The recent statement by the External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherji that China has actually 'endorsed' the Indo-US Nuclear Deal shows that President Hu Jintao's visit to India was not 'a passing visit' as mentioned in some press circles. Those familiar with the finer tenets of Chinese foreign policy will vouch that the Chinese do not believe in making sweeping changes in their foreign policy. Probably for the same reason, the Chinese chose to maintain a diplomatic stillness during Hu's visit. However, the Chinese reaction to the deal has been muted from the beginning and in all likelihood China will let this deal pass the litmus test in the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG).

The nuclear deal is just one example of the positive outcome of Sino-Indian engagement on numerous issues during Hu's visit. Since Rajiv Gandhi's historic initiative in 1988, every visit by the top leadership of the two countries has yielded in the setting up of new milestones in Sino- Indian relations and helped in what is aptly called graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT). This visit was no different, more so, since it was only the second visit to India by any Chinese president. The timing was appropriate since it also marked the high tide of "Sino-Indian Year of Friendship". A number of commitments have been made last year when the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was in India and Hu was here mainly to consolidate those gains.

The highlight of the visit was the 'ten point strategy' embodied in the Joint Declaration. It is indeed a 'road map' for comprehensive development of bilateral relations. Some of the decisions may be repetitions but they show the resolve of the two countries to promote the diversification of bilateral relations as an irreversible trend. New targets have been set in the filed of science and technology, cultural and people to people exchanges between the two countries. Bilateral trade and economic relations are anyway beneficiaries of Hu's visit.

The border issue remains the sore point. For the first time, China suggested acceleration of border talks and seeking an early settlement of outstanding issues. All these years, China had suggested patience on the border issue while advocating gradual improvement in other aspects of bilateral relations. Just before Hu's visit, Chinese officials released a barrage of statements claming Arunachal as part of China. Indian strategists need to further probe and discuss Chinese intentions in raising the ante over Arunachal just before Hu's visit. Perhaps the Chinese are playing game in the border talks in order to strengthen their bargaining position, particularly with reference to Tawang tract of Arunachal.

An emerging issue between the two countries could be the proposed diversion of Brahmaputra River. As the news leaked from the Chinese media on the eve of the visit, the Chinese Envoy to India Sun Yuxi didn't reject such apprehensions; he only said 'no formal proposal stands as of now'. Given that a large part of China is water deficit and the Chinese are surging ahead with their South-to-North Water Transfer Project, the diversion of Brahmaputra waters could add another 460 bcm to the Chinese water grid. Hu's visit saw the agreement on an expert level dialogue mechanism to discuss issues regarding trans border rivers. India is already receiving valuable hydrological data from China in respect of Brahmaputra and Sutlej, now extended to Parlung Zangpo and the Lohit. It is only pertinent that India should use this dialogue to seek official clarification on China's diversion plans and undertake all preventive safeguards due to a lower riparian state.

President Hu, during his visit, spoke highly of Sino-Indian relations as having a 'regional and global potential'. The fodder is there: regional maritime security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, illegal trafficking in arms, narcotics and people, and environmental degradation. India and China get to discuss these issues on various bilateral and multilateral platforms and indeed they have been discussed. However, Sino-Indian partnership cannot be achieved unless China walks a step ahead and gives due credit to India as a great power capable of sustaining a truly multipolar world order. China was reluctant to let India become a member of the East Asian Summit held last December. Similarly, China is not willing to help India get its rightful place as a permanent member in the UN Security Council. Chinese containment game against India continues, albeit in a discreet manner.

Hu's visit, as some sections of the media commented, has made India and China as 'partners' in the global balance of power game. Such painful misconstruction of relations and their romanticisation should be avoided. The two countries are great powers with legitimate aspirations and a fair amount of competition and rivalry is natural. Many bilateral issues remain to be resolved, the border being the most important. Hu's visit has shown that both countries are willing to continue the engagement game without being overtly rivals or partners.