Bajaur Attack: Musharraf's Preempts; Militants' React
23 Nov, 2006 · 2154
Priyashee Andley examines whether the missile attack was the only solution and the ramifications of the attack for Pakistan-US relations.
On 30 October 2006, the day the government was expected to sign a peace agreement with militants in Bajaur similar to the one signed in North Waziristan, missiles were fired on a madrassa in Damadola village in Bajaur agency. Later government reports claimed that the religious seminary was used as a training camp for terrorists. Why did Pakistan use military force when it was close to signing an agreement? Was a missile strike the only solution - given the law and order situation in the area? Has the attack effected Pakistan-US relations?
Contrary to military claims, the outraged local population of the Agency claimed that the 82 persons killed in the attack were not militants but innocent civilians. According to them, it was not Pakistan's Army but the US that carried out the attack. The subsequent backlash was strong as the government failed to justify its military action and motive. Attempts to keep the media out of Bajaur while disallowing the Sindh Assembly from debating the issue has raised questions about the evidence and identity of the victims.
Bajaur Agency is a part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), bordering the Afghan province of Kunar, a stronghold of the Wahabi Arab warriors of Osama bin Laden. Extremist groups including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami (HI) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), Jama'atul Mujahideen, Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) have deep roots in the area. This is one reason for exercising skepticism on the claims made by political and religious groups regarding the absence of any terrorist activity in the madrassa.
When the army launched the attack in Bajaur, it intended to prove that Pakistan need not "do more" to cooperate with its NATO allies to root out terror. The use of brutal force in Bajaur aimed to get rid of US and NATO skepticism and reservations on the efficacy of the deal with tribal leaders in Waziristan. For Pakistan, the Waziristan deal served two interests. First, it curbed Pushtun nationalism and second, it sustained ties with the Taliban if it came back to power in Afghanistan. However, the deal served as a license to the Taliban to freely operate in the area. There were no provisions to ensure that foreigners (Taliban militants) vacated the region. Moreover, NATO forces claimed that attacks against them had increased. Hence, another peace deal with Bajaur or Khyber could provide a safe haven for the Taliban and Al Qaida in the FATA.
The latest suicide bombing on 8 November, that killed more than 40 Pakistani soldiers in the Dargai region, has further added a new dimension to the conflict. It has increased the anxiety among the tribesmen over Musharraf's actions often dictated by the US. Dargai is considered a stronghold of the outlawed Islamic group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi, whose leader, Faqir Mohammed, is considered to be a close associate of al-Zawahri. The Dargai bombing was undoubtedly a response by the militants' to the Bajaur strike, clearly indicating the new trend: The militants are willing to take on the State, if it comes in their way or attempts to prevent them from pursuing their objectives. Can Pakistan's military regime manage its dual responsibility of fighting the war on terror while protecting its own territory from religious extremists against the US's war?
Pakistan's dilemma on internal and external security in the post 9/11 period, is clearly visible. It is essential for Pakistan to sustain ties with the US for regional security and economic development. On one hand, it is a major recipient of American economic aid worth billions of dollars for logistical support in the war on terror. On the other hand, Pakistan does not have the might to take on the coalition forces in Afghanistan if it acts against their interest. Both the denial of American or NATO forces launching the missile attack in Bajaur or, a confession by Pakistani forces for the same indicates a failure in Pakistan's policy in and on its borderland.
The manner of conducting a preemptive attack in Bajaur, the justification given by the government and alleged militant counter-response, has the potential to challenge Musharaff's regime and alienate its tribal population. Recent developments in Balochistan, Waziristan and Bajaur, indicate Pakistan's security dilemma and the current lack of options.