposed to give maps on the western and the eastern sectors. How much therefore, is the actual disputed territory between the two LACs?

• We will not know the answer to this question unless the Chinese first tell us their claims. The problem is whether or not there is actually an expansion of territories under Chinese occupation.

• The fact of the matter is that certain areas on the LAC are accepted as being disputed while on other areas, one side or the other refuses to accept that there is a dispute. Meanwhile, the pattern of Chinese activity remains the same.

• The LAC clarification was put on the backburner following the beginning of the Special Representative talks. However, the clarification of the LAC has not been dropped. The Chinese had only asked for going from the easy to the more difficult. It was expected that as we moved from the easier to more difficult areas, things would take more time.

• To the question of whether there is a lack of political will, it must be remembered that it was the same government that asked for LAC clarification being speeded up that also started the SR talks. These are two parallel processes and not coming at the cost of one another.

• Is the list of transgressions based on the claimed IB, the LAC, or the AGPL? And how are transgressions defined? What is the nature of these transgressions? Transgressions too are disputed.

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

Transgressions can be both intentional and unintentional and several of the former have occurred in high-altitude areas. For example, in the Pangong Tso lake area, China used to occupy only three high peaks out of four, now it also occupies the fourth, Point 6995. However, transgressions occur on both sides.What happened during the June 2003 visit of Vajpayee was that an Indian patrol that had strayed into the Chinese side was set upon by the Chinese army at Asafi La. Why had CBMs not functioned in this particular case? Some of these intentional transgressions can lead to future conflict. This had already happened in December 2000 when Indian and Chinese troops came eyeball-to-eyeball in Daulat Beg Oldi, even though there was no live firing.

China has called for normalization first and a border resolution later. India has a reverse set of priorities. However, India has adopted the Chinese formula with respect to Pakistan.The General Staff Department in China obviously has contingency plans of attack against Indian cities. All militaries around the world adopt such plans within their capabilities.For India to graduate from a minimum nuclear deterrent to a limited deterrent would take time and money, involving perhaps a doubling of the Indian defence budget.

When the Agni-III is finally ready for deployment, it is likely that the Chinese will come down to the table for negotiations and there is likely to be further progress on the border dispute. There is a correlation between the military deployment and the progress of border talks.Regional initiatives such as the Kunming Initiative cannot take off unless the border dispute is solved. So also the question of the FTA - after all where will customs posts be based?


Comments

There has been a policy of unofficial demilitarization in the border areas allowing for dialogue mechanisms to work. Where one side had real objections to an intrusion, then the embassy was served with a note verbale. Only such incidents can be counted as transgressions. Such transgressions have been infrequent. We should not exaggerate incidents on the border as there is a mechanism on the ground to deal with such situations.

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

Figures for transgressions occurred at the ground level and it is not necessary that these transgressions are always reported all the way up to the highest level. However, the frequency of incidents does not mean that Sino-Indian relations are currently affected in any substantial way.

Prof. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea

We must not forget the politics of the border issue and get too involved in little details. What sort of relationship is India looking for with China? How can we look at this relationship as a source of mutual advantage? What are India's expectations from this relationship?

The devil is in the detail and since not all have the same information, the issue must be dealt with carefully. We need to adopt a problem-solving approach. India has to look at other Chinese border agreements and see how these disputes have been solved. Both sides need to be move beyond a territory for territory approach and consider the interests of the peoples involved. The principle question therefore, is India's larger strategic vision with respect to its relations with China.